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9I. Goals of the paper
This paper wishes to present the shifts of  the inner emphasis of  the 
Hungarian legal system since 2010. Within the framework of  this the 
paper it briefly wishes to deal with – among others – the transformation 
of  the legal system from the natural law’s approach, thus with the new 
tendencies of  the legal approach that focuses on underlying values 
and interests (for example the particular tools of  the expansion of  the 
governmental capacity) instead of  specific expectations that can be 
transformed directly into actions that are formed in the rules. Besides 
the new phenomena that appear as possible advantages – not separable 
from them – certain regularities and possible consequences of  the “over 
accelerated” national law development that overload all norm systems 
of  the society will be presented – through Hungarian examples. 
Nevertheless this paper does not wish to present a complete overview 
of  the Hungarian legal system; it primarily wishes to present the objective 
social-political processes, legal institutions, legal practice and changes that 
took place in legal thinking that are considered the most severe nowadays 
and can be listed as the possible defining elements of  the near future. 
I will not review the near past and the present of  the Hungarian legal 
system from the approach of  the constraint of  globalisation trends, 
EU expectations and objective outside effects, I’d rather focus on the 
inner features significantly defined by the attitude, role consciousness, 
self-image and goals of  the legislator and law enforcer that stand before 
us as legal and public politics that can be well captured and described 
through legal instruments as well. 
The questions that are related to the lawmaking of  the past more than 
two years are partly of  content, inquisitive about the specific solutions 
of  certain regulations; and partly examine the aspect of  lawmaking 
meaning that they refer to the correspondence of  the establishment of  
law to aspects defined in and beyond law. 
Legal texts are in every case imprints of  the social media in which 
they were created and one of  their goals is to influence the world in 
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which they were made. So consequently these groups of  texts serve as 
important sources of  information not only in the circle of  social history 
reconstruction that aim at the judgement of  the past, but they could 
have a significant role in research about the present’s governmental 
structure and moreover about governmental and legal capacity. Not only 
itemised provisions should be considered as “legal texts”, but also the 
circumstances they were created in and the documents that set social 
afterlife of  the created rules. 
It is evident that legal texts are never simple mapping of  reality.1 If  
someone tried to reconstruct the social relations of  today’s Hungary 
from the Fundamental Law and other legislations in force the picture 
would be quite false. Therefore if  we examine the state of  the legal 
system and of  the wider legal system, three equally important fields are 
presented that should be processed at the same time: 
a) the process of  the creation of  the legal instruments (the correspondence 
of  this process to preliminary expectations, defined regulations, its 
social surroundings and embeddings), 
b) the content of  individual and normative decisions, the characteristic 
features of  the single institutions, and 
c) the actual application, operation and “rate of  utilisation” of  the 
abovementioned. 
One of  the difficulties of  the examination is that the possibilities hidden 
in the legal system can only be defined by applying excessively complex 
approaches and methods at the same time (see subchapter II.2). I wish 
to emphasise that my work undertakes the categorisation of  only some 
of  the aspects – that I found important in the circle of  the evaluation 
of  today’s governmental and narrowly taken legal capacities – and the 
presentation of  certain facts (examples) that can be related to these given 
aspects, the actual evaluation – including comparative examinations – is 
only performed at the most necessary degree. 
The weak point of  every similar analysis (that undertakes the mapping 
of  current processes) is the question of  political, more precisely direct 
1 Kessler, rainer: Az ókori Izráel társadalma. Történeti bevezetés. [Society of  ancient 
Israel. Historical introduction.] Kálvin Kiadó, Budapest, 2011. p. 42. 
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party political overtones and crosstalk. Facing this problem rationally is 
also unavoidable because the dilemma that whether the government, the 
power structure that does not necessarily respect the rules of  legislation 
created by itself  is capable of  renewing the moral foundation of  the 
society in a radical – or revolutionary – way comes up again and again in 
connection with the Hungarian political and legal system in the political 
argumentation between 2010-2012. 
There are two distinct possible answers to the recent suggestion, 
based on the partly political, partly scientific (?) debates of  the past years: 
a) The first can be communicated through a classic statement: saying that a bad/
sick tree cannot have good/healthy fruit, and no exemption can be given 
for systematically neglecting the existing legal regulations; at the same 
time the representatives of  the standpoint believe that a political 
philosophy built around breaking the rules cannot result in the 
formation of  social cooperation manifested in real compromise and 
the persistent moral renovation of  the society in a positive direction. 
b) Compared to this aspect those that consider the legislation of  the past 
two years appropriate or at least necessary argue that total and 
postponed transformation of  the big care systems is the absolute 
merit of  the legislation after 2010 and also – in tight connection 
with the former – it started the legal elimination of  the many false 
social consensus that morally made difficult the social, economic 
and cultural construction and the survival of  the lively tissue of  the 
society. Those that argue this way generally try to illustrate lawmaking 
as a primarily instrumental, basically quantitative question, saying that 
lawmaking forced and really accelerated by external circumstances 
(like the financial crisis) and internal capabilities (like state debt, 
the heavy inheritance of  the past, the moral sinking of  the society, 
etc.) necessarily comes with “some” mistakes as well. And it is 
also important – the representatives of  this aspect say – that the 
feature and number of  these mistakes cannot serve as a reason 
for someone to doubt the whole legal system or the higher moral 
status of  the political course, assuming that newly created content 
of  these regulation systems coming from real social needs can be 
justified morally. 
Introduction
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I do not wish to take sides in this rather important and unavoidable 
question within the frames of  this paper: instead of  open and simplifying 
resolution, I perform the process of  my topic in a way that besides 
concept definitions and the presentation of  applied methods (Chapter 
II), on the one hand I briefly list the traditional features and problems 
of  Hungarian public politics (Chapter III); on the other hand I describe 
the aspects and institutions and draw up the tendencies of  change based 
on which the value of  the transformation processes of  the past two 
years can be measured better. 
When I mention the elements of  the legal system in my work, the 
circle of  these include – broadly, beyond various legal institutions – 
certain elements of  the so-called legal system, like questions related to 
the lawyers’ layer (Chapter VII). 
I. Goals of the paper
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II. prelImInary facts, defInItIon of concepts 
and methods 
1. Introduction
A political and legal transformation took place in Hungary in 1989-90, 
that basically can be described as a democratic change of  the system. 
However the fast transition from state socialism to capitalism left many 
social questions unsolved, – that have been present and documented 
in the 1980s – and generated new difficulties in the level of  the social 
system. So the slightly controlled and forced pace privatisation that 
covered every sector, the radical change of  consumer habits, the stormy 
acceleration of  social differences and tensions (e.g.: the visible break 
off  of  Roma people) and the existence of  untouched big and wasteful 
care systems led to the institution of  ill-considered borrowing that was 
not appropriated to production becoming (one of) the main tools of  
individual and common “prosperity”. Briefly this can be summarised 
that the “price”, some sort of  political and financial cost of  bloodless, 
peaceful transition was the total absence of  breaking up with the past 
(its institutions, prominent people, way of  thinking, “organised reaction 
attitude”, ongoing practices). The particular symptom of  this system 
change – that was partial from a legal aspect, too – was the survival 
of  the Constitution2 in 1989 – approved in 1949 at the beginning of  
Communism – totally changed in content but with unchanged structure 
and number.3 
2 Constitution is the Constitution of  the Hungarian Republic (Act XX of  1949) 
modified with Act XXXI of  1989 that was in force until 31 December 2011, while 
from now on the expression Fundamental Law refers to the Fundamental Law of  
Hungary that entered into force on 1 January 2012 
3 The constitution declared on 23 October 1989 in honour of  the revolution 
of  1956 (as it was stated in the preamble) was destined to be temporary. The 
acceptance of  the new constitution was considered to be the task of  the Parliament 
that was formulated as a result of  the free elections. However, the constitution 
that was considered temporary remained lasting, the new constitution was not 
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In order to understand this study and the phenomenon presented 
in the coming chapters, it is important to know, why it was/could have 
been the most important political goal for the conservative (FIDESZ 
– KDNP) government that rose to power in 2010 to finish the system 
change through a “revolution” “taking place in the polling booths” 
that provides appropriate authority though its sweeping and massive 
nature for the transformation of  the whole legal system as well. As it is 
known, FIDESZ-KDNP won at the national election of  spring 2010 
with a sweeping rate bigger than 2/3 that was followed by the deep 
transformation of  the whole legal system in a short period of  time. 
It is impossible to overemphasise the importance of  this circumstance: 
the 2/3 majority – as I referred to it before – is a lucky opportunity for 
the implementation of  long postponed (more than 30 years in Hungary) 
structural reforms that affect the big care systems, but at the same time 
it can be a base for legal voluntarism and exercise of  power that adapt 
to formal consultation processes only. 
2. Possible ways of  capturing the problem. Question of  the 
method 
My presumption, that the authentic examination appropriate for 
further analysis needs a method that applies some sort of  inter- or 
multidisciplinarity; meaning that in the examined topic it is worth creating 
such strong academic and material frame from other social studies 
like political science, public administration, Christian social ethics and 
economic ethics (!) in which and compared to which the legal science 
arguments in the narrow sense and text level examinations can earn 
their real place and value. 
A priori in order to create a dialogue between law and other forms of  
knowledge a strongly interdisciplinary starting point is necessary.4 Today 
created; “continuous constitution making” became characteristic instead. The 
Parliament modified the constitution 25 times in the 20 years passed between 
1990 and 2010. Among the modifications we may find small-scale and minor ones 
and others that may be considered partial revision. 
4 sherwin, richard: Intersections of  Law and Culture. [A cross-disciplinary 
II. prelImInary facts, defInItIon of concepts and methods 
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this means more than using the methods of  sociology or discussion 
analysis to our help for the better understanding and overview of  
legal processes. Much rather the need for opening towards other new 
(science) fields that had none or only some connection with legal studies 
(cultural anthropology,5 theology,6 religion studies,7 social psychology, 
etc.). Moreover, today the relation of  these cannot even be restricted to 
“mutual introduction” on the level of  generalities, rather the creation of  
such previously constructed interdisciplinary procedures and connecting 
coherent and systematic methods is necessary, that are able to provide 
the stable frames of  substantive comparative analyses/researches and at 
the same time they are committed to necessary flexibility and openness 
as well.8
Gyula Gulyás – approaching the question from his own professional 
field – writes the followings: “Multidisciplinarity requires breaking up 
with the method of  one sided political analysis of  institutions and 
structures: the examinations in this direction have to be complemented 
with the theoretic and methodical possibilities provided by sociology, 
economic science and legal science. We have to consider the requirement 
conference hosted by the Department of  Comparative Literary and Cultural 
Studies, Franklin College Switzerland, Lugano, October 2, 2009.]
5 See details e.g. Freeman, michael - napier, david (editor.): Law and 
Anthropology. Current Legal Issues Volume 12, London, 2009. p 47. 
6 According to the most popular approach, theology is not more than a back and 
forth movement between two endpoints where the two endpoints are the eternal 
truth and the momentary situation in which the eternal truth has to be discovered. 
E.g. Tillich, paul: Systematic Theology. Reason and Revelation, Being and God, 
1/1951. p. 3. 
7 If  a religious study is a synthetic and according to the nature a describing study, 
the main goal of  which is to take into account the religious phenomena; then 
besides the sectoral professional sciences traditionally classified in this circle, the 
involvement of  characteristic methods and presumptions of  legal theory and 
branches of  legal science that rely on positive law in the analysis possibilities of  
certain dimensions of  religious reality may seem possible and necessary, especially 
if  it has an effect on law itself. 
8 roThchild, JonaThan: Law, Religion, and Culture: The Function of  System 
in Niklas Luhmann and Kathryn Tanner. Journal of  Law and Religion (2008-2009), 
Vol. XXIV., p. 476. 
2. Possible ways of capturing the problem. Question of the method
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of  ‘relevance’ on problem orientation and problem solving, meaning 
that the science of  public politics has to aim at the possible solutions of  
the real world, the making of  public politics and it has to turn its back 
on such sterile academic debates like the interpretation of  the classics 
of  theoretic politics or the criteria system of  good politics. According 
to Lasswell, the ‘strong criteria’ of  normativity particularly requires that 
the science of  public politics has to break up with the false pretence of  
’academic objectivity’ and it openly has to admit that in the analysis of  
governmental actions, it is impossible for a researcher to separate the 
goals and the tools, and the values and techniques.”9
Nowadays it can be observed that the examination of  the legal 
system is often simplified solely into a constitution based evaluation of  a 
constitutional aspect.10 Even if  we chose this – otherwise understandable 
– starting point11, it can be stated that “The examination of  [The] 
constitution as a norm category, needs the validation of  a complex system 
of  aspects considering its creation, modification (change), its subject, 
effect and its individual features”.12 One of  the reasons for this is that 
“Constitution making is an act with legal and political features at the 
same time. The decision whether a new constitution is needed is made 
outside the system of  law. The question of  the main directions of  a 
new constitution (e.g. Form of  government, mechanism of  protecting 
9 Gulyás, Gyula: A közpolitika paradoxonai. [Paradoxes of  public policy.] PhD 
disszertáció. (Doctoral dissertation.) Budapest, 2002. /kézirat/ p. 69. 
10 And – approaching the question in another way – we may experience that 
the examination of  certain fields of  social phenomenon (that are examined in 
this paper), seems to be “kept” for the sciences of  constitutional law and legal 
sociology.
11 “The constitution is the origin of  a legal system, it is the benchmark that 
helps the judgement of  every other laws. That is why it is very hard for a 
constitutional lawyer to judge a new constitution and the process of  constitution 
making – as that benchmark is the subject of  examination that can be used as 
a measure in other cases.” csinK, lóránT – Fröhlich, Johanna: Egy alkotmány 
margójára. Alkotmányelméleti és értelmezési kérdések az Alaptörvényről. [On the margins 
of  a constitution. Constitutional theory and interpretation questions about the 
Fundamental Law.] Gondolat Kiadó, Budapest, 2012. p. 13. [hereinafter referred 
to as csinK – Fröhlich (2012a)]
12 csinK – Fröhlich (2012a) p. 16. 
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basic rights, etc.) also does not belong to the territory of  law. These 
decisions have to be made by politics”.13 One certain constitution always 
contains at least two types of  group of  norm as well: one group of  
positive legal norms and another of  political norms. A constitutional 
law (as professional law) analysis is absolutely necessary, but it can never 
be satisfactory if  it does not cover the introduction of  the nature of  
political norms.14 Broadly: the material problem of  constitution making 
cannot be dealt with solely from the aspect of  law or legal science either; 
only the sum of  views and aspects of  many professional studies can 
create the catalogue of  questions and the pile of  answers that allow the 
substantial performance of  the task.15 
2.1. Beyond multi and interdisciplinarity: the new aspect of  social studies 
Modernity came with the introduction of  new explanatory principles 
in political philosophy as well. The majority of  authors discussing good 
government and the order of  social coexistence also explained “the human 
phenomenon” based on the ontological and epistemological presumptions 
of  the Cartesian-Newtonian world view, that was dominant in the new 
age social sciences for a long time and all other approaches were declared 
irrational: the individual was considered to be the implicit starting point 
and atomic unit of  social examinations.16 One way or another the raison 
d’etre of  political institutions was deduced from authority given by and/
or the natural endeavours attributed to the individuals. The historical 
heritage and the „blind” forces of  nature were taken into account as 
the obstacles to overcome of  the smooth evolution of  the individual. 
13 csinK – Fröhlich (2012a) p. 13.
14 sziGeTi, péTer: Társadalomkutatás – mi végre? Politikatudomány – Alkotmányjog – 
Világrendszerelmélet. [Social research – for what? Political science – Constitutional 
Law – World system theory.] Publicationes Jaurinenses op. 9. Széchenyi István 
Egyetem, Győr, 2011. p. 53. [hereinafter referred to as sziGeTi (2011)]
15 Ibid.
16 lányi, andrás: Az ökológia mint politikai filozófia. [Ecology as political 
philosophy.] Politikatudományi Szemle 1/2012. p. 105. 
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The main political goal became emancipation, the liberation of  the 
individual from these bounds, the main tool of  which is purely rational 
power.17
Today’s canon demands the society’s researchers to clearly distinguish 
statements that contain facts or value judgements. The „academic majority” 
is tends to admit only the former to be rationally manageable, meaning 
to be real.18 The global expansion of  rational institutions matured further 
huge changes by the end of  the 20th century, for as much as in the 
[complex] operation of  „power of  knowledge” embodied in networks, 
techniques and formalised relations (e.g. law, market, information 
technology) became more and more uncontrollable and distressing.19
It can be stated that social sciences are increasingly forced to start to 
also examine the underlying meaning of  things and the broader logical 
framework of  examined phenomenon more deeply besides or instead 
of  descriptive questions that are inquisitive about operation. In era of  
crisis, when everyday experience confutes our previous expectations, 
legal and political theory is radicalised as well: it has to examine and 
rethink the validity of  its presumptions that were considered stable. 
“This way philosophising will gain civil rights again, as it is harder and 
harder to exclude such questions from political theory discussion that has 
needs of  describing professional science and is averse to philosophical 
questioning that are not related to the method of  the operation, but to 
its sense (meaning the frames of  interpretation). 20
 The attention of  legal science, besides others, also turns more and 
more to the question of  morale principles penetrating – more – into 
the world of  law. One certain sign of  this is that the forefronts of  
“traditional” legal positivism create their own criteria systems one after 
another, which may allow this incorporation to happen justifiably.21
17 Ibid.
18 lányi op. sic. p. 106. 
19 lányi op. sic. p. 107. 
20 Ibid. 
21 maTThew h. Kramer: Where Law and Morality Meet. Cambridge University 
Press, 2008. 17. 
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3. The concept of  governmental capacity and its connection 
with the legal system 
It is obvious based on the abovementioned as well, that when I examine 
the newest Hungarian legal system, the discovery of  facts and processes 
would be possible in many approaches, based on many theoretical and 
practical viewpoints; however this work consciously wishes to emphatically 
enforce the aspect the so-called governmental capacity (both in the circle 
of  choosing the aspects of  the examination and grouping the facts), 
and by way of  introduction we have to clear the reason(s) for choice 
and the meaning of  this concept. The reason for choice was indeed that 
condition analysed above that during the examination such system of  
aspects and methodology is reasonable that is versatile enough; so it is 
obvious that for example a comparison with the fashionable expectations 
of  lawmaking today alone cannot give answers to the questions inquisitive 
about the state of  the Hungarian legal system after 2010. Such approach 
is justified which broadens the circle of  applicable methods (which may 
be and to be applied) as well standing in the “segment” of  legal theory 
in the widest sense, political science, sociology and other fields. And 
the – appropriately flexible and fashionable – concept of  capacity seems 
to be an appropriate, suitable starting point. 
The state-organised society’s legal system is most directly connected 
to the question of  (governmental) capacity by the concept of  legitimacy, 
if  that refers to the social foundation, acceptance of  a regime.22 
The old-new tool of  the state with an active and strong self-image 
that wishes to create new balance between the endeavours of  the market 
and the needs of  the society is guiding the society through law, that 
however goes through significant changes of  form not only because of  
the applied individual solutions, but because of  the movement of  the 
inner balance of  the legal system and especially because of  the emphasis 
of  its bound to the moral sphere. 
22 Of  course among the appearing factors as the reasons for dominant acceptance 
historical traditions, supernatural charisma and other things may appear besides 
the fact of  regulation by law. 
3. The concept of governmental capacity and its connection with...
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Capacity building can be defined as the sum of  conscious activities 
aimed at the strengthening of  governmental capacity. The subject of  
building capacity can be the government of  the affected country, but it 
often can be other international entities (e.g. bi- and multilateral donor 
organisations) as well. The latter scenario was and is the case for a 
long time in the transitioning countries, even though with decreasing 
importance in time; meaning that capacity building is closely related to 
the concept of  providing technical and financial aid. Capacity building 
is most frequently or at least traditionally aimed at the organisations of  
the government itself  – including both political (e.g. political decision 
making bodies, politicians) and administrative elements. Beyond that, 
however, they can affect the so-called non-governmental organisations 
or the in general broader community of  citizens as well.23
And as for the specific goals of  activities/programs aimed at building 
capacity, these are the developments of  human resources, institutions as 
microstructures and institutions in a wider sense as macrostructures.24
Governmental capacity – in a wider sense – shows the ability of  the 
state that allows fighting certain impending, hindering conditions, in 
order to realise its public political goals.25 Even though this need that 
occurs on the state’s side is far from being new – practically it is the same 
age as the state-organised society – the concept itself  (as state capacity, 
government capacity, policy performance and executive capacity, etc.) is relatively 
new, the literature of  the 80s does not deal with it yet.26 Part of  our 
uncertainties regarding the concept may originate from that it is very 
hard to find substantive indicators, that can be used well and stand up 
to the test of  comparisons, especially that they are often very complex 
„sum of  viewpoints” that consist of  many elements. The approach from 
the side of  trust capacity is like that for example,27 that is not afraid of  
23 haJnal, GyörGy: Adalékok a magyarországi közpolitika kudarcaihoz. [Supplements 
to the failures of  Hungarian public politics] KSzK ROP 3.1.1. Programigazgatóság, 
Budapest, 2008. p. 42. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Bevir, marK: Key concepts in governance. SAGE, Delhi, 2009. p. 41.
26 See e.g. Janda, KenneTh – Berry, JeFFrey m.– Goldman, Jerry: The Challenge 
of  Democracy. Government in America. Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1989. 
27 See e.g. Boda, Zsolt – Medve-Bálint, GerGő: Intézményi bizalom a régi 
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the complex examination of  mutualities based on trust either besides 
the traditional measures of  the trust towards the institutions.28
When defining the concept of  capacity the mention of  such concepts 
that can be found during the description of  similar phenomena in social 
sciences can be useful. The novel expression of  social power can be like 
this for example, which is the measure of  a certain group’s (e.g.: ones in 
powerful position, or the ones in power) social abilities, in which these 
abilities form the tools or conditions of  the satisfaction of  needs of  
another group (e.g. the whole society, or smaller groups) as an object.29
Among the conscious actions aimed at the strengthening of  
governmental capacity, and as some sort of  frame of  these activities 
the lawmaking has an unavoidable role as well. In this context we can 
also talk about legal capacity, as a narrower aspect of  governmental 
capacity. This study – as we already mentioned – does not wish to give 
a complex overview about the Hungarian legal system; it primarily 
wishes to introduce those legal institutions, legal practices and changes 
occurred in legal thinking that seem to be the most emphatic nowadays, 
and can be listed among the – possible – defining elements of  the near 
social future. 
Among the reasons for the creation of  this present writing the fact that 
basic and radical changes occurred in Hungary between 2010 and 2012 
that brought significant novelties regarding the content of  the previously 
existing legal institutions, the introduction of  new legal institutions in 
the legal system and the ideas about the law’s social role and possibilities 
is of  primary importance. One of  the most specified elements of  these 
changes is the integral system consisting of  the new constitution and the 
related great number of  cardinal laws – that now allows drawing many 
conclusions – that generated significant European echoes, regarding both 
the nature and direction of  intentions and certain specific solutions. 
és az új demokráciákban. [Institutional trust in old and new democracies] 
Politikatudományi Szemle 2/2012. p. 27.
28 meleG, csilla: A bizalom hálójában – társadalmi nézőpontok. [In the web of  
trust – social aspects] JURA 2012/1. pp. 72-75. 
29 FarKas, zolTán: A hatalom és az uralom fogalma. [The concept of  power and 
regime] Politikatudományi Szemle 2/2011. p. 31.
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My work, of  course, – as I have already mentioned before – wishes 
to refer to context regarding the European Union in the examined topic, 
but instead of  the deep analysis of  the effects of  EU legal instruments 
and practice on the Hungarian governmental capacity, primarily I will 
make an attempt to draw up the inside facts and processes (resources, 
structures and transforming legal aspect) that can be influenced directly. 
I will get round to draw up today’s outlines of  the single capacity 
elements in a way that I either draw attention to processes going on 
in the same circle often with an opposite indication, or I will present 
the possible advantages and dangers created upon the new phenomena 
through a specific example regarding the examined question. 
I repeatedly wish to emphasise that my work does not wish to perform 
the direct evaluation of  the government’s legislative activity; primarily I 
am taking on drawing up the necessary facts and novel classification in 
some aspects. 
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III. tradItIonal features of the hunGarIan 
leGal system and of the natIonal and socIal 
envIronment 
1. Traditional features of  Hungarian public and legal politics 
One of  the starting points of  this study is that the new democracies 
in Central-Europe created after 1989 did not build the political system 
on layered sophisticated social consultation processes and institution 
systems based on broad social participation, but almost solely on the 
structure of  Parliament centred politics making that is working on the 
base of  the principle of  representation. Rezsőházy considers that one 
of  the biggest problems of  societies coming out of  dictatorships is that 
as a consequence of  the absence of  civil society between the individual 
and the state, the members of  these societies could not learn and built in 
themselves the identification of  problems, the definition of  their interests, 
the exchange of  thoughts, the reconciliation of  different opinions, which 
results in that the variety of  the management of  problems could not 
evolve.30 It can be stated from the side of  public politics that legal and 
institutional conditions of  representative democracy were created in 
Hungary after 1990, but no substantive move has been made towards 
participatory democracy; meaning that Hungarian democracy has frozen 
on the level of  representative democracy.31 
Based on the most important features of  the public politics/public 
administration environment we have to state in advance regarding Hungary, 
that a) shifting off  responsibility and the absence of  democratic control, 
accountability and transparency are general because of  the traditional 
30 Interview with Rudolf  Rezsőházy Új Horizont 1/2001. p. 1. 
31 dr. Jenei, GyörGy: Adalékok az állami szerepvállalás közpolitika-elméleti 
hátteréről. [Supplements about the public politics-theoretical background of  
the state’s participation] In: hosszú, horTenzia – Gellén, márTon (editor): 
Államszerep válság idején. [State role during crisis] COMPLEX Kiadó, Budapest, 
2010. p. 95.
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„top down” system; b) the quality of  the decisions of  the public sphere 
is often inappropriate, the implementation is difficult, the evaluation is 
one-sided because of  the politicised and instable practice of  reconciliation 
of  interests; c) public politics is imbalanced, it is disproportionate and 
unpredictable because of  the weight and coordination of  the affected 
parties, moreover the relationship of  the political-administrative system 
and society is characterised by political predominance;32 d) the last phase 
of  public politics is missing; the processes of  public politics begin but 
they often do no “run out”, they do not have evaluation and closing 
phase.33 In the circle of  this evaluation the prior and posterior impact 
assessment of  laws have a crucial role, especially the posterior impact 
assessment, the primary goal of  which is to support the decision making 
situation of  the lawmaker, for as much as the examination expands the 
pile of  facts, the consideration of  which is indispensable to make a 
well-thought, justified decision.34 
It also has to be mentioned here that in the modernisation of  
the Hungarian public administration – on the measure of  Western 
reform trends – the deficiencies of  the balance of  state and market are 
continuous;35 and in the Hungarian model of  public politics decision 
making - as it was already mentioned – the “top-down” approach is 
dominant, for as much as the institutional mechanisms of  the involvement 
of  advocacy-integrative organisations operate formally only.36 It is 
also inseparable from the latter fact that the traditionally characteristic 
features of  Hungarian political culture are paternalism, intolerance and 
transforming personal relations into political.37 
32 Jenei op. sic. p. 95.
33 pesTi, sándor: Közpolitika szöveggyűjtemény. [Public politics anthology] Rejtjel, 
Budapest, 2001. p. 206.
34 See details: A Közigazgatás Korszerűsítésének kormánybiztosa által készített szempontok. 
„Részletes útmutató a hatályos jogszabályok utólagos és jogszabálytervezetek előzetes 
felülvizsgálatához.” [Aspects prepared by the governmental commissioner of  the Modernisation 
of  the Public Administration. “Ďetailed instructions to the posterior review of  regulations in 
force and preliminary review of  regulation drafts.”] Budapest, 1995. p. 5.
35 Jenei op. sic. p. 94.
36 Jenei op. sic. p. 95.
37 Kulcsár, Kálmán: Politika és jogszociológia.[Politics and legal sociology.] Akadémiai 
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One of  the possible aspects of  the politisation of  public administration 
is participation of  civil servants in politics. It rarely happens in Europe 
that public administration is the social base of  political turns, but – in a 
specific way – it is the professional and democratic commitment of  the 
Hungarian civil service sector that can be brought up as an example, for 
as much as it had an important role in the speed of  the constitutional and 
institutional processes of  the change in the political system. International 
examples show that in countries where the middle class in weak, the 
personnel of  public administration often has a moderating political 
function, representing significant power at the elections for example.”38
Among the classic governmental failure phenomena – that are not 
only characteristic in Hungary, but can be observed here for certain – we 
can mention the theoretical difficulties and measurability uncertainties 
of  setting public political goals, the influence practised by strong 
interest groups and the difficulties regarding the size and complexity 
of  governmental activities and the difficulties related to causal linking 
between certain public political programs.39 
It is also important that in Hungary “the all-time present stands 
out by the strong and unreasonable delegitimizing of  the all-time past, 
instead of  putting forward its own performance”.40 In this field of  force 
even the governmental course changes have “disastrous” features. The 
phenomenon of  value crisis known in sociology can arise following such 
legitimacy struggle...41
To sum up it can be stated that the predominance of  political, 
subjective factors can be observed in the social development of  the 
past twenty years, in opposition to other – economic, social, legal and 
EU integration – aspects.42
Kiadó, Budapest, 1987. p. 336. [hereinafter referred to as Kulcsár (1987)]
38 vass, lászló: A politika és a közigazgatás viszonya. [The relationship of  
politics and public administration] Politikatudományi Szemle 2010/3. p. 71.
39 haJnal op. sic. p. 33.
40 sziGeTi, péTer: A magyar köztársaság jogrendszerének állapota 1989 – 2006. [The 
state of  the legal system of  the Hungarian Republic 1989-2006] Akadémiai Kiadó, 
Budapest, 2008. p. 17. [hereinafter referred to as sziGeTi (2008)]
41 Ibid. 
42 sziGeTi (2011) p. 24. 
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2. Features of  the legal system and of  the system of  social 
norms in Hungary in the past decades 
“We are obviously living in the age of  changes in which law is becoming 
less the fixer of  some agreed tradition. From the duality that on the one 
hand law is the guard of  all-time status quo, but on the other hand it is one 
of  the tools – at least in silence – of  social dynamism and novelties, the 
latter seems to overcome the other.”43 In other words: the two important 
expectations towards law are great (formal) stability on the one hand, 
and sensitivity able to react, considering social interest on the other.44 
It was especially important for the Hungarian government after 
2010 to base its own lawmaking, including the Constitution on a solid, 
“irrefutable” – let’s say moral – foundation because of  the extraordinary 
extent of  legal changes. In relation to this handling the examination of  
certain (professional) administration fields (politics) as solely regulation 
questions of  legal nature would be a mistake. In social fields regulated by 
law the presence of  other type (level) of  normativity is also important; 
from the rules of  everyday social coexistence to the questions of  more 
special responsibility relations settled by political etiquette. The well 
developed law does not eliminate the raison d’etre or individual norms, 
community norms and organisational norms,45 as the generality of  law 
can only be realised with the „intervention” of  these.46 Moreover, it was 
the unsuccessfulness of  the previous lobby act (see subchapter VI.3.3.) 
that showed that in some fields the state cannot enter with its own 
additional regulations even in the case of  the absence of  self-regulation: 
43 varGa, csaBa: A jog és a jogfilozófia perspektívái a jelen feladatai tükrében. 
[Perspectives of  law and legal philosophy in the light of  the present tasks.] Állam- 
és jogtudomány 2008/2. p. 29. [hereinafter referred to as varGa (2008)]
44 luhmann, niKlas: A jog mint szociális rendszer. [Law as social system] In: cs. 
Kiss, laJos – Karácsony, andrás (editor..): A társadalom és a jog autopoietikus felépítése. 
[The autopoietichal structure of  the society and the law.] Budapest, 1994. p. 65. 
45 Especially not the mixture of  morality and politics, the convention (see sziGeTi, 
péTer – TaKács, péTer: A jogállamiság jogelmélete. [Legal theory of  the rule of  law] 
Napvilág Kiadó, Budapest 1998. p. 117.).
46 Tamás, andrás: A közigazgatási jog elmélete. [Theory of  public administration 
law] Szent István Társulat, Budapest, 2001. p. 145.
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in certain social spheres a lasting result can only be achieved only through 
the permanent stimulation of  self-regulating mechanisms, which is a 
slow and difficult solution but without any alternatives. That is why the 
new lobby regulation – partly – chooses the solution that it only creates 
mandatory regulations on the side of  the public servant that welcomes 
the lobbyist, and otherwise it is satisfied with creating samples through 
its own evolving practice on the one hand, and relying on the existence 
of  already created criminal law limits (bribery etc.) This results in that 
when we are examining the nature of  law, we have to measure how 
the abovementioned types of  norms differ from law, what interaction 
they have with law, and up to what extent does the practical use of  law 
depends on the existence and structure of  other regulation systems.47
The existence of  the norm’s validity is mostly proved by the sanction 
coming after the violation of  law, but this – the viability of  the sanction 
– needs some sort of  collective conscious and solidarity.48 Today law – in 
some tendency-like references – gives up on its own general preventive 
opportunities – just because in the absence of  consciousness and 
solidarity. For example the institution of  community service regulated 
in criminal law hardly exists in our present legal life in practice, and the 
disintegrating social experience that is against all sorts of  cohesion that 
work does not really have any value (and in this approach everyday work 
is just an obligation justified by the desire to survive) is reflected even in 
this fact. Likewise if  during the execution of  a penalty the society gives 
up on the possibility of  (re)education, at the same time it states that 
the sole substantive goal of  the penalty is segregation, meaning there 
is no valid reason that could link one person to another through future 
possible cooperation. 
According to András Tamás “law is an implicit imperativus in the world of  
sacred law at the most, but not in the modern political state. As the basic principle 
47 „The Nature of  Law” /article/ Stanford Encyclopedia of  Philosophy, January 4, 
2007 http://www.google.hu/searchsourceid=navclient&hl=hu&ie=UTF&rlz=1T
4PCTC_huHU374HU375&q=An+Outline+of+Contemporary+Legal+Thought
48 FrivaldszKy, János: Klasszikus természetjog és jogfilozófia. [Classic natural law and 
legal philosophy] Szent István Társulat, Budapest, 2007. p. 382.
2. Features of the legal system and of the system of social norms...
28
of  this is the moral and political foundation of  liberty and equality.”49 
Even one of  the most remarkable sources of  danger of  our age should 
be sought in this approach, for as much as this “enlightened” logic 
transformed into “positive law” that is lacking direct sacred elements 
makes easier the norm and the underlying moral cause becoming detached 
and makes possible the “fading” of  considerations giving grounds to the 
norm from behind the norm that continues to be valid. For example one 
of  the most essential problems of  the Hungarian public administration 
is that social reaction attitude that considers sanction, and the possibility 
of  it – separated from its direct, individual responsibility movement that 
is necessarily evaluating – as a cost of  socially acceptable, but legally prohibited 
behaviours (see subchapter. IV.2.3.2.).
It is also obvious that significant part of  changes arising in law is a 
fiction from the aspect of  the process of  social change: these show law 
as well as the state to be variable [even] where almost nothing happens”.50 
As András Sajó also draws attention to “that in the present society the 
fear of  real change raised the [at least apparent] adaptation to new to 
be official value and requirement”.51
The different system logics of  law and society also appear as the 
reason for the densification of  law52 for as much as the (sometimes) 
pathological effects of  the densification of  law can be traced back to 
the differences in the system structure, motivations and rationality – and 
deficiencies appearing on the side of  other parallel social norm types.53 
The densification of  law means the penetration of  law into certain – 
visibly – autonomous social spheres that through their own system 
logics partly form law have repercussions on it. The fact that lawmaking 
processes and individual decisions became part of  not just the broadly 
taken public, but the most broadly taken popular culture and media considers 
49 Ibid.
50 saJó, andrás: Társadalmi-jogi változás. [Social-legal change.] Akadémiai Kiadó, 
Budapest, 1988. p. 7.
51 Ibid. 
52 Which is explained by others also with the emerging of  “politics in court”. See 
e.g.: Pokol Béla: A jog elmélete. [Legal theory.] Rejtjel Kiadó, Budapest, 2000.
53 TeuBner op. sic. p. 73. 
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them as their own as well basically changes the operation method of  law.54 
However this latter phenomenon itself  does not eliminate the – at least 
partial - pertinence of  ideas about the law’s self-reference closeness, for 
as much as law also creates an autonomous legal reality through its own 
operations and it rather regulates and directs society this way through 
its own regulation and building from itself. 55
Further important supplement is that the trend-like changes of  today’s 
legal life – detectable both in Hungary and abroad and strengthened 
by crises - emphasise the aspects of  operability instead of  emphasising 
the law56, the rebuild of  the state instead of  its exile57, the suppression of  
54 sherwin, richard: Intersections of  Law and Culture. [A cross-disciplinary 
conference hosted by the Department of  Comparative Literary and Cultural 
Studies, Franklin College Switzerland, Lugano, October 2, 2009.]
55 TeuBner, GunTher: Társadalomirányítás reflexív jog révén. [Social 
management through reflexive law.] In: cs. Kiss, laJos – Karácsony, andrás 
(editor): A társadalom és a jog autopoietikus felépítése. [Autopoiethical structure of  
society and law.] Budapest, 1994. p. 67. 
56 The Constitutional Court explained in the 41/2005. (X. 27.) AB decision that 
it has a function originating from the Constitution in the protection of  bodies 
with autonomy. It clearly pinned down that “for example a legal regulation that 
regulates the organisation of  local governments in a way that it limits the essential 
content of  the right to form organisations, leads to the emptying of  municipal law, 
to its actual deprivation, and excludes the government making decisions with own 
responsibility in questions regarding its own organisation cannot be considered 
constitutional.” Accordingly, for example the autonomous operation of  higher 
education institutions was recognised as a constitutional value by the Constitutional 
Court. According to constitutional judge László Kiss, who appended a dissenting 
opinion to the resolution “it is the state’s right and responsibility at the same time 
for the higher education institution system to be “operable”. In this – unchanged 
democratic – approach the operability is more than institutionalised existence in 
a way that it makes the everyday life of  citizens much more “liveable”. See in 
details: Kiss, lászló: Jogállam és/vagy élhető állam. [Rule of  law and/or liveable 
state.] In: A demokrácia deficitje. [Deficit of  democracy.] PTE ÁJK – Pécs-Baranyai 
Értelmiségi Egyesület, Pécs, 2008. p. 142. 
57 In connection with the state’s role the opinions that from the (New) Public 
Management state concept and the neoweberian state ideas markedly argue in 
favour of  the latter are getting stronger; for as much as they state that instead 
of  the aspects of  cost efficiency, result orientation, etc. and the “reduction” 
and “unattractioning” of  the state coming from that and the bigger and bigger 
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the processual, negotiated feature of  law58 and they need the creation of new public 
consensus on a social level.59 All these intentions cry for scientific and political 
foundations, moreover – precisely because of  the emptying of  law, it 
becoming plastic and unstable and because of  the vanishing of  the 
general preventive effect – they have an even bigger wish: they make 
an attempt to bring moral and law “institutionally” closer, grabbing it 
outsourcing of  the state functions, attempt should be made at the creation 
of  a strong(er) and (more) active state. The newer approaches consider the 
maintenance of  the requirements of  the rule of  law important, and also the 
further endorsement of  certain efficiency aspects, but they think it is inevitable to 
substantially involve the elements of  strategic thinking and strategic planning in 
public politics. The believers of  a stronger state – who, in the debate about good 
government and good governance tend to take stronger position in favour of  the 
importance of  the former – argue that accountability and responsibility appearing 
as basic requirements are only possible where a thoroughly rethought strategy of  
cooperation between the state and the private sphere appears – contrary to for 
example the uncertainty of  outsourcing that blurs sharp boundaries. (Also see 
subchapter 4.2.1.)
58 A reference to the processual nature of  law – in the most common and neutral 
meaning – refers to the process in which from the creation of  circumstances 
providing reasons for lawmaking to the realisation of  some specific method of  justice, 
certain life and legal relations are formed, and expand in the frames offered by law. 
Compares to this neutral conceptual approach, the negatively taken processual nature 
refers to the exaggeration of  law’s “negotiative” feature, and to the deterioration of  
predictability through that. 
59 The non-revolutionary social – and through that necessarily state – model- 
and path changes mainly happen because of  internal, moral based changes 
lying on some pact or because of  external – typically economic – shock(s). The 
success of  path changes in the 21st century basically depends on the success of  
keeping the social level knowledge under control that could mean the (personal) 
centralisation of  intelligence and the institutionalisation of  the successful 
concentration of  the information at disposal. Another key question of  the 
state model changes is the “setting” and practical application of  the feature and 
measure of  state interventions and adequate – not only economic – incentives. 
The objective regarding the diversification of  represented interests appears with 
special importance in the latter circle; all intentions regarding the involvement of  
previously underrepresented interests that is aimed at the micro level presentation 
– and not least at the settlement by law – of  the possibility of  “having a say” for 
example. 
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as the sole possible alternative. We have to add that the crisis (crises) of  our 
age is not primarily of  economic nature, but rather of  moral and ethical nature.60
Some approaches consider the formation of  the so-called service 
state such “ending point” of  possible development, when the state 
organisation moves far away from the starting point, the pyramid-like 
royal “government” that is absolute and centralised, acts in a legally 
free, “opportunist” way, and makes unified and efficient directions and 
decisions against the citizens.61 It does this in a way that it “returns to 
the before absolutism forms of  autonomy and segregation”, and also 
when it has to deal with the long legal procedures of  the realisation and control of  
the state will. So, the bothering series of  conciliations and negotiations 
with the “orders” appears again – with new players – that led/lead 
to the formation of  new problems of  cooperation and coordination 
in planning and administration. Despite the mentioned development 
tendencies – that indicate a kind of  limited deterioration of  the internal 
sovereignty of  the state through the strengthening of  the law’s negotiated 
feature – the modern state organisation still has significant elements of  
structures formulates in absolutism and liberalism.62
Representatives of  modernist trends in legal science, like Hart, 
Kelsen, Dworkin or even Finnis try to present law as a unified whole and 
illustrate rule of  law as a method that is able dissolve value and social 
conflicts in a neutral way, on a non-subjective base. On the contrary 
postmodern reality does not justify this rigid homogeneity, this one-
way and homogenous process based on constraint. Moreover, the wide 
expansion of  delegated lawmaking, self-regulation of  players, various 
ADR techniques63 obviously burst the “traditional” and closed system of  
60 vízi e., szilveszTer: „Az erkölcs mindennek az alapja.” [Moral is the 
foundation of  everything.] In: hanKiss ,elemér – helTai, péTer: Münchhausen 
báró kerestetik. [Searching for Baron Münchhausen.] Budapest, Médiavilág, 2009. p. 363. 
61 pernThaler, peTer:Az állam szervezete, [Organisation of  the state.] In: 
TaKács, péTer (szerk.): Államtan – Írások a XXI. századi általános államtudomány 
köréből. [State study – Writings from the general political science of  the 21st century.] Szent 
István Társulat, Budapest, 2003. p. 338.
62 Ibid. 
63 ADR (Alternative Dispute Resolution) is the overall name of  dispute resolution 
processes that the parties use voluntarily – considering the nature of  the conflict 
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rules and values.64 Moreover, the ADR techniques push conflicts partly 
over the territory of  traditional law and legal equality. 
The abovementioned are grabbed in the thought of  Csaba Varga as 
well: “The change of  the interest of  theoretic legal thinking occurred 
in the past decades is related to the significant transformation of  our 
world view, and this explains the rewriting of  the decorporealisation 
of  law as a primarily discursive process, a particular communication. 
It is a telltale sign in the Western-European and Atlantic legal world’s 
description that they expect the continuous release of  the exclusivity 
of  the positivity of  law originating from itemization, which is described 
with liberal phrases, such as democratisation, participation, and/or the 
multi-polarisation of  legal procedures.”65
Following the more conscious reflection on the base units of  the 
construction of  sociality (in social studies), the formulation of  the 
“role” category had a crucial importance in exploration of  the reasons 
for the weakening of  cohesion and solidarity. Based on Georg Simmel 
the “role” category allows us not to base the certain comprehensive 
social formations on the people that participate in them with actions, 
but to formulate them on the line of  the roles that represent only a 
slice of  their personality. The modernising societies create more and 
more relations – on which such comprehensive social creations were 
organised – in which the participants become important from one aspect 
only, and their whole personality remains outside of  these creations. The 
single individual participates more and more in specialised roles – by 
the disciplined suppression of  the other parts of  his personality – in the 
– before or instead of  taking the dispute to court. ADR techniques have always 
existed, even though they were not called this; Hungarian legal history offers many 
examples for various negotiation-redemption compositions as well (e.g. the Decretum 
maius of  Mathias Rex allowed the agreement of  the convicted and the plaintiff-
accuser-victim and so the redemption of  the imposed punishment.) To that extent 
the name of  the ADR may be new, but its content can be considered „traditional”. 
64 BalKin, J. m.: „What is Postmodern Constitutionalism?” Michigan Law Review 
(1992) 90 – 1966. 
65 varGa (2008) p. 29. 
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modern societies and the dramatically increased complexity of  the society 
is based on such social organisation performed in disciplined roles.66
Segmentation, even “stratification” of  existence, appearing regarding 
individuals created the opportunity for the classic proportions of  rights and 
responsibilities of  given individuals to start a dissolution. Weakening of  
families and the dissolution of  many previous social forms contributed to 
the formulation of  the value crisis that has become general by now. In the 
various fields of  existence – school, official media, and family – the traditional system 
of  rights and responsibilities has been shaken. Besides the excessive emphasis 
of  individual rights and opportunities the performance of  obligations 
and the responsibility for the community has been pushed back.67 As it 
was stated in a recently published volume of  studies “the escape from 
all sorts of  obligations” has become general.68 So, “the aspect of  basic 
rights” might have been strengthened too much in the past decades that 
considered the aspects of  sustainability, applicability and operability as 
residual items, compared to the expansion of  the catalogue of  rights 
and strengthening certain laws in content. 
Another important aspect in the examined circle is that the validity 
of  law – at least in an aspect of  legal sociology – also depends on the 
answer given to the question of  how likely it can be stated that the law 
will be applied indeed.69 Despite the carefully created norm concept if  (a 
significant) part of  the regulations are not realised because of  legal, financial 
technical reasons or ones originating from the public morale or – and this is (was) 
also considered general – are not realised in time.70
66 poKol, Béla: A professzionális intézményrendszerek elmélete. [Theory of  professional 
institution systems.] Felsőoktatási Koordinációs Iroda, Budapest, 1992. p. 218. 
67 csermely – Fodor – Joly – lámFalussy: Ajánlás a nevelés-oktatás rendszerének 
újjáépítésére és a korrupció megfékezésére. [Recommendation for the rebuilt of  the education system 
and the restraint of  corruption.] Bölcsek Tanácsa Alapítvány, Budapest, 2009. p. 11. 
68 José orTeGa y GasseT: A tömegek lázadása. [Rebellion of  masses.] Pont Kiadó, 
Budapest, 1995. p. 187. 
69 Tamás op. sic. p. 144. 
70 E.g. majority of  the civil organisations taking care of  people with disabilities 
did not receive the normative based budget support for 2012 until July 2012. 
Because of  that many organisations were pushed to the edge of  functionality. 
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Iv. new elements and tendencIes of the 
hunGarIan leGal system
In this chapter we will explore the main elements and tendencies - that 
can substantially influence the governmental capacity – of  the renovation 
of  the legal system as the possible aspects of  the evaluation of  the 
governmental capacity.  
Based on Chapter III. the question can be formulated in a way that 
up to what extent was the legal system renewed in the past two years 
able and in the future up to what extent will it be able to correct the 
traditional, but negative tendencies showing in (both) lawmaking and 
law enforcement.
So in this part of  my work I undertake to briefly list phenomenona 
I consider important and the connecting main criteria in connection 
which the Reader can decide how those may influence governmental 
and legal capacity. These elements and „institutions” are not necessarily 
homogenous and we cannot even consider the review comprehensive, 
but my work is an intentional call as well, to in order for the presentation of  
missing aspects and for the increased creation of  „method clearing” to be performed 
in a later academic discussion. 
So let’s see briefly the certain more important elements of  the 
Hungarian legal system examined from the aspect of  governmental 
capacity! 
1. Response to the crisis and natural law movement
1.1. Giving up the concept of  continuous growth and development 
Until recently, most of  the papers – connected to the various fields of  
social sciences – takes/took the concepts of  predictability, continuous 
expansion, growth and prosperity for granted - even without expressed 
mention - as the defining elements of  the external environment. Since we 
carelessly assumed – presuming the relative peace of  the past 67 years to 
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be an irrefutable base - that the changes will be considered conjunctural 
fluctuation at most, like a wave motion, which all in all produces a 
well predictable and continuous average. This basic standpoint widely 
observable (and also reflected in legal politics) in social sciences was 
considered to be general even though a paragraph in connection with 
crisis management is present – in an almost compulsory way - in the 
majority of  the papers in the past decade. This wasn’t any other way in 
the various fields of  legal science either. However the expansion of  the 
catalogue and tool system of  rights made the lawmaker and the practicing 
lawyer: the erosion of  compulsory verification seemed to have started 
with the persistence of  peace. In the frames of  this relativism, neutralism 
and value pluralism that was feeding on individualism overcame our 
law, and responsibilities seemed to have become residual items besides 
rights (see subchapter III.2. above). Moreover simultaneously “the 
model – appearing of  economic nature on the surface - believed to be 
the condition of  our [economic] prosperity failed”.71
Phenomenona like globalisation, digitalisation, or even individualisation 
come together with the multiplying of  risk factors, or with the words 
of  Ulrich Beck the formation with the “global risk society”. The 
escalation of  risks becomes general following the effects of  science and 
technology, in the field of  relations between people and groups, social 
and international relations, and relations between the man and nature 
as well.72 In connection with these, the conversation between players, 
partnership and de facto cooperation are appreciated during severe crises 
– that of  course has consequences appearing in positive law as well.73
It is slowly outlined that the base for ideas of  change regarding 
regulation solutions and contents cannot be the idea of  prosperity to 
71 miszliveTz, Ferenc: Válság és demokrácia – 1989 öröksége. [Crisis and 
democracy – the heritage of  1989.] In: simon, János (editor): Húsz éve szabadon 
Közép-Európában. Demokrácia, politika, jog. [Twenty years free in Central-Europe. 
Democracy, politics, law.] Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Budapest, 2011. p. 134. 
72 G. márKus GyörGy: A harmadik út és a globális kapitalizmus megszelídítése. 
In: dalos rimma – Kiss endre (szerk.): Bal, jobb, harmadik út. [Left, right, third 
way.] Friedrich Ebert Alapítvány, Budapest, 2000. p. 9. 
73 miszliveTz op. sic. p. 133. 
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which the Western law and administration theories were unexpressedly 
built on in the past 50-60 years. 
Probably one of  the most important questions of  the past decades was that up to 
what extent can the narratives of  the more or less unified transatlantic law and political 
order can be extended to the other two-third of  the world. This suggestion became 
especially emphasised in the circle of  expectations related to terrorism 
being handled by law, as such – seemingly theoretical - aspects analysed 
in this paper like the maintenance of  law’s operability, the “suppression 
of  its negotiative feature” and eventually the need for “justice in content” 
have placed the classic and neoliberal law concepts and the expectations 
regarding the further expansion of  them under extreme pressure already 
at the beginning of  the 2000s.74 And the crises after 2008 emphasise the 
tenable and necessary nature of  these needs even more, however without 
being able to declare certain statements in connection with the existence 
and future of  the unified transatlantic narrative(s)… 
Anyhow – as a summary – it can be stated that while as a result 
of  various crises – more intensive than before – the formation and 
strengthening of  disaster recovery (legal) politics can be observed, at 
the same time there is a need for balance, conciliation and sustainable 
solutions greater than ever. 
1.2. Strengthening of  the natural law approach
The functional differentiation of  the society is an experience for the 
modern man; the more and more obvious autonomy of  the systems 
of  politics, law, economy, science and also religion that meant strong 
challenge for the social theories as well, when they (should) have (had) 
to describe this world that became eccentric – meaning centerless.75 The 
feature of  the modern and “postmodern” social theoretical concepts 
conceived in the age without a central organising principle is that they 
74 BainBridGe, Jason: Lawyers, Justice and the State. Griffith Law Review (2006) 
Vol 15 No 1. p. 170. 
75 cs. Kiss, laJos: Bevezetés. [Introduction.] In: cs. Kiss, laJos – Karácsony, 
andrás (editor): A társadalom és a jog autopoietikus felépítése. [The autopioethical 
structure of  society and law.] Budapest, 1994. pp. 7-8. 
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hardly or do not take note of  the philosophical-moral nature of  the 
human, and they are not inquisitive about the right social coexistence, 
order connected to social integrative forces and this way they give up 
the theoretical foundation of  the functional social order as well.76
In early cultures law and religion typically formed a unified science 
complex that as a power organising knowledge material, with [sometimes] 
fading origin, through generations of  further verbal demise ultimately 
identified itself  as a gift from God.77 In the formation of  the current state 
of  modern law and legal science, separation from the exclusivity of  divine 
natural law – earlier - was one of  the decisive effects: the transcendent 
(moral) verification of  the validity of  positive law created by human was 
profaned in the form of  rational natural law.78 Even though the urge to 
verify the validity of  positive law with transcendent, so-called metajuristic 
(moral) principles was not eliminated, the verification problem itself  was 
replaced to the dimension of  the historicity of  the non-created world.79 
Pál Kecskés writes: „When the conservativism of  the historical-legal 
school that evolved in the world of  ideas of  romanticism considered the 
common law manifested in the historical folk spirit to be the source of  
positive law, by urging the historical method it significantly helped the 
evolution of  legal positivism,”80 that with the rejection of  metaphysics 
– meaning the rejection of  the existence and role of  God - considered 
specific positive law the only existing and valid law (with that according 
to its standpoint the only underlying reason for the created regulations 
should be sought in the historical circumstances). In this approach the 
concept of  law was narrowed down to the law used in material (positive) 
meaning, the only resultant of  which and the only one entitled to the 
interpretation of  it this way is the state and state will. 81
76 FrivaldszKy János op. sic. p. 382.
77 Juhász, ziTa: De iure non scripto, avagy a korai jogfogalom duplexivitása. [De 
iure non scripto, or the duplexity of  the early law concept.] De Iurisprudentia et 
Iure Publico 1/ 2011. p. 4. www.dieip.hu
78 cs. Kiss op. sic. p. 8. 
79 Ibid
80 KecsKés, pál: Természetjog. [Natural law.] In: szaBó, miKlós (editor): Natura 
Iuris. Bíbor Kiadó, Miskolc, 2002. pp. 219-220. 
81 Ibid
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It is absolutely important to call the attention to that positive law 
itself  has always had a double meaning: the religious concept that 
interpreted the nature in a metaphysic way was opposed to” the positive 
law originated in the new age (16th-18th century), interpreted in an 
enlightened rationalist way – or of  laic concept - ”, that gives a specific, 
empiric sense, and connects the concept of  positive law to some sort 
of  empirical characteristics (typically to instinct, some sort of  easily 
recognisable need). 
As the process of  law becoming positive, and the functional separation 
of  moral and law (morality and legality) progressed, starting from the 
strengthening of  legal positivism that overshadows the natural law 
thinking, the following alternative presents/presented itself  to the answer 
sought to the question of  the “origin and nature” of  legal validity: 
positive law acquires validity through a decision made in the frames of  
a goal rationally presumed (legal!) procedure, and is not in need of  any 
transcendent justification outside of  law, or the dependence on metajuristic 
(moral) principles, the external justification necessity exists.82 It is worth 
noting here that today we can witness the slow strengthening of  natural law concepts 
– interpreted in the broadest sense possible - again. In context with law 
positivism that still can be considered ruling the suggestion according 
to which “law as a momentum belonging to a norm and value system, 
needs the justification of  its validity is lifelike; and that the changing 
world of  positive experience cannot provide satisfactory justification 
could be hidden only until the philosophical spirit tied from one-sided 
scientific erudition regained its consciousness.”83 
The relation of  the previous lawmaker to the concept of  truth is the 
particular appearance of  how morality and legality relate to each other, 
that appeared particularly in the Judicial Procedure Code (hereinafter 
JPC).84 Article 1 of  the old JPC contained that “the aim of  this law 
is to ensure the decision on legal disputes arising in connection with 
the personal and material law of  citizens based on the truth in court 
procedures”. Article 3 ruled similarly, that stated that “The task of  the 
82 cs. Kiss op. sic. pp. 8-9. 
83 KecsKés, pál op. sic. p. 220.
84 Act III of  1952 on Civil Procedure Code 
IV. new elements and tendencIes of the hunGarIan leGal system
39
court is to intend to uncover the truth according to the aims of  this 
present act.” On the contrary, the Article 1 of  the new JPC accepted 
in 1999 - that was unchanged in name and numbering – is about the 
obligation of  settling the legal disputes fairly, and the intention to state 
the truth was left out of  the tasks.85 Meaning the central element was now 
the fair nature of  the procedure; we might as well say that in this legal 
concept the correct carrying out of  the production of  evidence, legality 
and legitimacy in a narrower sense become the crucial question, and not 
the objective – or in other words absolute – truth, in the detection of  
which the production of  evidence is just a tool. The significance of  this 
difference in the starting position is also rather great, even if  the question 
is considered partially technical by some authors in the bibliography, 
originating it in the basic difference between civil and criminal justice. 
Besides the undeniable welfare progresses, the increasing consumption 
and the expansion of  human freedom rights, the 20 years left behind 
us are still burdened by problems that tension the society inside, the 
origin of  which is worth to be sought in the weakening of  the moral.86
One of  the biggest enemies of  predictability on a social level is that 
social and legal intention that confronts the traditional values, for example 
the institution of  family or the expectation regarding the respect of  
the work of  others – preferred by today’s lawmaker as well – preaching 
some sort of  pluralism. This perception is well summarised by the 
words of  Frivaldszky: „It is not possible – appealing on the equality 
of  cultures and multiculturalism - to consider for example the wide 
variety of  sexual identities as “cultural difference” in their intentions, 
85 For the topic see e.g. dr. Földesi, Tamás: A jogban alkalmazott igazság 
terminusról és annak háttérbe szorulásáról a magyar polgári eljárásjog újabb 
fejlődésében. [About the truth terminology applied in law, and it being pushed back 
in the newest development of  Hungarian civil procedure.] Magyar Jog 8/2003. pp. 
467-473.; furthermore KenGyel, miKlós: A magyar polgári eljárás. [The Hungarian 
civil procedure.] Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 2002. p. 86.; and nováK, isTván: Az eltűnt 
igazság nyomában. [In the wake of  missing truth.] Magyar Jog 11/2001. p. 606. 
86 Bús, Balázs: Morális rendszerváltásra is szükség van. [There is a need for moral 
system change, too.] In: simon, János (editor): Húsz éve szabadon Közép-Európában. 
Demokrácia, politika, jog. [Twenty years free in Central-Europe. Democracy, politics, 
law.] Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Budapest, 2011. p. 13. 
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need statements regarding the public sphere, meaning the legislation, 
as they are legitimate in their socially existing presence, and therefore 
they are equal to the traditional family whereupon they have to have the 
same legal protection as well. This is not only a natural law nonsense, 
but also doubts the family’s moral role discovered and strengthened by 
sociology as well”.87
The relativist and nihilist perception sets existing to be natural, and 
natural to be appropriate. Fake pluralism that wants to favour everyone 
relativises, and just the most important guarantees of  law (general 
preventive effect, the moral standard character of  law) get lost through 
this. The one entitled to make a decision – in the possession of  any sort 
of  majority – that does not have clear, persistent principle orientation 
that builds in common aspects will be likely to form moral pluralism to 
be of  legal nature while representing it and to assist to the deterioration 
of  social order in certain cases. 
According to Miszlivetz, the currently dominant approaches, 
perceptions of  democracy are basically elitists and are basically reduced 
to the rule of  law and the questions of  legality or are struggling in the 
trap of  the one-sidedness of  etatism. According to the interpretation 
that wishes to go beyond these approaches legality and legal procedural 
stability cannot form a democratic regime alone.88 It is important to 
emphasise that among the concepts describing the common belonging 
of  the members of  today’s – Hungarian – society an outstanding role is 
given to the expression legal community that, with a renewing content, is an 
increasingly defining element, component of  social identity89, moreover 
of  state identity as well. 
However the natural law direction of  legal concept outlined today stands before 
us as a basically relative natural law argument that is strongly bound both in time 
and space, for as much as its point of  reference is often nothing else than the direct 
pressure created by crisis, meaning the financial and other crises going on since 2008. 
87 FrivaldszKy op. sic. p. 384. 
88 miszliveTz op. sic. p. 142. 
89 szaBó, miKlós: A jog alkothatóságáról. [Law’s creation.] Miskolci Jogi Szemle 
2011. évi különszám, p. 187. 
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However we should not think that the penetration of  various natural 
law principles and ways of  thinking into Hungarian law/legal life happened 
in the recent years only; this is a phenomenon that is presumable as 
a process, only the “strong thickening” of  which can be observed in 
the recent period examined by us. Even the Hungarian compensation 
process after the system change was born from the “actualisation” of  
certain natural law principles,90 for as much as the partial correction of  
the previous legitimate decisions could take place only because they were 
unfair and realised “arbitrary deprivation” in a legitimate way. 
1.2.1. Christian natural law
How can the most generally perceived religion affect positive law the 
legal science that partly forms, partly explains that? As a starting point 
we can state that both – law and religion – are present in our everyday 
life as such norms, among the aims of  which the regulation of  desired 
individual and common behaviours, the sanctioning of  activities against 
the norm and the statement of  the other consequences of  these appear 
as one. Ultimately the particular function of  both is the formation and 
in some cases the strengthening of  social cohesion and integration or 
social solidarity. It is an axiom, that certain types of  norms strengthen 
and complement each other at best. 
The newest natural law – optionally with Christian foundation and 
content – is new in a way that it does not trace the provisions of  the 
positive law back to the creator of  the legal material or the principles 
strengthened in “legal history” etc. but accepts the general principles 
and itemised expectations of  the – worked out - system of  belief, that 
has a wide social embeddedness – typically the Bible in our culture – as 
a direct justification and a necessary resultant of  a certain regulation. Of  
course today it is still a hard question to decide whether the references 
to the identity of  God, the relation to him and religious heritage91 in 
90 In details see: dr. pruGBerGer, Tamás – dr. szalma, JózseF: A természetjog 
és polgári jogi kodifikáció. [Natural law and civil law codification.] Magyar Jog 
3/2003. pp. 129-139. 
91 The preamble of  the act XLV of  2010. Act about the testimony about National 
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the domestic and EU laws are just symbolic acts of  the legal system 
appearing as „residual items” or the substantial formers of  the legal way 
of  thinking themselves?! Only the time gives answer to the measures 
but the direction of  the change already seems clear. It is conspicuous 
observing the debate of  the Fundamental Law that what a great number 
of  references to Christianity and the Christian values appeared in order 
to support the raison d’etre of  the certain principles and provisions. 
This particular ultima ratio role of  Christianity also prevailed in the circle 
of  clearing the concept of  historical constitution, and it is also not a 
coincidence that in the debates evolved regarding the content of  the 
preamble the two most often raised – and questioned - elements were 
religion and the Sacred Crown.92
Contrary to the Constitution, the Fundamental Law makes reference 
to religion many times. According to the strong value presenting character 
of  the preamble most of  these references can be found in the National 
Creed. Even calling the preamble itself  “National Creed” refers to sacred 
charge93 However even the National Creed is preceded by the first line of  
Hungary’s anthem94 („O Lord, bless the nation of  Hungary”), so this way 
the first word of  the Fundamental Law („Lord”) is of  religious charge. 
The National Creed of  the new Fundamental Law obviously and 
intentionally raises the central elements of  the Christian religious moral 
to a constitutional level (belief, love), and article R expressedly makes 
compulsory the consideration of  the Creed during the interpretation of  
the provisions of  the Fundamental Law. The text in the first paragraph 
Belonging:„We, the members of  the Parliament of  the Republic of  Hungary, who 
believe that God is the lord of  history, and who that try to understand the course 
of  history from other sources, for our country and the whole of  the Hungarian 
nation, in the spirit of  our responsibility set in the Constitution (...)”.
92 See in details: anTal, aTTila – nováK, zolTán – szenTpéTeri naGy, richárd 
(editor): Az alkotmány arca: preambulum tanulmányok. [Face of  the constitution: 
preamble studies.] L’Harmattan, Budapest, 2011.
93 horKay hörcher, Ferenc: The National Avowal In: csinK, lóránT– schanda, 
Balázs – zs. varGa, andrás: The Basic Law – A First Commentary. Clarus Press, 
Dublin, 2012. pp. 26-28.
94 Kölcsey Ferenc Himnusz című költeménye (1823) [The poem Anthem of  
Kölcsey, Ferenc.]
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of  the preamble also states, that Hungary is „part of  the Christian 
Europe”, and recognises the „nation preserving role of  Christianity”. 
Finally, after the Closing provisions, in the postamble it can be read that 
the “representatives of  the Parliament define the Fundamental Law 
aware of  their responsibility before God and man”. 
However, besides the fact of  these arguments and the previously 
mentioned positive law occurrences we have to state that the majority 
standpoint today does not primarily presume the formation of  the 
desecularisation effects and the post-secular society (Habermas) as a 
result of  some sort of  religious renaissance or a renewing religious 
life95, but as a result of  such strong political intentions, that express 
religious requirements and expectations in the public sphere and the 
various fields of  the public96 and also – let us add – in the constitutions 
themselves. The modern Hungarian legal system today is certainly not 
a system introducing positive law, but the interpretation of  certain 
provisions of  the Fundamental Law and certain further instruments 
and institutions of  the legal system in a way of  the Constitutional Court 
and others, moreover, the increase in number of  provisions consciously 
and expressedly of  Christian origin within the legal system, may mean 
an obvious imbalance. 
1.3. Questions and answers regarding the new tendencies
Where are the sources of  danger in the above said, in the law concept(s) 
that preaches the primacy of  underlying principles and the priority of  
moral? There, where we get to the rather specific questions: e.g. how, 
why and what makes a public servant, especially the lawyer public 
servant patriotic? Can it be assured with regulation? How – through 
what techniques – is it possible to build the principles of  Christianity 
into positive law? Directly (closely, by the adoption of  the Bible’s poems) 
95 niGel BiGGar – linda hoGan: Religious Voices in Public Places. Oxford University 
Press, 2009. p. 58. 
96 Bassam TiBi: The Islamist Shari’atization of  Polity and Society. A Source of  
Intercivilizational Conflict? Paper submitted to the Conference „Religion in the 
Public Space” CEU, Budapest, 2010. p. 1.
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not, for sure. Is it possible to predispose for the acceptance and practice 
of  these values, in a way that regulation generates institutional scenes 
where these values can be displayed? We can be absolutely sure that 
regulation running out in „lösung” is contra productive. It is a crucial 
aspect that even though for example some elements of  the extremely 
severe and current roma problem in Hungary are strong in terms of  their 
need of  appearance, and most of  the problems have been drawn up, 
it still can be stated regarding the whole of  the Hungarian society that 
in the context of  this circle of  questions, the institutional and informal 
mechanisms that would make possible to practice the ability of  social 
solidarity and participation and the more conscious experiencing of  
coexistence are mainly missing. 
I have to refer to János Farkas, who says in one place that „it is not 
hard for a writer of  [a] play to write in the screenplay that „grave-diggers 
come onto stage and occupy the audience for 10 minutes”. The instruction 
is simple, but the problem that „how and with what it is possible to 
occupy the audience’s attention? is even bigger (…), meaning the most 
difficult task is finding the technology of  cases.”.97 The situation is the 
same in connection with building natural law (in certain cases Christian 
natural law) principles into the legal system: the visualisation (visibility) 
of  these obviously does not primarily depend on the concept of  the 
law or finding the appropriate legal technical solutions; much rather 
depends on the selection of  values beyond the law and on the feature 
of  the operation mechanism of  social integrative institutions. 
2. Tendencies coming from the change of  the state’s self-image 
2.1. Emerging general features of  the good state in the crisis 
The importance of  the requirements against the good state is overstated, 
and its necessity is emphasised by the fact of  the crisis, the urging nature 
of  management needs coming from the crisis. In the following lets go 
through on the one hand the aspects and institutions that the state cannot 
97 FarKas, János: A „szürke zóna”. [The „grey zone”.] Disputa Könyvek, Budapest, 
1992. p. 24. 
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give up even during crisis, on the other hand those solutions that became 
necessary just because of  the new nature of  challenges; in many cases 
producing original institutions that did not exist before.  
According to the conservative approach the state’s foremost task is 
to be a source of  authority; free economy and private ownership are 
just tools to maintain institutional order, and not goals alone.98 After 
it became obvious that there are tasks only the state can fulfil, the 
standpoint according to which even the „limited state” cannot be weak 
state is well founded. Why the state should even be strong – according 
to the neoconservative argument? Primarily, because it has to control and 
maintain market order. The smooth operation of  the market order is not 
nature’s gift; it requires continuous attention and – if  necessary – sturdiness 
from the state. In this approach the application of  the state’s coercive 
force could be legitimated the most if  it is used „in the protection of  
the free economy”.99 In the state that wishes to accommodate to the new 
world order and the challenges of  globalisation and is neoconservative 
in thoughts the government switches the traditional priorities of  the 
„welfare state” to the preference of  requirements of  successful resistance 
in the international arena. Meaning that intention of  involvement in 
globalisation becomes the guiding principle of  the state. However this 
state does not only „suffer” globalisation, creating a passive-defensive 
attitude in connection with it, but it intends to participate actively.100 
This state consciously lets go the rigid discrimination of  the public 
sphere and the market – however in the methods of  connecting the two 
significant differences are shown between the various shapes. However 
we have to note that the previously mentioned activity could not only 
mean the alignment with the international actors, but also necessarily 
undertaking the conflicts – with the same actors - sharper than before. 
98 scruTon, roGer: A konzervativizmus jelentése. [The meaning of  conservativism.] 
Novissima Kiadó, Budapest, 2002. p. 39. 
99 eGedy, GerGely: A neokonzervatív állam Thatchertől Cameronig. [The 
neoconservative state from Thatcher to Cameron.] Politikatudományi Szemle 
XIX/3. p. 32. 
100 eGedy op. sic. p. 37. 
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The political ideology and the economic doctrine – that can be called 
neoliberalism and “market fundamentalism” – that strongly defined the 
past 20-25 years worldwide and existed in parallel with neoconservativism 
reinterpreted the state’s social role among others. According to this 
interpretation the place of  the state that already reached a crisis in the 
‘70s and that can be called welfare from a social aspect, planner or 
intervener from an economic aspect, or business like – through the state 
owned companies – was/could be taken by the more efficient “regulator 
state”. The regulator state tries less to increase social and economic 
welfare through direct income transfers, subsidies and the operation of  
state owned companies, it rather intends to create the institutional and 
regulation conditions that help the emergence of  the market as the so 
to say most efficient allocation mechanism. In this approach the increase 
of  social welfare could haven been interpreted primarily as the fruit of  
the improvement of  efficiency.101 
Today, as it was mentioned above, – in connection with the role of  
the state - the opinions that from the (New) Public Management state 
concept and the neoweberian state concept strongly argue in favour of  
the latter; for as much as they state that instead of  the aspects of  cost 
efficiency and result orientation etc. and the “dismissal” and “dis-magic” 
of  the state coming from that, and the bigger and bigger outsourcing of  
state functions, the creation of  a stronger and more active state should 
be pursued. Since it became more and more common from the ‘70s 
that various governments financed a wide range of  welfare services, but 
they often assigned for-profit or non-profit organisations to the actual 
service activity. This way the expansion of  welfare care was temporarily 
available without the substantial increase of  bureaucracy.102 Opinions 
about the success of  the new public management have been different 
from the ‘80s: some considered it a miracle, while others pointed out 
101 Boda, zsolT – scheirinG, GáBor: A közszolgáltatások politikai értelmezéséről. 
[The political interpretation of  public services.] Politikatudományi Szemle XIX/3. 
pp. 45-46. 
102 lesTer m. salamon: The rise of  the non-profit sector. Foreign Affairs (1994) 
Vol. 73, No. 4. p. 2.
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that with the introduction of  the new theory best case scenario is/was 
the saving of  3% of  the costs of  public institutions.103
New approaches also consider the maintenance of  the requirements 
of  the rule of  law important, and the further enforcement of  certain 
efficiency aspects, but they consider the substantial involvement of  the 
elements of  strategic thinking and strategic planning into public politics 
inevitable. Followers of  the stronger state – that in the dispute about 
good government and good governance take sides more decisively in favour of  
the importance of  the former – argue that transparency, accountability and 
responsibility that appear as basic requirements are only possible where 
the well rethought strategy of  the cooperation between the state and 
the private sphere appears contrary to the uncertainties of  for example 
outsourcing and PPP constructions that dismiss sharp boundaries. 
PPP construction proved to be especially unsuccessful in Hungary: the 
studies prepared by the Development and Methodology Institution of  
the State Audit Office of  Hungary clearly showed that market research 
necessary for the foundation of  the projects and the impact study about 
the opportunities of  implementation were missing in the majority of  the 
cases, moreover no economical and cost-comparison calculations were 
made (!); most of  the specific constructions did not fulfil the elemental 
(classic) expectations – that had the state’s interest in view – imposed on 
PPP investments either, for as much as during such an investment the 
implementation (construction), availability and operating risks (would 
have) had to be born by the investor.104
In connection with good governance theories it is unavoidable to state 
that this trend does/did not react to the problems coming from the 
Western-European development, but it is/was an artificial requirement 
system established for the developing world the primary aim of  which 
is/was the increase of  the subsidy absorbing and utilising capacity of  
103 hosszú, horTenzia: Az állam szerepe a kormányzásban. [The state’s role 
in governance.] In: Államszerep válság idején [State role in crisis.] (editor: hosszú, 
horTenzia – Gellén, márTon), COMPLEX Kiadó, Budapest, 2010. 51. 
104 BáGer, GuszTáv: A köz- és magánszféra együttműködésével kapcsolatos nemzetközi 
és hazai tapasztalatok. [International and domestic experiences in connection with 
the cooperation of  the public and the private sphere.] Állami Számvevőszék 
Fejlesztési és Módszertani Intézet, Budapest, 2007. p. 63. 
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the beneficiary countries, in a way that the “right” regulation methods 
of  the relationship of  the state and the society and the desire for the 
introduction of  appropriate market mechanisms were defined, urging 
the takeover of  the model compatible with the Western democracies.105 
Nevertheless, the expression good governance is a construction appearing in 
the description attempts of  the features of  Western countries’ economic 
development as well.106
The most sensitive question in connection with the model of  good 
governance is whether we interpret the concept of  good from the 
result’s or the process’ side; as in the former case good governance will 
be the one that is most efficient in the allocation of  public goods and 
enforcement of  commonweal that raises how to handle efficient but 
not democratic models, forms of  state (e.g. Singapore).107 This dilemma 
arises especially sharply today – besides the expansion of  neoweberian 
concepts strengthened by the crises - primarily in connection with the 
task of  demarcation of  public and private interest. 
The most frequently mentioned element of  the circle of  concept of  
good governance is the program of  managing democratic deficits that 
appears in various scenes; even the main goal of  the document „About 
good governance” issued by the European Commission in 2001 was 
to transform the EU’s governmental system in order for the European 
Union’s institutional system to get closer to the European citizens through 
the coherence of  common and community policies.108
2.1.1. Attempts of  the good state in Hungary 
Processes of  the two decades (1990-2010) after the Hungarian system 
change can be characterised with even two paradoxes: 
105 hosszú op. sic. p. 53. 
106 Bevir, marK: Key Concepts in Governance. SAGE, Delhi, 2009. p. 95. 
107 hosszú op. sic. p. 53. 
108 Torma, andrás: Hét tézis az EU és a tagállamok közigazgatása közötti 
kapcsolatról. [Seven theses about the relationship between the EU and the 
member states’ public administration.] In: Publicationes Universitatis Miskolcinensis, 
SECTIO JURIDICA ET POLITICA Tomus XXIX/2. Miskolc University Press, 
Miskolc, 2011. p. 325.
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1. The integration of  the Hungarian economy into the world market 
happened without the convergence of  the whole of  the Hungarian 
economy. 
2. The gradual weakening of  the state and the failure of  the substantial 
reform of  the state budget together resulted in the formation of  a 
territorially big, but not efficient state. „The Hungarian state model 
became too extended for night guard state and too weak for welfare 
state. This model could be mostly named „speed bump state” as 
it spreads along many fields of  the economy and the society, but 
it is not present where its strength and organisational skills would 
be needed the most; it protects regarding its intention, but actually 
it rather breaks down the processes, wants to obstacle bad, but 
eventually it can be bypassed and stepped through”.109
We can state that the „market turn” reduced to privatisation and 
outsourcing at the very end of  the 20th and the very beginning of  the 21st 
century did not result in real competition in Hungary. „Public institution 
monopoly was often replaced by private monopoly. The privatisation of  
public services resulted in the formation of  a client system; outsourcing 
often became a source of  the increasing of  corruption. (…) So, the 
efficiency of  public services was not increased significantly by the 
application of  market mechanisms. The common thesis that private 
companies are more efficient in public services than public institutions 
was not justified by practice in any country in the modern world so far.”110 
The embeddedness of  these ideas was strengthened by that according 
to the neoclassical economic perception the state has to intervene only 
in the case of  services – like home defence, education, public and asset 
safety, environmental protection etc. – where the market does not 
operate perfectly or at all. (…) Until recent times it was also presumed 
in Hungary that the tasks performed by the state are expressedly second-
109 pulay, Gyula: Az éjjeliőr államtól a fekvőrendőr államig. Merre tovább? 
[From night guard state to speed bump state. Which way to go?] Új Magyar 
Közigazgatás 6-7/2010. p. 29. 
110 Jenei op. sic. pp. 95-96. 
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class compared to tasks performed by private companies according to 
the instructions of  the market.111
Of  course the „rediscovery” of  the state is also not a direction 
that can be absolutised; if  the state solved all tasks through the central 
bureaucracy it could hardly avoid critics regarding the totalitarian – and 
what is at least as important, the less efficient – state. Basically this is the 
reason for the tasks acknowledged and undertaken by the state are just 
partly solved by the state itself, according to the principle of  subsidiarity, 
and in many cases the state relies on the help of  institutions of  the 
economic and civil sphere and religious institutions. 
An important fact that is not closely related to what I have said, is 
that such forms of  state intervention can be possible that do not narrow 
the autonomy enjoyed in the private sphere, but – in certain cases – they 
expand it. The expansion, centralisation, lets say nationalisation of  
education, social and healthcare is typically like this. We see this direction 
being realised in all three fields in Hungary based on the current political 
commitments and regulation intentions (see later). 
It also depends on the institutional features of  the state (organisation 
system, features of  internal decision making processes, characteristics 
of  conciliation and conflict management mechanisms, the separate 
interests of  those acting in the administration, resources at the state’s 
disposal, etc.), whether it is able to overcome its boundaries set by the 
social relations, and to actively participate in the formation of  them. 
We may find a significant part of  the answers under the section of  the 
so-called „developing state” section in the bibliography.112 It was a widely 
accepted scientific and professional standpoint for a long time, that „In 
Hungary there is a need for a state that is self-limiting but powerful and 
is adjusting to the challenges of  the 21st century, and is performing social 
111 csáKi, GyörGy: A fejlesztő állam – új felfogásban. [The developing state – 
in new perception.] In: csáKi, GyörGy (editor): A látható kéz. A fejlesztő állam a 
globalizációban. [The visible hand. The developing state in globalisation.] Napvilág Kiadó, 
Budapest, 2009. pp. 13-14. 
112 A nemzetközi fejlesztéspolitikai stratégiakészítés gyakorlata, [The practice of  
international development policy strategy making.] Kopint-Datorg Rt., Budapest, 
2006. pp. 9–32. 
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management based of  consequent strategy planning”.113 Balázs Kovács 
has already referred to that both the European Union and Hungary are 
in crisis regarding the field of  development politics based on strategic 
planning when setting this thesis. Since strategic planning is not properly 
aligned with challenges, the made documents about development politics 
are characterised by the absence of  social consensus and the development 
policy oriented planning is still at an early stage in the domestic public 
administration: the strategies providing base for planning are incidental 
and usually they were made in a not proactive way, because of  external 
pressure, as an effect of  expectations coming from the membership of  
the European Union”.114 
Today it can also be stated that the state’s – abovementioned – 
consciously self-limiting character has significantly decreased, due to the 
various crises. Basically the current problems and perspectives of  the 
developing state can be considered the consequences of  the changed 
world economic environment and the globalisation. The especially 
problematic „moving” fields among the relations of  nowadays world 
economy are for example the maintenance of  the extended system of  
state subventions; the operation of  commercial and foreign currency 
limitations; the substantial limitation of  the penetration of  transnational 
companies, the limitation of  foreign investor’s activity in the capital 
market115, and recently the limitation of  lending and borrowing. 
The primary goal of  today’s developing countries to provide „decent 
standard of  living” 116 for their citizens – based on Western models – 
becomes less and less maintainable, and also it can only be interpreted 
besides the revaluation of  the role and weight of  the developed world. 
Of  course from the aspect of  the world economic convergence to 
the countries of  the developed centre in development, the significant 
decrease of  the severe internal imbalances of  the developing countries, 
the optimalisation of  the profit to be obtained from external economic 
113 Kovács, Balázs: Fejlesztő állam a XXI. században. [Developing state in the 
21st century.] Polgári Szemle 4/2006. www.polgariszemle.hu/archivum 
114 Ibid
115 csáKi op. sic. p. 31. 
116 csáKi op. sic. p. 33. 
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relations, the developing state remains the most viable option in the 
third millennium as well.117
Magyary Zoltán Public Administration Development Programme – 
that made the intention of  forming the public administration to be of  
national nature equal of  the previously favoured efficiency aspect - became 
one of  the frames, and the continuously renewing and “rephrased” base 
– beyond public administration – of  the Hungarian government’s ideas 
regarding the good state after 2010.118 
2.2. Metamorphosis of  the state. Certain theoretical questions of  the performance 
of  public duties
After 2010 the area for movement of  the state was extended also because 
(majority of) human public service institutions which previously were 
operated by local governments – primarily in the field of  health care 
and education – were (or will be soon) transferred to state maintenance.
In parallel with this the centralisation of  the previously torn, hardly 
manageable system of  specialised authorities is being performed; many 
specialised authorities which were independent earlier integrated into 
the metropolitan and county government office operating as regional 
institutions of  the Government, and another important change is that 
the administrative tasks of  local governments will be gradually shifted to 
newly establishable organisations; from 1 January 2013 approximately 80 
types of  cases will be shifted from the notary of  the local government 
to the new district (in Hungarian: járás) offices. 
According to newer approaches the new solutions of  service 
organisations are not only forced by external conditions and market 
anomalies, but – beyond these – also the traditionally low efficiency 
of  state/local governmental institutions.119 It is an important question, 
117 Ibid
118 Magyary Zoltán Közigazgatás-fejlesztési Program. [Magyary Zoltán Public 
administration Development Programme.] A Közigazgatási és Igazságügyi 
Minisztérium kiadványa, Budapest, 2012. p. 5. 
119 Józsa, zolTán: Önkormányzati szervezet, funkció, modernizáció. [Organisation, 
function, modernisation of  local governments.] Dialóg Campus Kiadó, Budapest-Pécs, 
2006. p. 78. 
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therefore, what effect the use of  non-traditional organisational forms, 
within it the inclusion (or repeated exclusion) of  the elements of  civil 
and for-profit sector would have on the system of  administrative 
organisations, the performance of  public duties (with regard to the fact 
that the public organisations traditionally have competition hampering, 
monopolistic features). 
Does the operation of  these organisations endanger the unity, 
transparency, stability of  the administrative institution system; if  yes, is 
it necessary, despite this, to include them into the performance of  public 
duties? Is the performance of  public duties cheaper with the inclusion 
of  for-profit and non-profit organisations? We may definitely state that 
expect for some exceptions – no! The inclusion is often not justified 
by the reason that it makes the performance of  public duties cheaper 
– and through this, more effective – but the fact that the building and 
maintenance of  society has some momentums beyond the law and 
some which are not necessarily influencable by law, such as the existence 
of  the knowledge and skills of  social solidarity, trust towards certain 
institutions – and unwritten norms, – networking making harmonised 
actions easier. Regarding the creation of  social capital these may be even 
more important than the results of  legislations and the conditions of  
financing. With regard to networking it shall be stressed that one central 
approach of  the renewal of  governance focuses on those networks which 
it views as the central features of  modern governance.120
By today it has become clear also in Hungary that changes within 
the traditional administrative (public administration) institutional system 
did not solve the problems alone anywhere. The answer, therefore, is 
twofold, on the one hand the reinvention of  the state is going on (the 
replanning of  the catalogue of  public duties and the replanning of  the 
public task performer), on the other hand the performance of  public 
duties, especially public services – which cannot be fitted into the scope of  
narrower public administration and system of  tools – is realised through 
constantly renewing shape and type organisations, tools and methods. 
Naturally, it shall be added to the picture that the crises emerging after 
2008 do not favour those ideas – popular also lately – which consider 
120 hosszú op. sic. p. 52.
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instead of  care taking forms based on high staff  number institutions 
the transformation, „outsourcing” these to small communities better 
and necessary, from several aspects.121 
2.2.1. Relationship of  the state and civil organisations and their 
territory marked by law
Very different standpoints have been developed in the Hungarian literature 
regarding the features of  entities that partly fill the territory between 
the state bodies and the narrower private sphere of  the individual, and 
the boundaries of  certain spheres (state, market and civil etc.). Many say 
many from Tamás Sárközy to Éva Kuti, they place the dividing and fault 
lines elsewhere, but all of  them agree that the question is very important 
also from the aspect of  the state’s performance ability as well. 
Until the middle-end of  the 2000s the state received serious critique, 
saying that „the efficiency of  the state organisation and within that the governmental 
direction is low because of  the hyper proliferation of  the background organisations 
and the constant intention aimed at the creation of  half-state fake civil organisations 
(public foundations, public bodies, public companies)”.122
While in the ’90s and 2000s majority of  the authors condemned 
the state overload and the negative effects of  the mesosphere, saying 
that it weakens civil activity, the compellingness to self-care, etc., today 
most of  the criticism refers to the openly expanding state that draws 
the public duties to itself. Otherwise, in the latter case it is only that the 
state – recognising that directly or indirectly it is almost a sole financer 
in many fields – leaves out the local governments and for or non-profit 
organisations from the task fulfilment and financing process. 
Apparently a process – serving parallel and same goals – is going 
on, in the frames of  which the state consciously reorganises the legal 
status and the subsidy system of  the organisations of  the civil sphere 
121 pFeiFFer, Jan: A nagy létszámú intézményeken alapuló ellátási formák 
átalakítása Közép-Kelet-Európában. [Establishment of  care systems based on 
high staff  number isntitutions.] Esély 3/2012. pp. 7-14. 
122 sárKözy, Tamás: Kormányzás, civil társadalom, jog. [Government, civil society and 
law.] Kossuth Kiadó, Budapest 2004. p. 5.
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that have potential roles in the fulfilment of  public duties. It is important 
regarding the civil creations, that 
1. the modifying role of  the local governments can decisively affect 
the future of  civil organisations created near them;
2. churches, as financially supported entities that have a role in the 
fulfilment of  public duties have been through significant decrease 
in number;
3. furthermore, such new creations like civil company123 and social 
cooperative – that was created formally earlier, but gained substantial 
appearance now – received legal status as well (of  course the latter is 
a partially market actor, but it is a type of  organisation with classic 
civil criteria and with e.g. involvement in public labour as well.
We have to add that in Hungary the classification of  civilians based on 
specific activity form and activity level (pressure group, QUANGO124, 
national regional, local organisation, etc.) „does not have much importance, 
partly because apart from the chambers they do not have adequate 
regulations, and partly because theoretically all non-state organisations 
do all sorts of  things”.125
By the way we may call the QUANGOs in Hungary GUANGO, 
with a little word game – by merging the words guano and NGO – for 
as much as this organisation circle was „layered on” various social needs 
in a way that beyond a point – the financing and maintenance was made 
gratuitous – it left them behind, making the aspects of  transparency, 
accountability and efficiency of  secondary importance, or sometimes 
even less.
The feature (previous tendency), according to which the state imitates, 
reconstructs and substitutes the civil sphere, weakening that was already 
123 The legislator introduced this form of  association without legal personality 
in 2011. [Article 578/J paragraph (1) of  the Civil Code: Natural persons may 
establish association for the facilitaion of  their non-financial interest and for the 
harmonisation of  their community activities without financial contribution (civil 
association).] 
124 Quasi non-governmental organisation
125 Krémer, Balázs: Az NGO kultuszáról. [About the cult of  the NGO.] Esély 
2/1996. p. 50.
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pointed out in several references. During the analysis of  the issue it 
cannot be disregarded that the economic and sociological literature of  
the past one-two decades is mainly about that the state by undertaking 
the „replacement” and „simulation” of  the market and self-regulating 
social mechanisms, and particularly the political organisation of  the 
society, ultimately the state itself  prevents the political decision processes 
meeting the actual interest fragmentation of  the society. 
Real social autonomies – due to their independence - are at least partly 
resistant to various external interventions. This – regarding the examined 
topic - provides opportunity for the formation of  at least two statements: 
the existence of  autonomy – at best – is independent of  in what forms the 
institutional separation constituted by law is manifested, and the existence 
of  autonomies cannot depend on the indirect or direct financial subsidy 
of  the state. So, it is worth stating that besides ensuring e.g. the basic legal 
conditions of  individual and organised common-like practise of  religion 
and the protection guarantees, – in religious life references in the narrower sense 
– the state does not have any further institutional obligations to religious 
communities operating in any forms in Hungary, and no community can 
raise expectations towards the state regarding material subsidy, considering 
just its own religious character. In a given case losing the spiritual status126 
and the possible „total material impossibility” occurring as a result of  that 
cannot be connected formally – even if  we are talking about an unjustified 
withdrawal – since the primary basis of  the viability of  a civil-like creation 
cannot be the existence of  state financing. The social fields that are viable 
beyond the need for autonomy have to be able to take care of  their own 
basic means of  sustenance besides creating internal regulations, customs 
and symbols, even when they are increasingly vulnerable to and at the 
mercy of  regulations, decisions and other forces coming from the „bigger” 
world that surrounds them..127 This logic is not in contradiction with the 
argument that states as an expectation that the conscious state places emphasis 
on the predictable regulation environment and on working out the set forms of  value 
terms commitment that supports the institutions of  social solidarity, e.g. through the 
taxation system of  the creation of  the public benefit status. 
126 New act on curches
127 GunTher TeuBner op. sic. 75. 
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Civil organisation – at best – creates institutional channel between the 
society and the state, transmit the society’s needs and interests towards 
the state, on the other hand it forces the state to continuously legitimate 
itself, and to increase the publicity of  its operation.128 Civil society 
and political state cannot exist without each other, but both try to be 
superior to the other.129 Even in a way that it expropriates the traditional 
institutions and classic territory of  the other „party”… Therefore (and 
for the sake of  completeness) we have to indicate that the dismissal and 
the narrowing of  the state and its exile from certain fields previously 
mentioned many times was not a one-way, homogenous process in the 
past two decades either; since in this previous period, as a result of  the 
change of  the state’s role consciousness and through its international 
obligations new tasks became public duties that were not undertaken 
before. One of  the good examples for this is victim protection that 
appears as not only a public administration task, the regulation of  which 
was missing earlier as well, and (almost) solely civil people fulfilled the 
certain tasks. However – with some simplification - the state penetrated 
into this field in the middle of  the 2000s, temporarily superseding the 
dominant White Ring Association that was operating there earlier. 
One of  the final questions is how far the civil society can go in the participation 
of  (political) decision making? According to the general view the presence 
is desirable and subservient only in the decision preparation phase that 
presents both informal and institutionalised forms. 130 It is important, 
that the complete public negligation of  the civil society in Hungary would mean the 
violation of  norms that are less mature regarding the legal forms, but already exist 
in the form of  political etiquette.
128 JaGasics, Béla: A nonprofit szféra elmélete [Theory of  the non-profit sector.] 
Landorhegy Alapítvány, Zalaegerszeg 2001. p. 5.
129 Konrád, GyörGy: Az autonómia kísértése. [Temptation of  autonomy.] Antipolitika. 
Budapest, 1989. p. 17.
130 seBesTyén isTván: Civil dilemmák, civil kételyek a civil szervezetek (köz)
életében. Civil Szemle 2004/1. 36. 
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2.3. New contents of  norms created and maintained by the state
In the examined time period (after 2010) we may have witnessed the 
appearance, (re)vival, positioning in the legal system and constant 
communication of  notions – which were hardly interpretable before as 
practical expectations or rules – such as, among others
a) patriotism, commitment to the nation. Within the scope of  the examination 
of  governmental intentions and possibilities this is one of  the most 
exciting questions: how will the attitude of  the public administration 
of  tomorrow differ from today’s and why? The condition for the 
establishment of  a staff  with proper spirit – and proper professional 
knowledge – is obviously the creation of  a generally known, accepted 
and followed system of  regulations, which, regarding its moral 
directions is unavoidable, thus has primacy compared to the necessarily 
secondary – though existing – regulatory content. If  this is true, the 
following question rises: beyond the expectations stated in the law 
what further elements are needed for this?
b) state level sense of  justice, which is also shown in „how the members 
of  society interpret political phenomena and how they take the 
criticism of  others” – state Veronika Takács with reference to Rawls. 
„If  defeated by the sense of  justice of  the majority the government 
may even give up the protection of  its unjust advantages. The sense 
of  justice is a great social value the protection of  which requires the 
cooperation of  many.”131 The society „shall tolerate those somewhat 
disturbing behaviours [which differ from the system of  values of  the 
society], or shall fight against them with non-legal means”.132 The 
public law sanctioning of  a behaviour violating public order may 
be justified only if  „it becomes obvious that the non-legal means 
are not enough for ensuring lawful behaviour”.133 The real critical 
131 Cites: TaKács, veroniKa: A polgári engedetlenség mozgalma. [Civil 
disobedience movement.] Közpolitika 2/2011. p. 6.
132 KánTás, péTer: A közrend elleni jogsértések természetéről c. doktori értekezés 
tézisei. [Thesises of  Doctoral Dissertation ’About the nature of  violations of  law 
against public order.] Budapest, 2010. p. 4. 
133 Ibid.
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point is when dissatisfaction – due to the subjectively experienced 
„unacceptability” of  the existing circumstances – oversteps the 
considerations of  individual safety, like an anomy, and the retentive 
effect of  calculable consequences related to expectations ceases to 
exist.
In the field of  authority „everyday political failures” may be the 
significant and „structural” uncertainty falling on those concerned 
due to the operation of  the given political sector, the inoperability 
of  sanction system(s) and the „demonstration effect” caused by 
the massive, obvious violations of  law which remained without 
consequences.134 Among the main reasons of  changes of  laws and 
institutional changes after 2010 there are certainly present a major 
amount of  needs which were formulated upon the political and 
street events of  2006, which had on themselves the contours of  a 
sort of  collective feeling of  justice, resulting in the overwhelming 
victory of  FIDESZ-KDNP at the elections of  2010.
c) social solidarity. It is obvious that the at least proper enforcement of  
laws and other norms – due to historical and other reasons – also 
in this field may only be possible through the establishment and 
facilitating of  the development of  conscious and initiative solidarity. 
The conclusion of  this work is that the developer state does not 
only mean the improvement of  the (concentrated) accessibility of  
different services and the higher level planning and publicity of  
certain authority functions, but also the priority of  the means and 
institutions of  social cohesion beyond budget rationality. In this the 
long term professional principles of  certain authority fields have 
extremely important role, thus only the existence of  these, and their 
validity which cannot be torn apart by changes of  governments may 
ensure socially calculable development. At the same time we shall 
tell off  the belief  that the changes of  law necessary bring about 
the changes of  society (as well), as – referring back to the previous 
thought – only the continuous representation of  clear values provide for 
real changes.
134 haJnal op. sic. p. 49.
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Naturally, law shall constantly offer its own results which clearly 
communicate the values of  the majority, because „no solid foundations 
can be laid for the safe functioning of  the constitutional order without […] 
making a clear distinction between democracy and dictatorship, right and wrong, 
good and evil” (Transitional Provisions to the Fundamental Law of  
Hungary135 Preamble).
d) in general the shift of  attention to natural law thinking (for details 
see subchapter IV.1.2)
In case of  values and principles listed above the most important professional 
challenge is the dilemma that how these expectations – within the scope 
of  regulation of  certain life situations – may be put into practice, and 
what shall be done if  the applicable provisions of  itemised law get into 
conflict with these. The latter question may be formulated in a way that 
whether in a rule of  law constellation it is possible – in the course of  
law enforcement and further legislation – to consciously represent interests 
against the all time valid laws? The Hungarian legal life after 2010 provides 
several examples that in the government there are intentions to answer the 
question positively. In addition to the many examples presented in this work 
it is worth mentioning one more: in July 2012 Máté Szabó, Parliamentary 
Commissioner of  Human Rights draw attention to the fact that the limit 
of  the number of  students acceptable to higher education was set in the 
EMMI136 contrary to the rules of  the relevant laws. „The government 
shall withdraw its decision about the number of  state funded students 
acceptable to higher education, and shall set out the limit of  the number 
of  students entering higher education in the academic year 2012/2013 in 
compliance with the relevant legal regulations” – this is what Máté Szabó, 
Parliamentary Commissioner of  Human Rights requested the government 
to do. In relation with a petition the parliamentary commissioner started 
procedure ex officio in June 2012 about the significant reduction of  the 
number of  students acceptable to higher education. He held that the 
government did not comply with the guarantee provisions of  the valid act 
on higher education, so far as those regulate that the limit of  the number 
135 Hereinafter referred to as Aár. 
136 Ministry of  Human Resources.
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of  students could differ from the number of  the previous year with plus-
minus 10%. Upon the question of  the parliamentary commissioner the same was 
admitted by the undersecretary of  state responsible for education, but in this regard he 
referred to the realisation of  the strategic goals of  the government.
“The Fundamental Law strictly declares that laws oblige everyone, 
thus also state institutions” – writes Máté Szabó. “During the realisation 
of  factors, guidelines and goals defining the professional-strategic 
environment state institutions shall always act in compliance with the law. 
The decision of  the Constitutional Court delivered in a similar question, 
upon the regulation regarding the number of  students considers legislation 
unlawful if  the content of  a lower level norm was not defined in line 
with the provisions of  the act carrying authorisation for its enactment.” 
Based on this the parliamentary commissioner held that the guarantees 
of  the act on higher education were not fulfilled during the enactment of  
the government decree, which caused controversies in relation with the 
principle of  legal certainty, and through this with the right to education.
2.3.1. New contents of  the meaning of  public interest
Among new values and increasingly protectable aspects we have to 
mention especially the notion of  public interest, the extraordinary role 
and materially new meaning of  which entitles it to be presented – in a 
catalogised way – in a separated subchapter.
In case of  any organisation – therefore also in case of  the state – the 
„built-in Achilles-heel” of  operation is the operational disturbance which 
may occur upon the primacy of  individual (private) interests against 
public or community interests.137 By examining the older Hungarian legal 
system – which existed before the summer of  2010 – we may state that the 
protection of  individual interests is more sophisticated and realistic (thus 
more relevant in practice) than the abstract and ambiguous protection of  
public interest. The most extreme example of  this „disorder of  balances” 
is the political (legislative) corruption138, the diagnosis of  which is that market 
137 chrisTopher hood: The Art of  the State. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998. p. 25. 
138 haász, János – maGyari, péTer: A pártok együtt számolták a kenőpénzt. 
[Parties counted the bribe money together.] 22 March 2010 http://index.hu/
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players „wrote” the law, which were intended to serve their interests (e.g. 
in case of  the Podolák-Fónagy modification).139 Certain effective lobbies 
sometimes „overdid the expectations”; in the Hungarian Parliament it 
was not a one-time occasion when due to the involvement of  serious 
economic (private) interests two or more – textually – identical proposals 
or modification proposals were submitted. Due to the „electricity-lobby”, 
which was considered the strongest at the time there was a draft law to 
which two – fully identical – modification proposals were submitted, 
one from the representatives of  the then opposition KDNP, the other 
from a representative of  the then governing MSZP.140 
Main directions of  the protection of  public interest in Hungary – after 2010
a) making public finances more transparent and establishing further limits to the 
use of  public funds (for details see section I of  subchapter IV.2.3.2)
b) extension of  the notion of  public interest
The regulation (or detailed regulation) of  fields from which the state 
earlier kept out (or which it did not regulate thoroughly) belong 
into this scope.
ba) An example for this is the inclusion of  the state support of  
„foreign currency debtors in trouble” into the scope of  public interest, 
in parallel with the thorough regulation of  financial institutions. 
From the aspect of  our topic a significant and at the same time new 
attempt is the act LXXV of  2011 on the fixing of  the exchange 
rates used for the calculation of  instalments of  foreign exchange 
denominated mortgage loans and the forced sales procedure of  
gazdasag/magyar/2010/03/22/a_partok_egyutt_szamoltak_a_kenopenzt/
139 On 20 November 2009 János Fónagy and György Podolák MPs of  MSZP 
submitted to the Parliament a package about the modification of  fifty-seven sections, 
under the title „The modification of  energy laws”. Within sixty-six minutes the MPs 
voted positively on the modifications with significant majority. According to experts 
for the period between 2011 and 2015 the law increased the price of  electricity with 
12.7 billion HUF compared to the previous plans of  the energy office – by the 
modification of  the support budget of  certain power plants.
140 TóTh, isTván János (ed.) :Kormányzati kudarcok, járadékvadászat és korrupciós 
kockázatok a magyar villamosenergia-szektorban. [Governmental failures, allowance hunting 
and corruption risks in the Hunagrian electricity sector.] BCE Korrupciókutató-központ, 
Budapest, 2010. pp. 141-144.
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residential properties, together with the new act approved in 2011 
on the final repayment of  foreign currency debts – also on the 
modification of  some acts related to the protection of  homes – which 
provided for the repayment of  foreign currency loans at 180 HUF/1 
CHF and 250 HUF / 1 EUR exchange rate. The incorporation 
of  idea(s) into an act means that the state, with retroactive force, 
overwrote the private law contracts made earlier between banks and 
debtors. On the one side there are the requirements of  financial 
stability and legal certainty, while on the other side there might be 
the outlines of  some kind of  public interest, which, with regard to 
the significant changes recognised by law which occurred in the 
circumstances after the conclusion of  the contracts – which make 
the performance of  obligations almost impossible – justifies state 
intervention at unusual degree and depth;
bb) increased protection of  community values
Act XXX of  2012 on Hungarian national values and Hungaricums 
states in advance that specific collections, national values, and the 
different level and characteristic of  their collections, so-called 
value bases are established, which present new frameworks in the 
identification, systematization of  national values, in the registration 
of  their data, and in their continuous updating and maintenance. 
bc) the clarification and detailed description of  the content of  certain 
responsibilities also belong to this field. As it may bee seen from 
below today’s Hungarian law presents the regulation and sanctioning 
need of  the state regarding the individual, the parent, the community, 
the local government and the state in a much broader scope than 
before (e.g. introduction of  the notion of  damages caused with 
legislation, increase of  the level of  expectations towards parents, 
etc.). (For details see subchapter IV.2.3.2.)
c) limitation of  non-essential content of  fundamental rights
ca) Another form, direction of  expressing public interest and 
strengthen the mechanisms for the protection of  public interest is 
the gradually increasing limitation of  the „not significant content” 
of  fundamental rights with respect to public interest.141
141 In its decision 22/1992. (VI. 10.) AB the Constitutional Court, based on 
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On 4 October 2010 approximately 700 thousand cubic meters, 
strongly virulent, dangerous mud spread over Devecser, Kolontár, 
Somlóvásárhely, Tüskevár, Apácatorna and Kisberzseny, because a 
retaining wall of  a red mud container of  the privately owned alumina 
factory in the close town of  Ajka broke. The gravity of  the catastrophe 
is well shown by the fact that the government first declared, then – 
upon the decision of  the Parliament on 18 October 2010 – prolonged 
till 31 December 2010 the emergency situation in Vas, Veszprém and 
Győr-Moson-Sopron counties. As – one of  the – normative answer(s) 
of  the government given to the mentioned events act CV of  2004 
on national defence and the Hungarian Army – within the scope of  
extraordinary measures applicable in environmental emergencies – was 
supplemented with the following Article 197/A: “The operations of  a 
business association may be brought – in line with those set forth in (3) – under the 
supervision of  the Hungarian State. (2) In the name of  the Hungarian State the 
undersecretary for public finances or a government representative may act. (3) The 
person defined in paragraph (2) a) reviews the financial situation of  the business 
association, b) approves, signs the financial obligations of  the business association, 
c) in connection with the avoidance of  the situation which reasoned the introduction 
of  the extraordinary measures and the alleviation of  consequences decided in issues 
belonging to the competence of  the main organ of  the business association (…)”. 
It is important to mention that the provisions of  the new act had 
(has) to be applied also in the ongoing cases. According to the 
reasoning of  the draft law its goal was to create more effective 
possibilities of  governmental intervention for more effective measures 
against catastrophes occurring in connection with the activities of  
certain business associations and for the alleviation of  their harmful 
consequences. For this it became possible that – beyond the previous, 
liberal legal concept – the minister responsible for public finances 
or a governmental representative may supervise the operations and 
the permanent practice of  the body held that “the limitation of  fundamental 
rights remains within constitutional limits if  the limitation is not related to the 
untouchable essence of  the fundamental law, if  it is unavoidable, thus if  it is 
forced, moreover, if  the weight of  limitation is not disproportionate compared to 
the goal which it aims at achieving.”
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activities of  the given business association, based on the decision 
of  the government.  
cb) Based on Article 46 paragraph (7) of  act CXC of  2011 on 
national education the enforcement of  a student’s rights shall not 
violate the interests of  other students or the public, the public rights. 
The phrase according to which the child, during the enforcement of  
his rights shall not violate “public interests” describes the act’s attitude 
well. Based on this undefined interest the right to participation in 
education, or the right to human dignity may be limited unilaterally. 
It is not just a theoretical possibility, which is shown by the fact 
that in the future school-age students may be banned from school 
based on this.
d) definition of  public interest as national interest
Let us present here only one example (of  the several available). 
The following is read in the Preamble of  Act CXCIX of  2011 on 
public service civil servants: “A state, which is strong, not bigger 
than necessary, which is able to adjust to changes quickly and flexibly 
– which gives preference to national interests – may be based on 
public service which bears the appreciation of  society, is effective 
and cost efficient, democratic, party neutral, operates lawfully, and 
it members have modern knowledge, they serve Hungary’s interests 
and the public good impartially and with patriotism. Our aim is to 
facilitate the establishment of  the value based civil servant professions 
based on strong patriotism.”142
2.3.2. New concepts of  responsibility
Responsibility of  the continuous, constant recognition of  the rules of  social 
relations, behaviour in compliance with these; responsibility for behaviour, 
for its fitting into social relationships; the obligation of  commitment for 
antisocial behaviours.143 The next feature of  today’s Hungarian legal system 
cannot be separated from the – moral – issues which have been repeatedly 
analysed earlier: the new, system-based concept of  responsibility. With some 
142 Highlighted by the author (á. R.)
143 Ibid.
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simplification the key issue of  conservative and neoconservative paradigm 
is responsibility, moreover, the revolution of  responsibility, contrary to 
other – previously dominant – concepts absolutising freedom.144
In this new approach the citizen does not appear primarily as the 
addressee of  rights and exemptions or as consumer, but mainly as 
responsible citizen (also in the expectations of  laws), which took place 
in the new laws by the more thorough, more precise and sanctioned 
definition of  different responsibilities.
A speciality of  the regulation is that according to its intentions 
it appears at all possible levels and forms, moreover, it consciously 
increased expectations at all stages and situations: e.g. in the scope of  
state responsibility in addition to increasing its role in the performance 
of  public duties it introduces the notion of  damages caused with 
legislation. Even though financial prohibitions may be mainly mentioned 
with regard to state organisations, the so-called extra taxes introduced 
in 2010 and later with regard to market organisations, in the financial, 
the energy and the telecommunications sector may also be mentioned 
in this sphere. This new legal concept clarifies the responsibility of  the 
individual from several aspects, and also beyond motivation for self-
reliance; e.g. it defines the content of  parental obligations more clearly.
If  we examine the question from the aspect of  governmental 
capacity, we shall definitely state that the comprehensive strengthening 
of  different circles and levels of  responsibility my ease, balance of  the 
possible negative effects of  the extension of  the role of  the state.
Let us analyse the separate spheres of  responsibility systematically:
I. Responsibility of  the state
In relation with the before mentioned red mud catastrophe in Kolontár 
the review, reconsideration and precise regulation of  the responsibility of  
the state and its organisations became especially urgent. In my opinion 
the responsibility of  the state – in general – may be raised in three – 
hardly separable regards:
144 BaráT, Tamás: Felelősség – társadalmi felelősségvállalás. [Responsibility 
– social responsibility.] In: Társadalom, gazdaság, jog, politika. XXI. Század - 
Tudományos Közlemények, April 2012 (27.) p. 47. 
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a) the omission of  authorities (in forms of  responsibility for late 
performance of  obligations, not or not properly performed inspection 
or supervision activities, in cases in which these had legal ground), 
or their mistakes (defaulted individual decisions);
b) in form of  responsibility for missing legislation, missing laws, and 
for dysfunctional legal environment.
c) as question of  responsibility beyond and regardless of  the existence 
and content of  laws: by examining the existence of  moral, ethical 
extra responsibility of  entities, institutions, persons embodying the 
all time power in a centrally organised society.145 From the moral 
responsibility c1) political responsibility taking or c2) a form of  
mitigation of  damages, compensation may emerge, which is not 
based on law, thus is mainly justified by the basic expectations of  
social solidarity, raised to the level of  state politics. 
Within the scope of  responsibility of  the state the newer Hungarian 
legal development performed the following precisions:
a) extension of  the scope of  tasks performed directly by the state
b) extension of  liability for damages (damages caused by legislation): 
Article 6:547 of  the New Civil Code prepared upon the Codifying 
Committee introduces the category „Liability for damages caused 
with legislation” into Hungarian law. 
c) extension, precision of  public finances liability
ca) The following may be read in Article N) paragraphs (1)-(3) of  
the Fundamental Law:
(1) Hungary shall enforce the principle of  balanced, transparent and sustainable 
budget management. 
(2) Parliament and the Government shall have primary responsibility for the 
enforcement of  the principle set out in Paragraph (1). 
(3) In the course of  performing their duties, the Constitutional Court, courts, 
local governments and other state organs shall be obliged to respect the principle 
set out in Paragraph (1). 
145 rixer, ádám: A vörösiszap-katasztrófa miatti felelősség. [Responsibility for 
the red mud catastrophe.] In: szécsi, GáBor (ed.): De iuris peritorum meritis 7 – 
Studia in honorem Endre Tanka. KRE ÁJK, Budapest, 2010. pp. 27–28.
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Article 36 paragraph (4) of  the new Fundamental Law may be 
interpreted as attempt for increasing state influence of  (public) 
finances and calculable – reliable – state operations; it reads as 
follows: „[the] Parliament may not adopt a State Budget Act which allows 
state debt to exceed half  of  the Gross Domestic Product.”
cb) Among the most important act setting out the most important 
(financial) legal guarantees of  the efficient use of  public funds we 
shall mention (among the newer acts of  the examined period) Act 
CVIII of  2011 on public procurements, Act CXCIV of  2011 on 
the financial stability of  Hungary, and Act CXCVI of  2011 on 
national property.146
d) extension of  the scope of  responsibility and the prescription of  
specific activity:
da) Hungary – with respect to the togetherness of  the united 
Hungarian nation – shall bear responsibility for the fate of  Hungarians 
living abroad [Article D) of  Hungary’s fundamental law]147
db) In relation with public finances Article 29 paragraph (1) of  
the Aár. introduced the following regulation: “As long as the state 
debt exceeds half  of  the Gross Domestic Product, whenever the State incurs 
a payment obligation deriving from a decision of  the Constitutional Court, 
the Court of  Justice of  the European Union or any other court or an organ 
which applies the law, and the amount previously earmarked by the Act on the 
Central Budget for performing such obligation is insufficient and the missing 
amount cannot even be supplied out of  another amount earmarked by the Act 
on the Central Budget for other purposes without violating the requirement of  
balanced budget management, a special contribution to covering common needs 
shall be established, exclusively and expressly related to the performance of  such 
obligation in terms of  scope and designation.”
146 For details see: pFeFFer, zsolT: A közpénzek hatékony elköltésének pénzügyi 
jogi biztosítékai. [Financial legal guarantees of  effective spending of  public funds.] 
JURA 1/2012. pp. 88-93. 
147 This provision of  the Fundamental Law obviously does not create 
extraterritorial effect or force. About this see: lóránT csinK – Balázs schanda 
– andrás zs. varGa (eds.): The Basic Law of  Hungary. A First Commentary. Clarus 
Press, Dublin, 2012. p. 47. 
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II. Deepening of  responsibility through new expectations towards local governments
Within the principles of  the new local governmental system the main 
goal is to increase the responsibility and self-maintaining abilities of  
local communities, for example through the new public employment 
system or the limitation of  crediting and the prohibition of  planning 
of  operational loss. 148 According to the plans the introduction of  task 
financing will terminate the past practice according to which local 
governments considered all tasks “obligatory”. 
III. Declaration and strengthening of  the responsibility of  communities
a) Section 4 of  the Transitional Provisions to the Fundamental Law 
of  Hungary formulates the responsibility of  one of  the largest 
opposition party’s of  today’s Parliament as follows: 
The Hungarian Socialist Party, having gained legal recognition during the 
democratic transition, shares all responsibility which lies with the state-party, 
as the legal successor of  the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, heir to the 
unlawfully accumulated assets and beneficiary of  the illegitimate advantages 
obtained under the dictatorship or during the transition, and by reason of  the 
personal continuity which linked the old and the new party and is still characteristic 
of  the party’s leadership.
b) by the strengthening of  social partnerships149 motivation for 
community, initiative self-provision.
IV. Responsibility of  market organisations
a) The topic of  responsibility taking of  market organisations, and in 
general the issue of  social responsibility taking was limited to the 
148 For details see: hoFFman, isTván: Átalakuló önkormányzati vagyon – az 
alkotmányos szabályok és a sarkalatos törvények tükrében. [Changing local 
governmental property – in light of  fundamental law rules and cardinal acts.] 
Jegyző és Közigazgatás 3/2012. pp. 18-20. 
149 For details see act X of  2006 on partnerships and on Government decree 
141/2006 (VI. 29.) on social partnerships
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CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility), i.e. the popular topic of  social 
responsibility taking of  organisations till the near past, and it was 
used only in a limited sense: it was intended to present donation, 
charitative activity and sponsorship offering competitive advantage. 
A specific field of  responsibility of  market organisations is the support 
of  culture and within this, sport. Nowadays in Hungary, in the field of  
culture the financing system consists of  several channels: in addition 
to central and local governmental funds – in forms of  direct and 
indirect (e.g. tax allowances) support – the players of  business and 
civil sectors also take significant part of  the mecenature. Without 
going into details regarding valid laws I concentrate on examining 
one significant novelty in this field: from 1 July 2011 a new law 
entered into force according to which companies and entrepreneurs 
subject to corporate law may support the so-called „spectacular 
sports”, among them football, up to the level of  70% of  their tax 
amount.150 Through this support football received significant sources 
for development. However, it is not impossible that this financing 
model will be introduced in other fields of  culture – interpreted in 
the broadest sense – in the near future.
b) Within the examined scope the Hungarian regulations after 2010 
established the new form of  general and proportionate sharing of  
taxation – more balanced than before, adjusted to real financial 
results and possibilities – (also) through the introduction of  the so-
called extra taxes in 2010 and subsequently in the financial sector, 
the energy sector and the telecommunication sector. 
150 For details see Article 22/C of  act LXXXI of  1996 on corporate tax and 
dividend tax
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V. Increasing the level of  individual responsibility
a) Inclination, motivation for self-provision
According to Article O) of  the Fundamental Law „Every person 
shall be responsible for his or herself, and shall be obliged to contribute to the 
performance of  state and community tasks to the best of  his or her abilities and 
potential.” This is closely related to the intention to abolish decades 
old false public agreements: in shall be mentioned that – from July 
2012 – the employment contract of  the employee may be terminated 
also during sick-pay, which abolishes the decades long false practice 
(public agreement) of  escaping into sick-pay – though which being 
supported by the state.
b) Increasing the level of  special (role-related) individual responsibility 
ba) e.g. within the scope of  raising parents’ responsibility Article 
9 paragraph (3) point g) of  Act CCXI of  2011 on the protection 
of  families sets out as parental obligation that the parent shall be 
obliged to take care of  the supervision of  the child based on the 
provisions of  a separate law, when the child is in public areas, bars 
and pubs at night, and according to paragraph (4) „the parent shall 
spend the support received after the child on the caretaking and 
bringing up of  the child”. 
bb) A specific issue which is worth mentioning within the scope of  
special individual responsibility for the community is that for those 
applying for state funded or partially funded academic programs 
starting in September 2012 the conditions of  receiving support is 
to sign to contract which is concluded between the student and the 
Hungarian state. In this the state undertakes to fully or partially cover 
the costs of  the students’ education (in form of  full or partial state 
scholarship), while the students undertake to earn the degree within 
a given period of  time, and to work in Hungary – within 20 years 
following the completion of  studies – for a period of  time which is 
the double of  the time of  studies, thus they „commit themselves to 
work for the Hungarian economy in a certain period of  their life”. In 
the background of  this specific and quite new concept there is the 
consideration that the state finances the education of  these students 
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(future professionals), thus it is the „obligation” and responsibility 
of  the beneficiary towards the state and the community to return 
something from the benefits of  his work to the environment which 
supported, „educated” him.
c) Renewal of  responsibility for certain past acts: in Act CCX of  2011 
on the punishability of  crimes against humanity and the exclusion 
of  their limitation period, and the punishment of  certain crimes 
committed in the Communist dictatorship the Parliament confirmed 
its international law commitment according to which it considers 
the most serious international crimes exempt from the statute of  
limitation, and it enacted a law regarding the punishability of  certain 
acts151 committed and not punished in the Communist dictatorship.
There is a question which is raised more sharply than ever, namely that 
„what the content of  the normative bond is which motivates people to 
be loyal to their political community”.152 In order to answer the question 
we have to step beyond the minimalist and individualist approaches, 
in which political integration only has instrumental value, i.e. it is 
described exclusively as a too of  individual good153 because the internal 
authorisation of  legitimate rule of  law power – at some degree and in 
an unchanged way – results from free, natural and necessary subjection, 
and is based on the free acceptance of/by subjects.154 The members of  
151 In the application of  the act communist crime: crime committed in the 
Communist dictatorship, which at the time of  commission was crime defined 
in the appendix of  the valid criminal code (intentional murder, qualified acts of  
intentional aggravated battery, forced interrogation, unlawful detention, treachery 
and treason, treason against the territory of  the Hungarian state and harbouring 
a criminal in relation with the mentioned crimes), which were committed in the 
name, on behalf  or with the approval of  the party state and about which no 
criminal procedure was conducted in the Communist era due to political reasons.
152 BódiG, máTyás: Jogelméleti és politikai filozófiai reflexiók a közérdek 
problematikájáról. [Legal theory and political-philosophic reflections about the 
problem of  public interest.] In: szamel KaTalin (ed.): Közérdek és közigazgatás. [Public 
interest and public administration.] MTA Jogtudományi Intézete, Budapest, 2008. p. 48.
153 BódiG op. sic. p. 49. 
154 zlinszKy, János: A hatalomgyakorlás ellensúlya: Közigazgatási bíróság. 
[Counterbalance of  power: Administrative court.] In: varGa zs., andrás – 
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the community, due to their voluntary subjection, have responsibility 
towards each other for compliance with the jointly established norms, 
for law abiding behaviour followed in society. There is the obligation 
described in the old legal principle „honeste vivere, neminem laedere, suum 
cuique tribuere”, i.e. to live decently, not to hurt anyone, to give everyone 
what they deserve.155 A good state focuses on this, the responsibility 
towards each other, instead of  (in addition to) loyalty towards the state.
2.4. Institutional transformation of  the state
The political-legal analysis of  the state’s organisation and its institutionalised, 
traditional elements necessarily requires the review of  the system of  
powers, either with regard to certain branches of  power or regarding 
their „effect on each other”, their finely tuned system of  relationships. 
It is not the task of  this work to evaluate in details the system of  checks 
and balances existing in Hungary, the realisation and results of  the 
division of  power156 comparing these with requirements defined in 
Western constitutional law.157 Even though the significant transformation 
of  the legal system – up to a certain degree – is the transformation of  
the state’s organisational system as well, the aims of  this paper do not 
require the introduction of  these structures. This subchapter aims „only” 
at presenting certain significant changes – which occurred after 2010 
– in the field of  the traditional branches of  power – and specifically in 
the field of  executing power and justice. It shall be definitely stated that 
Fröhlich, Johanna (ed.): Közérdekvédelem – A közigazgatási bíráskodás múltja 
és jövője. [Protection of  public interests – Past and future of  administrative 
courts.] Op. sic. p. 67.
155 zlinszKy op. sic. p. 68. 
156 Naturally, Hungary was also affected by different debates, for example by the 
one which emerged about the contraction or separation of  regulatory institutions 
operating in the field of  media and communication. About this see: rozGonyi, 
KriszTina: Hatóságok konvergenciája: össze vagy vissza? [Convergence of  
authorities: this or that?] Infokommunikáció és jog 3/2012. pp. 127-128. 
157 Lásd pl. r. c. van caeneGem: Bevezetés a nyugati alkotmányjogba. [Introduction to 
Western constitutional law.] Magyar Közlöny Lap- és Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 2008. 
pp. 33-45. 
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even though this work repeatedly refers to the fact that in the examined 
period within the whole state-political system the number and weight of  
institutional-legal counterbalances (guarantees) seems to be decreasing, 
there are counterexamples, as well, which in certain significant fields 
create or renew substantive control mechanisms. Among the latter ones 
the quasi veto power of  the Monetary Council158 may be mentioned, in 
relation with which the Fundamental Law of  Hungary states in Article 
44 paragraph (3) that „The adoption of  the State Budget Act shall be subject 
to the prior consent of  the Budget Council (…).” Act CXCIV of  2011 on 
the economic stability of  Hungary adds that draft laws containing the 
modification of  the budget – which would modify the main income or 
expenses numbers of  the budget or would increase the rate of  budget 
deficit – may be put on final vote only with the previous consent of  the 
Monetary Council. The significance of  this institution is based on the 
fact that in 2012 one time the Council refused the approval.
2.4.1. Transformation of  the Hungarian public administration
The transformation of  the system, tasks and authority of  the state bodies occurred 
after 2010 in the public administration in Hungary is the most spectacular. Lets 
see the most important fields one after the other: 
In the process of  the transformation of  the Hungarian municipal 
system act CLXXXIX of  2011 on local governments (hereinafter: 
Mötv) that was accepted in 19 December 2012, that enters into force 
between 2012 and 2014 in three steps, is of  great importance. The basic 
goal of  the act is the building of  a modern, cost-effective, task oriented 
local government system, that provides opportunity for democratic and 
effective operation, and at the same time – in a way that enforces and 
protects the citizens’ collective rights to local governance - it sets stricter 
frames for municipal autonomy.159
158 The Monetary Council gives opinion about the draft act on the central budget, 
but may also give opinion about any issues related to the planning, execution of  
the budget, the use of  public funds and the situation of  the public finances.
159 dr. BeKényi, JózseF: Megújult a magyar önkormányzati rendszer. [Renewed 
Hungarian local governmental system.] Jegyző és Közigazgatás 1/2012. p. 6. 
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In Hungary, as response to the centralisation of  the council system, 
the previous act on local governments160 practically created independent 
branches of  power, giving independence to all townships, besides 
minimal central control. The operation of  the local governments did not 
become efficient as a result of  this, many townships became indebted 
and the fulfilment of  tasks became low quality: „(…) the act on local 
governments accepted in 1990 had expressedly negative consequences 
regarding the regulation of  the middle level especially.”161 
Based on the current changes two-third of  the local governments’ public 
services will be centralised and the majority of  the public administration 
authority of  the local governments will be eliminated. So in the future a 
much stronger central administration control will be applied. 
One of  the most important changes is the substantial integration of  
the territorial public administration, that wished to give an answer to one 
of  the most urgent problems of  the past twenty years of  the Hungarian 
public administration: Since 1990 every government of  the period tried to 
stop and turn around the tendency of  the a high degree fragmentation of  
the regional public administration professional management organisations, 
but the attempts failed in every case, or had fragmentary results before 
2010.162 Following the unsuccessful regionalisation after 2002 the public 
administration offices operating as the regional body of  the government 
were reorganised to the county level and the creation of  the capital and 
county governmental offices on 1st January 2011 put an end to a two 
decade disintegration process (see act CXXVI of  2010 on capital and 
county governmental offices and amendments of  law in connection 
with the creation of  capital and county governmental offices and the 
regional integrations). The integration affected 14 organisations (types 
160 Act LXV of  1990 on local governments
161 pálné, dr. Kovács ilona: A középszintű önkormányzás változó trendjei. 
[Changing trends of  middle-level selg-government.] Új Magyar Közigazgatás 
10/2011. p. 25. 
162 viráG, rudolF: Az államigazgatási feladat- és hatáskör-telepítés új rendszere 
– a járási rendszer kialakítása. [New system of  state administration tasks and 
competences – the establishment of  districts.] Magyar Közigazgatás 1/2012. pp. 
11-12. 
2. Tendencies coming from the change of the state’s self-image 
76
of  bodies) and more than 150 bodies within that163, resulting in serious 
cost savings already in the first year. 
The creation of  the governmental offices developed as tools of  
centralisation was followed by the consolidation of  the county municipal 
institutions: the state took over the significant debt stock accumulated 
by the county local governments from 2011 and later it took over the 
maintenance of  the institutions of  county local governments. For 
example from 1st January 2012 the capital and county hospitals became 
under the maintenance of  the Pharmaceutical and Healthcare Quality 
and Organisation Development Institution (PHQOI) the central office 
managed by the Ministry of  Human Resources (previously the Ministry 
of  National Resources). All the city hospitals providing inpatient care 
were taken over by the state until 1st May 2012, and until 1st January 
2013 city hospitals and outpatient clinics will be taken over as well. 
These healthcare institutions will be/are managed by PHQOI as well. 
The other – not healthcare – institutions were integrated by the county 
institution maintenance centres, the County Institution Maintenance 
Centres (CIC). The circle of  about 700 institutions involved budget 
bodies, economic companies and public foundations. 
Very important changes occur(ed) in the Hungarian public education 
as well; in connection with which the most frequently mentioned issue is 
the centralisation and the quasi nationalisation of  the public education. 
It seemed for a long time that the full nationalisation of  the public 
education institutions will take place, but the new legal regulation – 
through dividing responsibility and resources – replaces the tasks in 
connection with operation (management and maintenance) to local 
governments instead of  total nationalisation. The representatives of  
the state expect the predictable use of  resources, the decrease of  the 
educators’ material and other type of  vulnerability and the increased 
enforcement of  professional aspects from the new system that enters 
into force in 2012.
In local-regional administration several further, significant novelties 
have been introduced: in the relationship of  central state organisation 
163 The contraction affected about half  of  33 regional – partly county, partly 
larger regional – state administration authorities.
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and local governments it is a significant difference that instead of  
the previous – less strict – legality monitoring the so-called legality 
supervisions will be introduced from 2012, significantly broadening 
state control.164 Within the scope of  this relationship we shall stress that 
in case the local government fails to enact a local governmental decree 
(to which it is obliged by law), the metropolitan or country state offices 
(!) may enact the decree.
Another change is that while from 1990 the previous legislator named 
as addressee of  majority of  state administration tasks and competences 
the notary (who operated as organ of  the local governments), the districts, 
which will be formed as of  1 January 2013165 will realise the separation 
of  state administration tasks into separate organisation, separating 
more than before – also organisationally – state administration tasks 
belonging to the competence of  the government and local governmental 
tasks belonging to the responsibility of  local governments.166 The state 
administration authority competences of  notaries have always been 
broadened, and this extension was not always followed by the provision 
of  necessary financial sources and other conditions.167
From 2013 175 county district offices and 23 capital city district 
offices will be formed as branch-offices of  government offices. District 
offices will be responsible for certain state administrative tasks – which 
earlier belonged to the notary of  the local government, – and the local 
organisations of  the capital and county government offices’ specialised 
organs will also form part of  the districts.168 For example, tasks related to 
164 Article 34 paragraph (4) of  the Fundamental Law of  Hungary introduced 
– in harmony with Article 8 of  the European Charter of  Local Governments – 
the legality supervision of  local governments as of  1 January 2012. The detailed 
rules may be found in Chapter VIII of  act CLXXXIX of  2011 on the local 
governments of  Hungary.
165 The government decided about the conceptual principles of  the establishment 
of  districts with Government decree 1299/2011 (IX. 1.)
166 viráG op. sic. 15. 
167 dr. szeKeres, anTal: A jegyző államigazgatási hatásköreinek változása. 
[Changes of  the public administration competences of  notaries.] Jegyző és 
Közigazgatás 3/2012. p. 5. 
168 About the details of  modifications see act XCIII of  2012 on the establishment 
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the management of  documents will be transferred from the notaries to 
the districts (such as address registration, passport management, vehicle 
registration), immigration control tasks, child welfare and child protection 
tasks, part of  social services in which the local government does not 
have individual power of  discretion, and majority of  environmental 
issues; while the notary keeps probate actions, the registry duties, the first 
instance building authority tasks, industrial and commercial permissions, 
part of  social services which are related to non-subjective allowances, 
local tax management and e.g. task related to ragweed.169 However, it 
shall be stated that the reorganisation of  tasks and competences has 
been ongoing regardless of  the establishment of  districts, it is enough to 
refer to the fact that infringement procedures were placed from notaries 
to metropolitan, county government offices from 15 April 2012. In the 
district offices – in addition to main offices – the following specialised 
organisations will operate: district child welfare, district animal health 
and food inspection office, district land registry, district labour office, 
and public health specialised office.
Together with state administration duties the district offices overtake 
from the mayor’s offices the civil servants responsible for the mentioned 
fields, their relationship will be transformed into governmental service 
relationship. It is a very significant development that Js will overtake not 
only the employees, but also the movable and immovable assets necessary 
for the performance of  the duties, these will be transferred to the free 
use of  the state, the property manager will be the government office. 
It also belongs to this issue that according to Article 38 paragraph (1) 
of  Hungary’s Fundamental Law the property of  the state and of  local 
governments is national property. In 2011 the Parliament approved as 
cardinal act the act CXCVI of  2011 on national property (Nvtv.), and 
with this state and local government property received unified regulation 
which is unprecedented in Hungary, and which at the same time provided 
of  districts and on the modification of  some related acts, which was approved by 
the Parliament on 25 June 2012
169 For details see Act XX of  1991 on the Tasks and Scope of  Authority of  the 
Local Governments and their organs, of  the Commissioners of  the Republic, and 
of  Certain Centrally Governed Organs
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for the distraction of  the property of  local governments. According to 
István Hoffman „Instead of  the previous strong constitutional protection 
with the obligation of  the performance of  tasks the property of  local 
governments became a sort of  target property, which moves together 
with the modification of  duties and competences, therefore with the 
modification of  the obligee of  the duties changes may occur also in the 
property situation, - but at the same time no obligatory compensation 
claim is established [towards the local governments].170
Actual case management will be possible in the government windows 
operated as part of  district offices, open all around the country from 
Monday to Friday from 8 am till 8 pm, or at the so-called case assistance 
appointed to the settlement from 1 January 2013. It is important that 
in this system the client may manage his cases not only at the centre 
of  the J, but at all settlements which operated document bureau earlier. 
In the new system the civil servant who gets into contact with clients 
(at about 300 integrated client service points) will not participate in the 
substantial management of  cases which cannot be settled immediately, 
and therefore the actual management of  the petitions submitted to him 
will happen at the relevant specialised organisations. This, naturally, does 
not exclude the possibility that the client may get into direct contact 
with the actual manager of  his case, but according to the plans this will 
further accelerate the procedures. 
2.4.2. Certain theoretical issues of  the reorganisation of  public 
administration – in general
Despite the before mentioned significant changes it shall be stated that 
questions which seemed to be in focus of  the literature of  administrative 
law in the past decades (Hungary’s administrative territorial division; 
region-county-small area; levels and institution types of  central public 
administration) are partially phantom questions, as in a family with two 
children the descenders’ situation may be critical, while a family of  four 
generations living under the same roof  may provide excellent emotional, 
spiritual and physical development, completion to its members. As in 
170 hoFFman op. sic. p. 20. 
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a family the individual success of  members, in public administration 
the function maturity of  levels and units is guaranteed by the proper 
division of  tasks, a clear system of  processes defining the related 
individual relationships, and the system of  relationships which is accessible 
and contains conscious and emotional elements. From this aspect 
there is a more important question, namely whether the reassuring 
regulation of  public contracts and public administration contracts, the 
comprehensive settlement of  public procurements, the establishment 
of  further guarantees against corruption, etc. has been established; thus 
whether those fundamentally important institutions are created which 
in fact can bear a very high – and certainly of  eclectic style – building.
Even though in the primary sources of  EU law there are only few 
specific provisions which would prescribe direct rules for the structure and 
operation of  state organisation, more precisely the public administration 
infrastructure of  member states, it is undoubted that „it is constantly, 
broadly and more and more intensively having effect on it: through the 
acquis communautaire, the community achievements in a quasi implicit way, 
while through the EU law, and primarily through Article 4 paragraph 
(3) of  the TEU171 also expressis verbis”, so far as the latter requirement 
formulates the obligation (result obligation) to enforce EU law, which 
cannot be understood in any other way than the public administration of  
member states shall be reliable, transparent and democratic.172 Continuing 
the above mentioned – family – example the significance of  „personal 
example” shall be stressed, which is regulated in Article 197 of  the TEU 
under the title administrative cooperation. 173
171 TEU Article 4 paragraph (3) Pursuant to the principle of  sincere cooperation, 
the Union and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in 
carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties.
The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to 
ensure fulfilment of  the obligations arising out of  the Treaties or resulting from 
the acts of  the institutions of  the Union.
The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of  the Union’s tasks and 
refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of  the Union’s 
objectives. 
172 Torma op. sic. p. 317. 
173 TFEU Article 197
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It is obvious also within the transformation of  local-regional 
administration that e.g. the modification of  the frameworks of  local 
governmental system may be complete only in relation with the renewal 
of  other elements of  the state organisations, as well as with the reform 
of  big care systems,174 thus the reconsideration of  each element of  the 
system – with regard to each other – may bring about permanent results.175
2.4.3. Certain theoretical issues of  the reorganisation of  authorities
The review would not be complete without outlining the most important 
theoretical and institutional questions of  today’s authority, especially that the all time 
dysfunctions of  public administration, its manifested operational disorders usually 
become most obvious in this field, and at the same time attempts made at changing 
the situation are tested here first. 
The events that took place on the streets of  Budapest in September 
and October 2006 confirmed the long suspected – and in other relations 
already proven – truth that it is impossible to leave past behind with 
„one great jump”. The frequency of  protests, as well as their forceful 
or forceless conduct, furthermore, the application of  sanctions by 
authorities, namely the police against protesters, police violence may be 
(1) Effective implementation of  Union law by the Member States, which is 
essential for the proper functioning of  the Union, shall be regarded as a matter 
of  common interest.
(2) The Union may support the efforts of  Member States to improve their 
administrative capacity to implement Union law. Such action may include 
facilitating the exchange of  information and of  civil servants as well as supporting 
training schemes. No Member State shall be obliged to avail itself  of  such support. 
The European Parliament and the Council, acting by means of  regulations in 
accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall establish the necessary 
measures to this end, excluding any harmonisation of  the laws and regulations of  
the Member States.
174 In addition of  the above mentioned reorganisation of  the great systems 
of  health care and education the new regulation of  Hungarian pension system 
shall also be mentioned: after 1 November 2010 it was not possible to pay 
private pension contribution any more, in parallel of  which the rate of  pension 
contribution to be paid to the state increased. 
175 dr. BeKényi op. sic. p. 6. 
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indicators of  the stability of  democracy, the institutionalisation of  the 
freedom of  assembly and of  expression.” (Máté Szabó) It may be stated 
that the guarantee of  the democratisation of  police by the institutions 
of  law, politics and publicity proved to be insufficient in Hungary after 
the change in the political system (the events of  2006 drew attention to 
this). This statement may be proved also if  one of  the most neuralgic 
point of  authority operations is the obligation of  enforcement of  orders, 
even if  they are unlawful, which results from military principles.176 It is 
not a coincidence, either, that the intentions of  the European Union 
in the field of  authorities mainly concentrate on ensuring fundamental 
rights,177 on strengthening their guarantees, and on preventing emerging 
legal and organisations barriers; on the establishment and continuous 
operation of  member states’ cooperation.
As existentialist philosophy assumes, the real character of  the individual 
may – often – be shown in the border situations of  life; similarly, the 
democratic commitment of  certain authority cultures and the persons 
composing them may be measured only in the non-planned, sudden – 
sometimes cataclysm-like – events requiring skill-level response. Each 
such situation, at the same time, is great opportunity for organisational 
learning and for gaining individual experiences in form of  rational and 
moral basic truths. Phrasing it in the opposite way, and carrying on the 
opinion of  Elemér Hankiss, according to which even in the decades of  
state socialism the deep structural continuation of  certain civil values 
may be observed,178 it may be stated that signs referring to the survival 
of  certain previously popular values may be observed also in the past two 
decades – as heritage of  state socialism. As Péter Kántás put it (merely 
in theoretical approach) „the authoritative, ambiguous notions – such 
as public order – survived the police state and due to their substantial 
176 chrisTián, lászló: A rendészet alapvonalai, önkormányzati rendőrség. [Outlines of  
authority, self-governmental police.] UNIVERSITAS – Győr Nonprofit Kft., Győr, 
2011. p. 135. 
177 Nowadays several authors include into the conceptual elements of  state as 
fourth factor – in addition to area, population and power – the criterion of  the 
enforcement of  universal human rights norms. 
178 hanKiss, elmér: Diagnózisok 2. [Diagnosises 2.] Magvető Kiadó, Budapest, 
1986. 
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undefined nature they may become serious weapons within the rule of  
law public administration in the hands of  law enforcers”.179 
In summary it may be stated that the regulation of  authorities and 
especially of  authority procedure(s) in Hungary is – still – in significant 
arrears compared to the material and procedural regulations of  other 
administrative fields.180
2.4.4. The reorganisation of  Hungarian justice system
2.4.4.1. Appreciation of  the role of  the justice system
In relation with legislation it may be stated that „The legislator makes 
the general rule, but several situations exceed this rule. One possible, 
though rather scary answer to this is casuistic, when the legislator tries 
to regulate every possible scenario in advance. The other answer is the 
constant modification of  laws, which contravenes with one principle of  
the rule of  law defined by Locke, the requirement of  the existence of  
permanent, but at least long-lasting laws. The third solution – evident 
for and favoured by conservative legal approach – may be the judicial 
development of  law.”181 Today’s legislator seems to be departing into all 
three directions at the same time. The constant increase of  the number of  
legislative products, the modification of  laws performed at extraordinary 
speed, and the precedent-like nature of  law are tendencies which can be 
each supported based on new legal instruments.
With regard to the latter one it is an actual question in the present 
Hungarian legal literature whether – even theoretically – it is possible to 
have and apply in parallel a special precedent law and the law of  codes.182
179 KánTás op. sic. p. 2. 
180 About this see e.g. sziKinGer, isTván: A rendészeti eljárásról. [About law 
enforcement proceedings.] Rendészet és emberi jogok 2/2011. pp. 29-35. 
181 paczolay, péTer: Alkotmány és történelem. [Constitution and history.] Elhangzott 
a Történelemtanárok 21. Országos Konferenciáján Lecture given at the 21st 
National Conference of  History Teachers – 8 October 2011, Kossuth Klub. 
[hereinafter referred to as paczolay (2011)]
182 szalma, JózseF: A precedensjogról. [About precedent law.] Új Magyar 
Közigazgatás 11/2011. p. 37. 
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Among the reasons of  the increase of  the role of  adjudication and 
the increase of  the value of  judicial activates the following factors shall 
be mentioned.
1. Establishment of  a multi-layer law. The disorder of  coherence resulting 
from the interaction of  EU, international and national law developed 
a need for the increasing role taking of  judges. This is also an 
international tendency.
2. Accelerating legislation and quickly obsoleted laws. Disorder regarding the 
real content of  law may occur not only upon the interaction of  
the above mentioned layers of  law, but the too quick changes, the 
accelerated modification pace of  otherwise coherent regulations 
overestimates the role of  the judge applying the law. (For this see those 
written about the phantom pain of  the law in subchapter VI.3.7.)
3. Due to the high level of  fusion of  legislative and executive power 
the role of  justice – as counterbalance – is appreciated. Even though 
different justice reforms made attempt to extend political and legal 
control, the relative independence183 of  this sector – averting direct 
forces emerging in individual cases – still remains in Hungary.
4. Article 28 of  the Fundamental Law may enable the law enforcer 
(judge) to refer directly to the Fundamental Law. Focusing on the 
objective teleological interpretation may move the judge – as decision 
maker – towards a quasi legislator role.
5. The preliminary „pricing” of  changing principles as principles and tool 
of  interpretation in the legal system – primarily in the Fundamental 
Law – is less possible (e.g. the expectation of  behaviour paying 
attention to the achievements of  the historical constitution, the 
consideration of  the interests of  future generations, the consistent 
enforcement of  the requirement of  soundness the may increase 
the uncertainty of  legal practice, and not only because these are 
relatively new elements in the legal system and legal life: it seems 
as if  the legislator was consciously widening more than ever the 
scope of  aspects which may be and shall be considered during law 
183 In this sense with independence I mean the organisational (corporative) 
independence, which means the independence of  the judiciary, the separation of  
judicial power from the other branches of  power.
IV. new elements and tendencIes of the hunGarIan leGal system
85
enforcement, at the same time broadening the area of  movement 
of  the judge.)  
Here it may also be mentioned that the opposers of  moral, value-
based interpretation usually refer to the widespread reason according 
to which with this interpretation judges present their own personal 
moral views as part of  the constitution.184 The real danger – obviously 
– is if  „under the mask of  moral there is the politicisation of  law.”185
6. With the introduction of  real constitutional complaint, thus with the 
possibility of  directly object to and annul public authority decisions 
specific, individual level legal protection shall become more effective. 
The Constitutional Court receives a competence according to which 
in individual cases it may annul the court decision without abolishing 
the underlying law (without becoming part of  the strictly viewed 
court system). It is a just assumption that through this constitutional 
principles and values directly affect the legal system as a whole.186
7. The improvement of  the conditions of  judicial activities also 
improves the quality and speed of  law enforcement and deepens 
public trust. On 28 November 2011 two acts were approved which 
placed the Hungarian judicial system on new grounds: Act CLXI 
of  2011 on the organisation and management of  courts (herein 
after referred to as: Bszi.) and Act CLXII of  2011 on the status and 
remuneration of  judges. The biggest change undoubtedly happened 
in the management of  courts: the National Justice Council (OIT) 
was replaced by the National Office of  Judges (OBH), and its more 
effective decision making mechanism. In the previous system the 
practise of  dividing judicial positions was extremely problematic and 
institutionally limited, and this lead to the result that significant (!) 
differences emerged between the amount of  workload of  certain 
courts, especially at the expense of  the Metropolitan Court of  
Budapest and the Pest County Court.187 
184 csinK – Fröhlich (2012a) p. 82. 
185 csinK – Fröhlich (2012a) p. 83. 
186 csinK – Fröhlich (2012a) p. 100.
187 oszToviTs, andrás: Az új magyar bírósági szervezetrendszer. [The new 
Hungarian judicial system.] In: rixer, ádám (ed.): Állam és közösség. Válogatott 
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8. The existence of  certain new legal institutions, in case they broaden 
the area of  movement for the judge. We may consider as such e.g. 
the measure regulated on the new Penal Code, Article 63 paragraph 
(1) and Articles 67-68 of  Act C of  2012 on the Penal Code on the 
so-called reparation, which may be applied individually, instead of  
sentence.
Naturally, many factors (seem to be) contradict(ing) the before 
mentioned: the legal socialisation of  majority of  law enforcers, the 
limited professional independence within the organisation, and the hardly 
separable performance evaluation aiming at objectivity (and significantly 
affecting promotion) have counter effect on the precedent law-nature of  
the legal system, which, on the other hand, is against independence and 
„creativity”, which in addition to the excessive repression of  subjective 
elements prefers many indicators such as the number of  overruled cases 
or the speed of  finishing the cases. These are specific „organisation 
sociological” barriers, which are in front of  the increase of  the role of  
the judge, provided for by the legal system. Another significant aspect 
is that Hungarian legal education does/did not necessarily socialise law 
students along this legal concept. 
2.4.4.2. Renewal of  constitutional adjudication in Hungary
In this chapter constitutional adjudication has been already mentioned, 
but it is worth summarising the main changes and new questions in brief.
Article 24 of  the Fundamental Law dealt directly with the Constitutional 
Court, the competences of  which are regulated by this article and Article 
37 paragraph (4) on public finances. The a) abolishment of  a former 
form of  actio popularis, the b) narrowing down of  the scope of  initiators 
of  subsequent norm control188 and contrary to this c) the introduction 
közjogi tanulmányok Magyarország Alaptörvénye tiszteletére. [State and Law. Selected public 
law essays in respect of  the Fundamental Law of  Hungary.] Lőrincz Lajos Közjogi 
Kutatóműhely – KRE ÁJK, Budapest, 2012. p. 381. 
188 According to Article 24 paragraph (2) point e) ot may be initiated by the 
Government, one-fourth of  MP sor the parliamentary commissioner of  human 
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of  real constitutional complaint, and d) the limitation of  subsequent 
norm control, constitutional complaint and judicial initiation against and 
annulment of  certain laws related to public funds are the main changes. 
With the introduction of  real constitutional complaint, thus the 
possibility of  direct overruling and annulment of  public authorities’ 
decisions the concrete, individual level protection of  rights becomes 
more effective. The Constitutional Court receives the possibility of  
annulling exclusively the original court decision made in an individual 
case without establishing the unconstitutionality of  the law in subject.
Based on the article of  Tushnet 189 it is worth referring to the 
fact that the general competence of  the Constitutional Court within 
which it can submit the whole of  the legal system to the aspects of  
constitutionality is very important for the actual enforcement of  the 
constitution.190 Subsequent abstract norm control and the competence 
for annulling the laws which are contrary to the Fundamental Law are 
definitely needed for the protection of  democracy and due to aspects 
of  the protection of  the rights set forth in the Fundamental Law.191 In 
the new system there are two new ways for the abstract examination of  a norm: a) 
subsequent abstract norm control which may be initiated also by the 
parliamentary commissioner of  fundamental rights, within which the 
norm may be examined at the Constitutional Court through the aspects 
of  constitutionality, after examinations upon conditions elaborated by 
rights. According to Article 26 paragraph (3) „The Prosecutor General may request 
the Constitutional Court to examine the conformity with the Fundamental Law 
of  legal regulations applied in concrete cases tried with the participation of  a 
prosecutor with regard to the violation of  rights laid down in the Fundamental 
Law, if  the person concerned is unable to defend his or her rights personally or if  
the violation of  rights affects a larger group of  people.”
189 marK TushneT: Az állami cselekvés tana és az alkotmányos jogok horizontális 
hatása. [Theory of  state activities and the horizontal effect of  constitutional laws.] 
Fundamentum. 2/2004. pp. 5-18.
190 csinK – Fröhlich (2012a) p. 100. 
191 „A law – even if  it gets through the primary filter as being in compliance with 
the Constitution – may prove to be unconstitutional subsequently, due to mistakes 
emerging in the application of  the law or due to the lack of  regulation for certain 
situations which emerge newly and would require regulation.” csinK – Fröhlich 
(2012a) p. 101. 
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the parliamentary commissioner of  fundamental rights; the other one 
is b) a version of  constitutional complaint, which allows for submitting 
a petition not (only ) against a decision made by a public authority, but 
also against the underlying norm; the norm may be annulled similarly. 
This – after defining the person having the right of  initiative and the 
conditions of  admissibility – may fill the role of  norm control based 
on involvement (used in individual cases).192
In connection with the forming practice of  the parliamentary 
commissioner of  fundamental rights Péter Paczolay noted that the 
parliamentary commissioner’s petitioner rights are key issues of  the 
new regulation: the parliamentary commissioner of  fundamental rights 
has submitted twenty petitions for the declaration of  subsequent 
unconstitutionality till July 2012. He turned to the Constitutional Court 
due to the act on families, on student contracts, the act on minorities, 
the act on the right to vote and the act on the Constitutional Court. „All 
in all, conditions are given for the Constitutional Court to exclude the 
unconstitutional laws from the legal system” – stated the President of  
the Constitutional Court in an interview.
The other important issue – which has been analysed often in 
domestic legal and political scientific literature – is the introduction,193 
192 csinK – Fröhlich (2012a) p. 101.
193 The Parliament on its session on 16 November 2010 approved the Act CXIX 
of  2010 on the modification of  Act XX of  1949 on the Constitution of  the 
Republic of  Hungary, with which it modified Article 32/A of  the Constitution 
about the Constitutional Court. Article 32/A paragraph (2) and (3) valid from 
20 November 2010 read s follows: „The Constitutional Court shall have powers 
to review laws on the central budget, the implementation of  the central budget, 
central tax revenues, duties and contributions, customs duties, and on the central 
government conditions for local taxes, if  the grounds cited in the petition for 
the alleged breach of  the Constitution is limited to any violation of  the inherent 
rights of  life and human dignity, the right to the protection of  personal data, the 
right to freedom of  thought, freedom of  conscience and the freedom of  religion, 
or the rights granted under Article 69 in connection with Hungarian citizenship, 
and it mentions no other reasons. The Constitutional Court shall annul any laws 
and other statutes that it declares unconstitutional. The Constitutional Court 
shall have powers to annul laws on the central budget, the implementation of  
the central budget, central tax revenues, duties and contributions, customs duties, 
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and survival in the Fundamental Law of  the prohibition regarding public 
funds. Referring to the modification László Sólyom, first president of  
the Constitutional Court wrote that „questioning the necessity of  a 
rule of  law control may bring serious threat to the rule of  law itself ”194 
. Therefore it may happen, for example, that an act, let it be an act on 
taxation, is unconstitutional (is against the Fundamental Law), but the 
Constitutional Court has no procedural competence to examine this, 
to declare the unconstitutionality of  the act or to annul it (except for 
petitions referring to the inherent rights of  life and human dignity, the 
right to the protection of  personal data, the right to freedom of  thought, 
freedom of  conscience and the freedom of  religion, or the rights granted 
in connection with Hungarian citizenship).195 
Another important issue regarding the practical operation of  the 
Constitutional Court is the often analysed political division of  the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court. In relation with this the president of  
the body said the following: „Regarding the issue of  judicial pension 
the Constitutional Court was more divided than ever,196 and by now 
the obvious intention characterising my first two years, according to 
which in big cases decision shall be made with consensus, cannot be 
maintained any more”.
and on the central government conditions for local taxes, if  the grounds cited in 
the petition ofr the alleged breach of  the Constitution is limited to any violation 
of  the inherent rights of  life and human dignity, the right to the protection of  
personal data, the right to freedom of  thought, freedom of  conscience and the 
freedom of  religion, or the rights granted under Article 69 in connection with 
Hungarian citizenship” 
194 sólyom lászló: Ezen a lejtőn nehéz megállni! [It is difficult to stop on this 
slope!] Iustum Aequum Salutare, 4/2010. p. 6. 
195 TóTh J., zolTán: Az alkotmánybírósági egyéni alapjogvédelem eszközei és 
gyakorlata – egykor és ma. [The tools and practice of  the protection of  individual 
fundamental rights in the practice of  the Constitutional Court – now and 
then.] In: rixer, ádám (szerk.): Állam és közösség. Válogatott közjogi tanulmányok 
Magyarország Alaptörvénye tiszteletére. Lőrincz Lajos Közjogi Kutatóműhely – KRE 
ÁJK, Budapest, 2012. p. 362.
196 From the 14 voting constitutional judges 7 (!) attached separate opinion to 
the decision, at the voting of  7:7 the vote of  the president proved to be decisive.
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v. the fundamental law and the cardInal acts
1. Reasons for establishing the Fundamental Law
The reason for creating this subsection – moreover, the whole paper – 
was the tremendous number of  questions and impetuous debates which 
surrounded the establishment of  this instrument abroad and within 
the borders.197 During the examination of  the Hungarian constitution 
and the Hungarian legal system in general several “sharp” preliminary 
questions shall be answered, such as why it was necessary to create a new 
fundamental law more than two decades after the fall of  the iron curtain, 
less than one decade after joining the European Union, in possession 
of  a constitution which fully complied with international requirements.
The subject’s literature is rich in different statements: there are some 
who view the new constitution as result of  some symbolic efforts, which 
would not have been necessary at all, as the post-1989 versions of  the 
previous constitution – while keeping the original numbering of  the 
act – established a fully democratic state governed by the rule of  law in 
every sense, which proved to be operable also in practice. Some express 
their concerns about the euro-conformity of  the Fundamental Law due 
to its unspecified (legal) notions and the limitation of  certain institution 
(e.g. the narrowing down of  the Constitutional Court’s competences). 
Moreover, some stress that the Hungarian Fundamental Law not only 
197 The evaluation regarding the partly new problem raising, value system, 
priorities, moreover, circumstances of  creation of  the new Hungarian Fundamental 
Law (and through this the complete legal system) would be full scope only if  it 
was supplemented with a comprehensive analysis mirroring international trends, 
through which expectations regarding the new fundamental law “would be put 
into place”. The size of  the latter task, however, exceeds the frameworks of  
this work, as well as the possibilities of  its author. In this topic – in Hungarian 
language – see e.g.: JaKaB, andrás – Körösényi, andrás (editor.): Alkotmányozás 
Magyarországon és máshol. Politikatudományi és alkotmányjogi megközelítések. (Constitution-
making in Hungary and elsewhere. Political science and constitutional law approaches) MTA 
TK Political Science Institute – Új Mandátum Kiadó, Budapest, 2012. p. 309. 
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meets the basic values of  the European Union, but it goes further: it 
specifies, confirms and explains its basic values in a creative way. Among 
others with the method that originating from the requirement of  human 
dignity it views the world in the correlation of  family and public interest, 
and it establishes a definitely European, but still original and model 
construction which rewrites balances.
In order to answer the above assumption – but at least to shed light 
on the background legislative goals – it is useful to read one of  the most 
authentic sources, the opinion of  the prime minister of  the Hungarian 
government after 2010, who explained the practical role of  the new 
Fundamental Law as follows: „The events of  2006198 made it clear for 
Hungarians that our constitution – together with all of  its modifications 
– is a constitution of  failures, which cannot protect us from anything. 
It was not able to protect us from total indebtness, from political lies, 
abuses of  power, from police brutality, from the complete destruction 
of  economy, from speculation […] In 2006 the Hungarians realised 
that Hungary was unprotected and that the basic reason for this is the 
powerless transitional constitution. […] They came to understand that 
the renewal of  Hungary required a new fundamental law, which provides 
proper protection to Hungary and to Hungarians, and gives modern 
answers to the challenges of  the 21st century. […] We missed our self-
esteem [before]. Our national self-esteem. We missed to proudly tell 
everyone who we are, how we are connected, what we want; where we 
came from and where we are going, what we believe is good and what 
we consider bad.”199 
198 The speech of  Ferenc Gyurcsány, who established government after the 
elections of  2006, held in front of  his peers “was leaked” in the late summer of  
2006. In the speech the Prime Minister admitted that they had continuously “lied” 
for victory at the elections. After the release of  the speech the greatest turbulences 
of  Hungarian history from the times of  the 1956 revolution took place, among 
others on 23 October 2006, on the 50th anniversary of  the Hungarian revolution 
and freedom fight. 
199 orBán, viKTor: Az újjászületés dokumentuma. (Document of  revival) Magyar 
Nemzet, 25 April 2011. p. 6. 
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2. The Fundamental Law and legal continuity
In addition to the necessity of  making a new constitution it is worth 
examining in advance what the relationship of  the new document is to 
the old one, and to other instruments of  Hungarian legal history.
It may be stated in advance that approximately one-third of  the new Fundamental 
Law’s provisions fully complies with the text of  the previous Constitution’s text, another 
one-third shows great similarity, material correspondence regarding the essence of  the 
regulation, and „only” one-third of  the fundamental act may be considered brand 
new, therewith it introduces new legal institutions and fills old ones with new content.
It is also worth mentioning in advance that the catalogue of  rights 
starts with some general rules which comply with the main requirements 
formulated during the two decade practice of  the Constitutional Court 
(e.g. principle of  necessity and proportionality, material content of  
fundamental right…) and the list of  given rights and their material 
description is also not “surprising”. 
The Parliament approved the Fundamental Law on the 25th of  
April 2011, based on Article 19 paragraph (3) point a) and Article 24 
paragraph (3) of  act XX of  1949.200 These provisions establish continuity 
– which shall be further explained, naturally – between the Constitution 
and the Fundamental Law, together with the fact that the version of  
the Constitution established after 1989 considered itself  transitional. 
Moreover, Article 5 of  The Transitional Provisions to Hungary’s 
Fundamental Law states that “The coming into force of  the Fundamental Law 
shall not affect the effect of  legislation, normative decisions or orders, or other legal 
instruments of  state administration, concrete decisions or commitments of  international 
law which were adopted, issued, made or undertaken before the Fundamental Law 
came into force.”
Therefore, as its legitimate basis the Fundamental Law refers (also) to 
act XX of  1949, not to its Stalinist version, of  course. This consequence 
200 Fundamental Law of  Hungary, Closing Provisions, point 2. Relevant 
provisions of  the Constitution: “Article 19 (3) a) Within this sphere of  authority, 
the Parliament shall adopt the Constitution of  the Republic of  Hungary.”; “Article 
24 (3) A majority of  two-thirds of  the votes of  the Members of  Parliament is 
required to amend the Constitution and for certain decisions specified therein.”
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may be drawn from the comparison of  two provisions: the „reconciliation” 
of  the National Avowal’s – serving as preface of  the Fundamental Law 
– „We do not recognise the communist constitution of  1949 […]201 
statement with Section 2 of  the Closing provisions [„Parliament shall 
adopt the Fundamental Law pursuant to Sections 19(3)a) and 24 (3) of  
Act XX of  1949”] may be possible only in one way.
This primary picture is supplemented with further provisions of  the 
Fundamental Law; So far as the declared goal of  the Fundamental Law 
– in addition to the delegitimization of  a given period of  the past – is 
to restore legal continuity with the pre-1949 (legal) situation. The goal 
of  the Fundamental Law is – among others – to open up towards the 
past, to facilitate the resuscitation of  the so-called historical constitution. 
The National Avowal – partly for achieving the above mentioned goals 
– presents (also) the Holy Crown as embodiment of  state continuity, 
and describes the period between 19 March 1944 and 2 May 1990 as 
the interruption of  continuity, stating that Hungary’s autonomy was 
missing in this period. 
A specific line of  the new legal concept is the aspect with which 
it views the partial (legal) continuity (!) between the period between 2 
May 1990 and 25 April 2011 (1 January 2012) and the (legal) system 
of  the previous Communist dictatorship: according to point 5 of  the 
preamble of  Hungary’s Fundamental Law’s Transitional Provisions „At 
the time it was not possible to prosecute the crimes committed under the communist 
dictatorship and aiming at the building and maintenance of  the regime, and, in 
the absence of  a constitutional turning point which could have interrupted legal 
continuity, no possibility to prosecute these crimes opened up even after the first free 
elections.” Therefore one of  the most important practical (legal) aspects 
of  the topic of  legal continuity and facing the past is the problem of  
limitation, the partial settlement of  the which is attempted by the latter 
document202 (see sub-section 3.5).
201 “We do not recognise the communist constitution of  1949, since it was the basis for 
tyrannical rule; therefore we proclaim it to be invalid.”
202 About limitation see in details: varGa, csaBa: Elévülés? Visszaható törvényhozás? 
Csapdahelyzet és jogtechnikai semlegesség a jogban. [Limitation? Law-making with 
retroactive force?] Trap and legal technique neutrality in law. Iustum Aequum Salutare 
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The historical constitution is mentioned several times in the 
Fundamental Law. According to the first sentence of  the third paragraph 
of  the National Avowal „We honour the achievements of  our historical constitution”; 
according to Article R) paragraph (3) of  the Foundation „The provisions 
of  the Fundamental Law shall be interpreted in accordance with their purposes, 
the National Avowal and the achievements of  our historical constitution.” The 
National Avowal takes it for granted that there has been and there is today 
a legal framework – for eternal time – originating from Saint Stephen 
(1000-1038) and lasting till 1944, and the validity of  which – as it has 
been mentioned – was „suspended” only temporarily, from 19 March 
1944 till 2 May 1990.203 
The concept of  legal continuity which looms also in the new 
fundamental law204 has several antecedents in Hungarian legal literature 
and public thinking. In the past the issue of  legal continuity was present 
in legal public thinking in somewhat different context and with different 
content than today; so far as its forms of  appearance were mainly 
repeated king crowning formulas, oath texts 205 and crowning letters 
(diploma inaugurale) about the keeping of  the laws and costumes, 
freedoms, exemptions and privileges of  Hungary. Today the main – and 
regarding legal certainty almost only – question is obviously whether 
despite foreign legal systems existing often for more generations it is 
possible to return, even if  partially, to legal institutions, legal practices, 
social values appearing as legal values abandoned before – even in under 
force, – especially that there was also a „pause in the film” after 1948 
in those social sciences which are supposed to present these.206 The 
1/2012. pp. 103-115. [hereinafter referred to as varGa (2012)]
203 apor, péTer: A történeti alkotmány. (The histroical constitution) o. n. http://
www.szuveren.hu/jog/a-torteneti-alkotmany (1 February 2012)
204 The declared goal of  the Fundamental Law is to restore legal continuity with 
the pre-1949 (legal) situation. The aim of  the Fundamental Law is to „open to the 
past” and facilitate the „revival” of  the historical constitution.
205 About the crowning of  the last king see e.g.: sTephan Baier – eva demmerle: 
Habsburg Ottó élete. [Life of  Otto Habsburg] Európa Könyvkiadó, Budapest 2003. pp. 
31-32. 
206 Despite its radical nature it is typical that the fact of  the approval of  the 
new Constitution of  1949 was not indicated in the thick book of  Hungarian 
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answers of  the older legal literature – despite the acknowledgement of  
real difficulties – are basically positive; let us review some of  these in 
the following! 
„Faithfulness to the constitution proves the continuity of  the 
constitution, i.e. legal continuity. This means that the constitution may 
be modified only through legal, thus constitutional methods. Therefore 
everyone shall stand upon the basis of  the present constitution until its 
modification through a legally recognised way was performed. The use 
of  revolutionary means is as well dangerous as coup-like attempts. Such 
actions may only hamper the execution of  the constitution, but shall not 
terminate its validity. First, legal continuity shall be re-established and 
legal development shall be continued from where it terminated some 
time ago. In 1867 it was managed to put down the foundations of  1848 
despite the long term resistance of  the emperor” – writes István Egyed.207 
Nowadays Norbert Varga shares this opinion: „With the realisation 
of  the compromise following the neo-absolutism legal certainty was 
restored, which meant the survival of  our historical constitution. This 
continuity was realised – in addition to the restoration of  the old legal 
order – in the restoration of  legal institutions (right to vote at popular 
elections, ministers’ responsibility, etc.)”208 
When Egyed puts it in a way that „Revolutionary times, the eras when 
states shake are seedbeds of  establishing constitutions”,209 we can also 
add that among the possible goals of  changes there may be – naturally 
– the restoration of  legal certainty.
The shared approach of  viewpoints originating from before and 
during the Second World War is that – the mainly external – forced 
Historical Chronology – From prehistory to 1970. (Magyar Történeti Kronológia – az 
őstörténettől 1970-ig. [Hungarian Historical Chronology – From prehistory to 1970.] 5th 
edition. Tankönyvkiadó, Budapest, 1971. p. 588.)
207 eGyed, isTván: Az ezeréves magyar alkotmány. [The thousand years old Hungarian 
constitution.] Légrády Testvérek, Budapest 1941. pp. 249-250.
208 varGa, norBerT: Ideiglenesség és jogfolytonosság. Történeti jogintézmények 
szerepe a magyar alkotmányozásban. [Transition and legal continuity. The role of  
historical legal institutions in Hungarian constitution-making.] DIEIP 2/2011. 4. 
[www.dieip.hu; 16 May 2011] [hereinafter referred to as Varga (2011)].
209 eGyed op. cit. p. 246. 
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changes do not affect the basis of  the legal system, and as these are 
of  moral aspect, they may be reproduced and restored any time: “The 
Hungarian state has gone through many convulsions. […] Today it is 
torn, is unprotected; but it has not lost its faith in its future and is imbued 
by some mystical force, unswerving belief. […] State may be made by 
force, but only temporarily. […] The value of  our statehood comes from 
the fact that […] the individuals are connected not only by artificial legal 
bonds, but also by moral ties; everything holds us together which may 
make a mass a nations, which may transform the area of  the state into a 
homeland” – we may read.210 Similarly „[When] after the great difficulties 
of  the long years of  the war the spirit of  constitution making was raving 
throughout Europe and new constitution were prepared in a row not 
only in defeated, but also in neutral, moreover, in victorious countries, 
the tiny, torn Hungary – even in times of  difficulties which seemed to 
be undefeatable – defined the way of  public law reorganisation in the 
return to old constitutionalism.”211 
The opinion of  Gyula Moór is somewhat more tinged, as he does 
not only mention the issue of  returning to the old, but he extends the 
possibility of  legal certainty to certain legal relationships established by 
the „usurper power”, based on practical reasons: „Those who denied the 
possibilities of  establishing revolutionary law would confront the lessons 
of  world history, which prove that from the violation of  law (conquest, 
usurpation, revolution or coup) often new law was established. The 
legislative power of  revolutionary facts is acknowledged by the legitimist 
approach in the form the postliminium institution of  public law, which 
means that the usurper power may establish legal relationships which 
will be approved by the returning legitimate power, as it has no other 
choice. (For example Article 9 of  Act I of  1920 in Hungary).”212 It is 
not enough, therefore, to draw attention to the fact that „[the]two break-
ups with legal continuity which intended to be final in 1919 and in 1943 
210 eGyed op. cit. p. 245. 
211 eGyed op. cit. p. 248. 
212 moór, Gyula: A jogbölcselet problémái. (Problems of  legal philosophy.) Magyar 
Szemle Társaság, Budapest 1945. p. 25. 
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were both illegitimate, they were forced by Bolshevik dictatorships”213, 
but in each such case – in a supplementary way – we shall also give 
account about how those legal relationships may be settled which were 
influenced by the authorities in the given periods, and the acceptance 
of  the further validity and enforceability of  certain laws shall also be 
reasoned (e.g. the requirement of  legal certainty). „But simply based on 
theoretical considerations we shall arrive to the same conclusion – Gyula 
Moór continues his train of  thought – as if  we denied the possibility of  
revolutionary law, we would state that law may be established only in 
legitimate way, i.e. always in compliance with itemized law. This means 
that older law, which facilitated the establishment of  a newer law had 
to be established also upon the provisions of  an even older law. The 
retrospection cannot go on ad infinitum. We shall finally indicate a first 
law which could not be established upon the provisions of  an even older 
law – because there was no such law before – but it came into being 
upon its own force. This is the same as revolutionary law, as this is also 
established as law depending on its own force.”214 
During any attempt to interpret the relationship between the 
Fundamental Law and the historical constitution the separate examination 
of  legal continuity receives special attention also in the newest legal 
literature:215 „A precondition of  historical constitution, however, – partly 
as a type of  constitutions, and also as the historical constitution embodied 
in the Hungarian Holy Crown theory – is traceable organic development, 
legal continuity. The notion of  legal continuity is inseparably related to 
the constitutional development of  customary law; historical constitution 
may exist only where constitutional continuity is unbroken. Without 
this counter-related legal development cannot be interpreted, thus the 
notion of  historical constitution shall not lack the temporal succession 
of  written and unwritten law, and the compliance with the legal system 
213 paczolay (2011) 
214 moór op. cit. p. 25. 
215 csinK lóránT – Fröhlich Johanna: Történeti alkotmány és kontinuitás az új 
Alaptörvényben. [Historical constitution and continuity in the new Fundamental 
Law.] Közjogi Szemle 1/2012. pp. 5-6. [hereinafter referred to as csinK – Fröhlich 
(2012b)].
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serving as background for the before mentioned. Formal legal continuity, 
therefore means that the constitution may be modified only by those 
with proper authorisation, in a legal way defined in the constitution, 
regardless of  the content of  the changes. On the contrary, material legal 
continuity imposes a further requirement in additions to the conditions 
of  formal legal continuity, namely that the reform shall originate from 
existing institutions, constitutional structures, the development course 
of  the constitution, which can ensure organic development.216 
Regarding legal continuity looming in relation with the Fundamental 
Law it may be also examined whether such formal and material legal 
continuity may exist in connection with the historical constitution and 
with cardinal acts, but it is an unavoidable fact that in parallel with the 
annulment of  Act XX of  1949 – in the opinion of  Péter Paczolay, 
President of  the Constitutional Court – the cardinal acts were not and 
could not be restored with their original content, and other legal tools of  
the present were not renewed upon old requirements.217 (For the practical 
significance of  the notion of  historical constitution see section V.3.2)
3. Certain important features and functions of  the Fundamental Law
3.1. The Fundamental Law as basic norm and a tool of  legitimization
The establishment of  the Fundamental Law on the short run and partially 
unconditionally extends the area of  movement of  the establishing 
216 Formal and material legal continuity was defined this way upon TóTh JózseF 
zolTán by csinK – Fröhlich (2012b) p. 6 The authors supplement their statement 
with the following: “We do not consider as part of  this notion the public law 
continuity falling beyond legal continuity, which in this sense means, regardless 
of  any attempts which may be interpreted as the interruption of  continuity, the 
continuous development of  public law culture. With this regard we may mention 
the return to the acts of  1848 or to act I of  1946 at the time of  the change in the 
system, even though public law continuity did not exist.” (Ibid.)
217 paczolay, péTer: A történeti alkotmány és a konzervatív jogi gondolkodás. 
(Historical constitution and conservative legal thinking.) In: Magyar konzervativizmus 
– Hagyomány és jelenkor. (Hungarian conservativism – Tradition and the present.) Batthyány 
Lajos Alapítvány, Budapest 1994. p. 34. [hereinafter referred to as paczolay (1994)] 
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political force(s), therewith the values and institutions contained therein 
definitely comply with the actual, main directions of  social control, of  
its political and other intentions. Moreover – especially because of  the 
atypical nature of  two-third majority necessary for the modification of  
the Fundamental Law – the Fundamental Law made under exceptional 
historical and political “synods” may be able – in a neutral sense – to 
“capture” the future, again establishing a framework in Hungarian legal 
development which may remain unchanged for decades.
In positive law sense the constitution is the basic norm of  the legal 
system and at the same time it is part of  the legal system.218 It is disputed, 
however, how much these facts make the fundamental norm the basis 
of  the system of  social norms, and how much these make it a part of  
it at all. From this aspect it is what its maker wants the Fundamental 
Law to be viewed; at what way and at what degree it wishes to make 
the Fundamental Law the part and basis of  social norms. Viewing this 
issue from the aspect of  our specific topic it is obvious that the new 
constitution may lead to focusing on the conservative legal approach.219 In the 
perception of  conservative legal approach – among others – law is 
subjected to moral principles or at least some kind of  higher principles, 
law and moral cannot be divided as sharply as stated by legal positivism; 
furthermore, the role of  legal development by judges is very important.220 
If  we accept the possible division of  political and legal constitutional 
development it may be stated that the advantage of  „legal” constitutional 
approach may be relative accuracy and interpretation security, while its 
disadvantage is the is the danger that state goals and value preferences 
are missing.221 However, – as it has been referred to before – the new 
Hungarian political regime and the Fundamental Law itself  – contrary 
to the primacy of  rules – declares the primacy of  principles and values. 
218 sziGeTi (2011) p. 55.
219 paczolay (2011) op. sic.
220 The phrase conservativism has significant role with regard to the examined 
processes and phenomenons, but its explaining force is limited. For this see 
Balázs, zolTán: Menczer Béla gondolkodásának helye a magyar konzervativizmus 
hagyományában. [Place of  Béla Menczer’s theories in the traditions of  Hungarian 
conservativism.] Politikatudományi Szemle 1/2010. pp. 94-95.
221 sziGeTi (2011) p. 55. 
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Uncertainty may be significant regarding the appearance of  these – partially 
– new principles in itemized law because without legal (constitutional 
court, ordinary court) practice the real content, scope, direct referability 
(!), etc. of  these provisions is strongly doubted.
Within the evaluation of  the legitimization of  Hungary’s Fundamental 
Law – according to András Jakab – the clarification of  preliminary 
questions regarding the function of  the constitution are necessary 
(therewith that if  any constitution meets these requirements, út may 
be considered legitimate, worth to be followed): „We usually expect 
three things from modern constitutions: (1) they shall embody the self-
control of  power (this is declared in the protection of  fundamental 
rights and the basic theory of  the division of  powers), (2) the most 
important basic institutions of  the state structure shall be established 
(constituted) democratically, and (3) they hall be symbols which keep 
the society together.222 This latter one is closely related to the notions 
and procedures of  institutionalisation and legitimization, which is the 
transformation of  behaviour into habitual and typical in social roles, 
while legitimization problem occurs when experiences abstracted in 
the languages are transferred to the next generation. The legitimization 
procedure explains and certifies institutionalised processes for those 
who – as they did not take part in the establishment of  these procedures 
– do not consider institutionalisations natural.223 As soon as certain 
rules become obvious, i.e. they institutionalise as public agreements, the 
procedure starts immediately, within which the relationship between the 
rule (social and individual expectation) and its direct moral reasons starts 
to get more and more fragmented and ambiguous. This may indicate the 
222 JaKaB, andrás: Mire jó egy alkotmány? Avagy az újonnan elkészülő 
alkotmány legitimitásának kérdése. (What is a constitution good for? The 
question of  legitimacy of  the newly established constitution.) In: JaKaB, andrás: 
Az új Alaptörvény keletkezése és gyakorlati következményei. (The establishment of  the 
Fundamental Law and its practical consequences) HVG-ORAC, Budapest, 2011. 
p. 131. [hereinafter referred to as JaKaB (2011)]
223 Karácsony, andrás. Konstruktivizmus a társadalomelméletben. 
(Constructivism in the theory of  social science) In: A társadalom és a jog autopoietikus 
felépítése. (The autopoiethical structure of  society and law.) (editors cs. Kiss, laJos – 
Karácsony, andrás) Budapest 1994. p. 14. 
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significance of  the Fundamental Law and in its context of  the historical 
constitution, therewith the (given) notion and its content outlines, fixes 
and regulates the methods of  transfer of  social experiences. In order 
to prevent this information from becoming fragmented and ambiguous 
– regarding its content and ways of  access – the most obvious tool is 
existence of  a constantly “updated” and enforced social value catalogue.
3.2. Certain features of  the concept of  the historical constitution
Another question which is difficult to separate from the above mentioned 
issue of  legal continuity is the approach of  the Fundamental Law 
regarding to historical constitution, which is worth considering in order 
to indicate the practical significance of  the thrive of  this legal approach.
The Fundamental Law describes itself  as a fundamental law restoring 
the nation’s historical constitution. Even though this “historical 
constitution” is one of  the main legal sources of  the new structure, its 
meaning is barely mentioned in the preamble.224 Legal historical experience 
shows that in the existence and reappearance of  traditional law – even 
in the newest era – there is a phenomenon that countries becoming 
independent or separating in any way sooner or later include into their 
ideological-political reasons the intent of  relativisation of  traditional 
law.225 In Hungary the emphatic appearance of  historical constitution in 
the (new) Fundamental Law – also becoming an element of  interpreting 
itemized law – may be evaluated as similar development. 
It is supplementary information to this question that the historical 
feature of  the constitution has never meant pertification; historical 
constitution is also changing. „This change, however, it not forcible 
interruption and an introduction of  a new system, but [organic] 
development, further building, the [continuous] inclusion of  necessary 
reforms into the constitution.”226 
224 apor op. cit. 
225 Kulcsár Kálmán: Jogszociológia. (Legal sociology.) Kulturtrade Kiadó, 
Budapest, 1997. p. 129. [hereinafter referred to as Kulcsár (1997)]
226 eGyed op. cit. p. 248.
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The sources for getting to know the old Hungarian law, thus the „one 
thousand years old” Hungarian constitution, the historical constitution 
are – mainly – customary law, law and privilege. The leges cardinale (cardinal acts) 
meant the core notions of  the historical constitution, which theoretically 
consist of  cardinal acts which may be listed one by one, as it has been 
tried by many.227 „The consequence of  the historical constitution is that 
Hungarian constitutional theory used the material notion of  constitution 
(interpreting it as special organisation of  society). In Hungarian history the 
constitution in material sense – the basic values of  state – was regulated 
by the so-called “cardinal” acts.”228 It is an important supplement that 
the cardinal feature and fundamental feature of  laws were established 
by customary law. 229
We may state that the difference between written and historical 
constitutions may be apprehended mainly through differing ways 
of  thinking: while for written constitution itemized (positive) law is 
the primary source, historical constitution originates mainly from 
constitutional conventions.230 From the aspect of  the present Fundamental 
Law an important „[question] therefore is whether ‘genre differences’ 
between written and historical constitution may be superable; whether 
the achievements of  the historical constitution may provide help in the 
interpretation of  a system which is basically of  different logic (written 
constitution). We shall examine therefore whether there is an ‘achievement’ 
which may be useful for the interpretation of  the Fundamental Law.”231 
The expression of  achievement – in the Fundamental Law232 – itself  
227 E.g. csizmadia, andor: Hajnóczy József  közjogi-politikai munkái. [Public 
law-political works of  József  Hajnóczy.] Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 1958. pp. 
236-240.
228 paczolay (2011) op. cit. 
229 The earlier legislation also used the terminology of  fundamental law: the title 
of  act III of  1827 was maintaining the validity of  fundamental laws.
230 Vö. JaKaB, andrás: Mire jó egy alkotmány (What is a constitution good for?) 
Kommentár (Commentary) 6/2010. p. 13. [hereinafter referred to as JaKaB (2010)]
231 csinK – Fröhlich (2012b) p. 4. 
232 It is stated in the National Avowal that “We honour the achievements of  
our historical constitution and we honour the Holy Crown, which embodies the 
constitutional continuity of  Hungary’s statehood and the unity of  the nation”, and 
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probably refers to the fact that not necessarily concrete – contemporary 
– texts return to legal life, but background principles may be settled, 
returned, strengthened, provided that these principles are defined in a 
properly clarified way, which may be presented also in the present social-
legal context. Zoltán Szente states that the theory of  the Holy Crown 
and the Fundamental Law are concepts which cannot or can hardly be 
harmonised with each other, and he arrives to the conclusion that within 
the framework of  the Fundamental Law the resolution of  the before 
mentioned conflict may only happen by disregarding the achievements 
of  the Fundamental Law and the declarations related to the theory of  
the Holy Crown233. In reality one possible approach of  the historical 
constitution is which – at most – attributes symbolic importance to 
the notion and phenomenon of  historical constitution, stating that 
the relevant parts of  the National Avowal and Article R paragraph (3) 
wish to facilitate and strengthen respect for the achievements of  the 
historical constitution. „Such constitutional provisions are obviously 
self-generating norms, the designation of  which is to realise the social 
cohesion strengthening effect attributed to the Holy Crown and to the 
historical constitution.”234 Truly, the category of  historical constitution 
– as separate type of  norms – may be hardly inserted into the hierarchy 
of  norms, primarily due to its ambiguous content.
The most common mistake in relation with the historical constitution – however – 
is that we only consider as important issue the notion of  the historical constitution, its 
“itemized” content; however, in parallel with this we could ask the question why it is 
useful, what it can be used for: i.e. whether through the historical constitution we can 
get closer to the solution of  the present problems. And from this approach there 
are great opportunities lying in the historical constitution: István Egyed 
Article R) paragraph (3) according to which „The provisions of  the Fundamental 
Law shall be interpreted in accordance with their purposes, the National Avowal 
and the achievements of  our historical constitution.”
233 szenTe, zolTán: A historizáló alkotmányozás problémái – a történeti 
alkotmány és a Szent Korona az új Alaptörvényben. (Problems of  historical 
constitution making – the historical constitution and the Holy Crown in the new 
Fundamental Law.) Közjogi Szemle 3/2011. pp. 1-13. [hereinafter referred to as 
szenTe (2011)]
234 csinK – Fröhlich (2012a) p. 98. 
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said the following: „[Each] historical constitution has its immeasurable 
advantage that it really mirrors the public opinion of  the nation. We did 
not receive our constitution, we did not copy it, it was not made at all; 
it grew out from the national soul as result of  natural development as 
the greatest work of  national culture. Such historical constitution may 
be best described as the nation’s own way of  being; it perfectly suits the 
characteristics, spiritual state of  the nation. Such constitution, therefore, 
is the carrier of  great traditions and at the same time it is the way of  
future development.”235 The real force of  the historical constitution, 
therefore, shall be searched for in common understanding, i.e. in common 
understandings regarding important principles236, in those ones which 
may be worked out under given circumstances without the direct political 
defeat of  any of  the parties. At the same time, however, maybe this is 
the most significant obstacle preventing the historical constitution from 
becoming an organic part of  living law, as a living historical constitution 
– even if  only as a method (!) of  interpreting law – can only exist if  the 
relationship to the past is clarified, settled and definitely majority. As 
in the wider social-political environment one of  the main and constant 
difficulties is the lack of  common and valid tradition which may serve 
as basis for material discussions, every institutionalised way trying to 
establish it may be „desired solution”.
Phrasing it in a rather biased way: today the question is not (only) whether it is 
necessary to have a historical constitutions, but (also) in what way we should start 
the rebuilding of  the common past which serves as a foundation of  the present and 
which is still searching for its contours, and thus upon this basis where we can define 
the place of  the historical constitution in this common legal and everyday history. 
One of  the greatest weaknesses of  Hungarian politics and social (public) life is – 
traditionally – the separation, opposition of  its elite along expressly political aspects 
and breaking lines (and this has significant consequences in several fields of  social 
life). Therefore we shall not treat historical constitution as temporal problem of  
(legal)dogmatic (e.g. the question of  fitting it into the hierarchy of  laws), but we may 
235 eGyed op. cit. p. 247. 
236 Thought of  Barna Mezey (expressed: at the round table discussion ’The 
relationship between the Fundamental Law and the historical constitution’, on 29 
February 2012 at the Faculty of  Law of  Eötvös Loránd University).
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view it as a living framework, an objective way of  being, which may be suitable to 
establish basic compromises without obvious forces and self-abdication in fields which 
lack these nowadays. The clarified historical constitution, as specific objectivation, as 
specific institution may facilitate, for example, the development of  political etiquette, 
the expansion or reduction of  the number of  topics which may be discussed in public, 
and eventually may lead to the establishment of  new social common agreements. It 
could be a new political framework, which could provide for the common acceptance 
of  common values without – obvious political – defeats and unnecessary losses, due 
to its novelty and freshness.   
Nevertheless, in the establishment of  the “body” of  the historical constitution 
legal science shall have a determinative role, as well as the Constitutional Court 
and the courts; law in this regard – as a tool of  social engineering – may shape the 
society’s and the nation’s way of  thinking, approaches and biases (in certain ways 
influencing also governmental capacities…).
Therefore two opinions may be outlined about the meaning of  
historical constitution introduced in the Fundamental Law of  Hungary:
I. A limited concept – historical constitution as legal culture
For the representative of  this approach the historical constitution is much 
more a catalogue of  legal (public law) culture than that of  legal sources 
and independent legal (political) solutions. From the most cited authors 
András Jakab refuses to give more space to historical constitution in 
the context of  the new Fundamental Law than a „reasoning decorating 
role”.237 As it has been mentioned before, Péter Paczolay is at the same 
opinion: „The Hungarian historical constitution – despite all theoretical 
attempts made to justify it – was a constitution with significantly reduced 
force, the instalment of  which was eventually destroyed by the storms of  
the 20th century. However, some parts of  the old Hungarian constitution, 
mainly the symbolic ones, may be preserved. Today legal continuity is 
maintained mainly in symbolic elements, such as the coat of  arms and 
the Himnusz (Hymn).”238 In summary: for the representatives of  this 
approach the historical constitution is much more a catalogue of  legal 
237 JaKaB (2011) p. 199.
238 paczolay (2011)
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(public law) culture239, than that of  legal sources and independent legal 
(political) solutions.  
This „way of  use” regarding the historical constitution may be also 
described as the renewal of  the red tail concept 240, which focuses more 
on historical, comparative approaches during the legal interpretation 
activities of  the Constitutional Court and other courts, with well selected 
historical examples and reasons trying to find further confirmation 
to its opinion established regardless of  the mentioned institutions. 
Among the virtues of  this concept it shall be mentioned that during the 
examination of  given legal institutions it broadens the time horizon, and 
quasi forces the interpreter of  law, the legal practitioner to expand the 
need for the clarification of  notions to historical questions and aspects 
which it earlier mentioned only with one sentence or a reference. This 
may also be the danger of  the concept: sematic and forced use of  law 
might not increase respect for historical achievements, on the contrary: 
the unlimited nature of  references may have alienating effects on legal 
practitioners, while during the shaping of  general legal beliefs it may 
have effects which result in false, unreal expectations and ideas.
II. A radical concept – the historical constitution as a way for itemized law extension 
and the direction of  making political public agreements
A „domesticated” form of  this concept is the idea which would try 
to create an expandable „achievement-catalogue” – composed of  
individual institutions incorporated again into valid, positive law – partly 
in order to vest the interpreted notion with material meaning by „taking 
the Fundamental Law seriously”, and partly in order to prevent the 
establishment of  domestic scientific schools speaking in parallel with 
the use of  unspecified, discursive and undefined legal categories. This 
239 Thought of  Elemér Balogh (expressed: At the round table discussion ’The 
relationship between the Fundamental Law and the historical constitution’, on 29 
February 2012 at the Faculty of  Law of  Eötvös Loránd University).
240 A stylistic approach common during the state Socialism, which placed a 
summarising thought – which ideologically suited the official expectations of  the 
time – to the end of  linguistically formulated works (articles, studies, novels, film, 
etc.), sometimes expressly conflicting the actual meaning of  the work. 
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opinion identifies the institutionalised way of  connecting with the past 
with the establishment a more careful, partial material legal continuity. 
This approach, therefore, may be called the concept of  partial material 
legal continuity. This approach, however, also states that the – already 
started (see section IV.) – „resuscitation” of  individual historical legal 
institutions „may be possible only by taking into account the constitutional 
requirements of  the past period”241, thus it considers it necessary to 
create some kind of  a test also in this area.
In this approach – as it has been mentioned – it is also important 
– in given cases – that reasons looming from the past may be not only 
interesting, but not independent supplements, but at the same time also 
elements – inseparable from legal practice, but going beyond it – which 
are able to shape the present’s public opinion and common agreements.
The intention of  the legislator to re-introduce the historical constitution 
into the Hungarian legal environment as material legal institution may 
be shown by the fact that not only the Avowal refers to its significance, 
but also paragraph (3) of  Article R) transforms its application as an 
explicit requirement: its presence in the Fundamental Law, therefore, is 
not limited to the declarative elements, but also as a legalising item, as a 
significant tool of  interpretation. This is important also because in the 
newer legal literature there are opinions according to which the political 
declarations of  the preambles are separated from the legally binding 
norm content and may not [necessarily] provide obligatory guidelines 
for interpretation.242 
Article 28 of  the Fundamental Law refers to the – not clearly 
defined – use of  the historical constitution by legal practitioners: „In 
applying laws, courts shall primarily interpret the text of  any law in accordance 
with its goals and the Fundamental Law. The interpretation of  the Fundamental 
Law and other laws shall be based on the assumption that they serve a moral and 
241 E.g. varGa, norBerT (2011) p. 323.
242 A preambulumok egyes szerkezeti elemei és az értelmezési lehetőség közötti 
összefüggést lásd For the correlation of  certain structurel elements of  preambles and 
the possible ways of  interpretation see anTal, aTTila: „A preambulum ornamentikája 
és közjogi ereje” (“Ornamentics and public law force of  the preamble”) In: anTal, 
aTTila – nováK, zolTán – szenTpéTeri naGy, richárd (eds.): Az alkotmány arca. 
(The face of  the constitution.) Budapest, L’Harmattan 2011. p. 30.
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economical purpose corresponding to common sense and the public benefit.” Based 
on the comparison of  the cited paragraph of  Article R) and Article 28 
the only possible consequence is that in their interpretation activities 
based on the Fundamental Law the courts shall take the achievements 
of  the historical constitution as a starting point. 
In connection with this interpretation activity we may state that 
Article 32/A of  the previous Constitution did not reserve the right of  
interpretation of  laws to the Constitutional Court, and from Article 70/K 
and paragraph (2) of  Article 77 it was possible to explain the possibility 
of  judges to apply the Constitution directly, even though ordinary 
courts usually rejected those claims which were submitted exclusively 
due to the violation of  constitutional rights, requiring other reference 
to an act or any other piece of  law in order to deal with the subject.243 
Without analysing the relevant provisions of  the Fundamental Law it 
may be stated that it is obvious that in sketching the essence and outline 
of  the judicial behaviour „paying attention” to the achievements of  the 
historical constitution the Constitutional Court and the Curia will play 
an important role.
The frameworks of  the above mentioned two concepts (I-II) are 
strengthened by the polemy which unfolded in Decision IV/2096/2012 
of  the Constitutional Court. The following may be read in the reasoning 
of  the decision examining the issues of  the pension age of  judges: “It 
shall be a minimum requirement to the consolidated interpretation of  
Hungarian historical constitution to accept the fact that acts constituting 
the civil transformation in the 19th century form part of  the historical 
constitution. These act established – after not insignificant antecedents 
– the firm basis of  legal institutions on which the modern state under 
the rule of  law is based. Therefore when the Fundamental Law quasi 
opens a window to the historical dimensions of  our public law, it draws 
attention to those institution historical antecedents, without which our 
present public law relationships and in general our legal culture would 
243 Gárdos-orosz, Fruzsina: Az emberi jogok alkalmazásának lehetőségei a rendes 
bíróságokon, különös tekintettel a magánjogi jogvitákra. (Possible ways of  using human rights 
at ordinary courts, with special attention to private law disputes.) Theses of  doctoral essay. 
Győr, 2010. pp. 11-12.
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be rootless. In this new situation the responsibility of  the Constitutional 
Court is extremely important, one could say it is of  historical importance: 
at the examination of  given cases its shall include into its critical horizon 
the relevant source of  legal institution history”. In the given case the 
Constitutional Court acted so, using the provisions of  two acts from the 
19th century as independent reasons. However, in the examined field Béla 
Pokol’s separate opinion strictly opposes this reviving practice: „Article 
R) of  the Fundamental Law in fact refers to interpretation in light of  the 
achievements of  our historical constitution, but its presently undefined 
nature obliges us to act carefully. The present legal historical citations 
from these acts mentioned in the reasoning simply mean the detailed 
rules of  an old regulation. Should we treat these as obligatory today and 
confer normative force upon them contrary to the will and laws of  the 
present legislative majority, then in reality we would question the concept 
of  changeable law. Therefore in my opinion Article R) shall not be used, 
because it is contrary with the theory of  changeable modern law. In 
addition to this as precedent it may present a bad example, because the 
petitioner lawyers of  the present days submitting constitutional complaints 
will have dozens of  laws at their disposal from the 19th century, which 
may be referred to against the legal regulations of  the present days, as 
’achievements of  the historical constitution’. Within a short period of  
time this may create a false-historical reasoning dimension in the flow 
of  constitutional complaints, in which hundreds of  trainee lawyers may 
receive the task of  doing research in and prepare the use of  various 
documents of  legal history. The final result of  this cannot be anything 
else, but the discrediting of  the theory of  the historical constitution.”  
It is an important supplement to the significance of  the Fundamental 
Law that the Fundamental Law cannot be considered as strong instrument 
of  positive law as the previous one, due to its function as “a door to 
the past and to the future”. (See in details in the following subsection.)
3.3. A Fundamental Law open from down, from up and from the side
Now we shall draw attention to the fact that the new Fundamental Law 
stands in front of  us as a constitution open from downwards, from 
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upwards and from the side. Openness from downwards mean that by declaring 
legal continuity it theoretically opens the possibility to attribute – not 
yet clearly defined – actual law meanings to some parts of  the historical 
constitution. Openness from upwards may be interpreted in a way that under 
the force of  the new Fundamental Law it becomes the responsibility of  
the state (and its organisations) to proceed during the enactment of  any 
normative or individual act or the interpretation of  Hungary’s Fundamental 
Law by paying attention to the interests of  future generations.244 The 
protection of  the interests of  future generations requires us to „limit 
the enforcement of  the empirical majority with reference to an actually 
non-existing population – eventually to a principle valid regardless of  
the opinion of  the actual majority – let it be at political elections or 
through the market game of  demand and supply”.245 For its reliable 
operation in practice, however, the traditional principles of  democratic 
representation and decision making shall be supplemented246, therefore 
new institutionalised solutions are / will be needed.
Openness from the side shall be interpreted in a way that by the Transitional 
Provisions to the Fundamental Law of  Hungary and the cardinal acts 
the constitution is practically doubled and fills the „available space” even more 
than before, if  it is possible. 
The constitution which is temporally – i.e. regarding its own time 
scope – is open from up and down relativises itself: partly the obligation 
to interpret its provisions upon the historical constitution uniquely – 
retrospectively – reduces the bonds of  the constitution to the given time 
period, and partly – within the explanation of  constitutional values – the 
constitutional-fundamental law approach focusing on the interests of  the 
future generations makes the actual meaning of  the fundamental law’s/
constitution’s itemized provisions uncertain. This – above explained – 
openness itself  significantly increases the importance of  cardinal acts, 
244 See e.g. Article P) of  Hungary’s Fundamental Law: “All natural resources, 
especially agricultural land, forests and drinking water supplies, biodiversity – in particular 
native plant and animal species – and cultural assets shall form part of  the nation’s common 
heritage, and the State and every person shall be obliged to protect, sustain and preserve them 
for future generations.”
245 lányi op. cit. p. 118. 
246 Ibid. 
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uniquely reproducing the situation in which the main feature of  the 
historical constitution was that a well-outlined and palpable, though – 
regarding its principles and rules – not complexly written constitution 
was – mainly – made of  cardinal acts. In this regard the new Fundamental 
Law – which can be interpreted only together with the cardinal acts related 
and attached to it – uniquely opens up and at the same time weakens 
itself, giving more space to the infiltration of  ideas not – necessarily – 
based on legal positivism – both in legislation and in the practice of  
constitutional adjudication in a strict sense.
3.4. The “novelty” of  affected relationships
The speciality of  the Fundamental Law and the newer elements of  the 
legal system if  that the scope of  situations, the characteristics of  subject 
and their balance have been also changed. In this scope there is also a 
special duality: on the one hand the regulations of  virtual spaces may 
be in focus, and, on the other hand, the more precise, careful and new 
regulation of  essential conditions of  life is also important – e.g. through 
the regulation of  right to food or water, which were not considered 
relevant, central (legal) issues in Hungary earlier for decades.
3.5. How many legal instruments does Hungary’s Fundamental Law have?
It is known that there are countries the fundamental law of  which is 
composed of  more documents, not just one. Through the new products 
of  legislation the same situation occurred in Hungary, though not without 
legal difficulties.
The act called the Act on Transitional Provisions of  Hungary’s 
Fundamental Law (Aár.) consists of  two well separable material parts: 1) 
it names the criminal act committed during the Socialist dictatorship and 
their perpetrators (among them the successor party of  the Hungarian 
Social Workers’ Party, the Hungarian Socialist Party, existing today as the 
largest opposition party247), at the same time regulating the some legal 
247 „4. The Hungarian Socialist Party, having gained legal recognition during the 
democratic transition, shares all responsibility which lies with the state-party, as the 
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consequences of  the responsibility (e.g. reduction of  state benefits for the 
still living leaders of  the dictatorship); 2) contains provisions related to 
the entering into force of  the Fundamental Law (including the so-called 
Closing provisions), among which there are several provisions which 
cannot necessarily de derived from the Fundamental Law, and the presence 
of  which in the text conflicts with the statements of  the general reasoning, 
as it may be read there that these provisions [exclusively] „contain formal 
legal parts which include traditional transitional provisions related to the 
entering into force of  the Fundamental Law”. The controversy may be 
solved through the fact that the obvious aim of  the Aár. is – beyond their 
political declaration – to make provisions constitutional (by hiding them 
from the examination of  the Constitutional Court by raising them up to 
the fundamental law level) the harmony of  which with the Fundamental 
Law is at least questionable.
The Parliamentary Commissioner of  Fundamental Rights expressed a 
similar opinion,248 according to which „Regarding their content transitional 
provisions are rules which are related to issues already regulated in 
the fundamental law, and to the fundamental law itself, which define 
temporary differences, exceptions, or one time, specific actions. Their 
common characteristic is that their approval is made necessary by the 
transition from the old regulations to the new, their establishment is 
especially important for ensuring legal certainty in case of  significant 
modifications.” The parliamentary commissioner of  fundamental rights 
resents, among others, that several provisions do not make any attempt to 
define „temporal limits” logically inseparable for transitional regulations, 
legal successor of  the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, heir to the unlawfully 
accumulated assets and beneficiary of  the illegitimate advantages obtained under the 
dictatorship or during the transition, and by reason of  the personal continuity which 
linked the old and the new party and is still characteristic of  the party’s leadership.” 
248 The Parliamentary Commissioner for Fundamental Rights turned to the 
Constitutional Court on 13 March 2012. In his petition he primarily requested 
the annulment of  the Aár. as a whole, as secondary request the annulment of  the 
phrase in Article 31 paragraph (2) of  the Aár. which declares that the Aár. formed 
part of  the Fundamental Law, as well as the annulment of  provisions which 
cannot be considered transitional due to their material content. For the petition 
see (in Hungarian): http://www.ajbh.hu/allam/jelentes/201202302Ai.rtf  
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and several provisions actually detail the articles of  the fundamental law 
on the merits, define specific legal institutions, without them being related 
to the execution of  the Fundamental Law, or being transitional in their 
nature at all (an example to the latter one may be Article 30 of  the Aár. 
on the establishment of  a possibly new institutions combining the tasks 
of  the Magyar Nemzeti Bank and the institution supervising the financial 
intermediary system).249 By examining the characteristics of  provisions 
included into the Aár. it may stated therefore that these are mainly detailed 
rules and provisions regulating concrete legal relationships, which lack 
any general, abstract features otherwise characterising constitutions.250 
The transitional nature of  the document is also weakened by the large 
number of  political declarations, which mainly originate from the basic 
idea stated in the preamble according to which „Hungary’s current rule of  
law cannot be built on the crimes of  the communist regime”. Several provisions 
cannot be applied directly, they require further legislation (e.g. for the 
reduction of  Communist leaders’ pension). The existence of  laws, 
however, which will have the Aár. as their legitimate basis, would (have) 
also require(d) the exact definition of  the Aár.’s place in the legal system. 
It is (was) therefore a determinative question what the relationship 
between the Transitional Provisions to the Fundamental Law of  Hungary 
and the Fundamental Law was, and thus whether it can be reviewed 
by the Constitutional Court. A pre-question to the related theoretical 
examination is what place the Aár. has in the hierarchy of  legal source 
and – from constitutional law aspects – what it role is in the legal system. 
The original text of  the Aár. refers to two authorizations; as its legitimate 
basis is refers both to the Constitution251 and to the Fundamental Law. 
According to its Preamble the Parliament enacted the Aár. in the interest 
of  the enforcement of  the Fundamental Law.252 Moreover, section III. 
249 Article 2 of  the first modification of  Hungary’s Fundamental Law annulled 
Article 30 of  the Aár..
250 For the theory about abstract notions used in constitutions and in 
constitutional reasoning see: cass r. sunsTein: Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict. 
Oxford, University Press 1996. pp. 35-61.
251 The basic reason for this is that the Aár. was enacted by the Parliament on 30 
December 2011 (during the validity period of  the Constitution).
252 “(…) in the interest of  enforcing the first Fundamental Law of  Hungary, adopted 
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of  the Closing Provisions of  the Fundamental Law expressly refers to 
the Aár.: the „Parliament shall adopt the temporary provisions related to this 
Fundamental Law in a special procedure defined in point 2.” The Fundamental 
Law, therefore, considers the enactment of  the Aár. necessary. The 
fact which could have made the reader of  the two legal instruments 
somewhat confused at the beginning of  2012 was that the Aár. clearly 
referred to its relationship to the Fundamental Law in paragraph (2) 
of  Article 31, according to which „The Transitional Provisions shall form 
part of  the Fundamental Law”, but this was not necessarily clear from the 
Fundamental Law itself  (from the cited point 3 of  the Closing Provisions), 
from the expression „related to”.
Several possibilities were raised, therefore: the Aár. a) will be part 
of  the Fundamental Law; b) is a legal source independent from the 
Fundamental Law, at a fundamental law level, or c) is a legal source, but 
not at fundamental law level.253 These options – as it has been mentioned 
– were not raised as dogmatic, theoretical questions, but also sharply 
raised the question whether the control of  the Constitutional Court 
exists over this instrument. It may be stated safely that an act like the 
Aár. may become part of  the Fundamental Law in two ways: on the one 
hand, if  the Fundamental Law itself  declares that the Aár., established 
in a separate document forms its part, or, on the other hand, in the case 
if  the approval of  the Aár. happened within the procedure aiming at the 
modification of  the Fundamental Law. If  it had been so, then – at the 
time of  the first version – the Constitutional Court would have had the 
right to examine it on the merits. The significance of  the question – and the 
serious mistake of  law making – is shown by the fact that the first modification of  
the Fundamental Law happened in this case, stating that: “Transitional provisions 
declared in Article 3 shall form part of  the Fundamental Law.”254 
according to the requirements of  the rule of  law, hereby proclaim the following (...)”
253 csinK – Fröhlich (2012a) p. 146. 
254 Article 1 of  the first modification of  Hungary’s Fundamental Law
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4. Main criticism regarding the Fundamental Law
Well-known legal protection organisations formulated several times 
between 2012 and 2012 the requirement that „(…) the Parliament shall 
not reduce the present level of  protection of  fundamental rights, except 
for justifiable constitutional emergency. If  a cardinal act reduces the level 
of  protection in any way, the legislator shall provide detailed reasoning 
about what kind of  threat of  which fundamental right or value makes 
the reduction of  protection necessary. (…) We also request that the 
further planned reorganisation of  public institutions regulated in the 
Constitution – except for the organisation of  the Government, naturally 
– shall mirror a conservative approach, thus the system and character 
of  constitutional institutions may be changed only upon serious and 
publicly explained reasons. We request the review (…) of  the already 
introduced changes. (…) We also request to keep in mind that the 
structural reorganisation of  the state’s organisation shall not result in 
the reduction of  institutional guarantees attached to the protection of  
law, i.e. the original competences of  the Constitutional Court shall be 
revived (…)”.255 In summary, therefore – with serious simplification – the 
requirement of  reliability, foreseeability and reasonableness lacking actual 
interests were defined in the before mentioned statement, as well as in 
other criticisms. (Regarding further external criticism see section VI.5.3). 
5. Cardinal acts
Article R) paragraph (1) of  the Fundamental Law states that the 
Fundamental Law shall be the foundation of  the legal system of  Hungary. 
Regarding the system of  laws and the hierarchy of  laws paragraph (1) 
of  Article (T) states: „A generally binding rule of  conduct may be laid down by 
a piece of  legislation which is made by a body with legislative competence as specified 
in the Fundamental Law and which is published in the Official Gazette. (…)” and 
based on paragraph (3) of  the same article: „No legislation shall conflict with 
255 Joint statement “Cardinal request” of  the Eötvös Károly Institute and the 
Hungarian Civil Liberties Union made on 4 July 2011; http://ekint.org/ekint/
ekint.news.page?nodeid=465
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the Fundamental Law”. According to the Fundamental Law legislation shall 
include Acts of  Parliament, government decrees, orders by the Prime 
Minister, orders by the Governor of  the National Bank of  Hungary, 
ministerial decrees, orders by autonomous regulatory bodies and local 
ordinances. Legislation shall also include orders issued by the National 
Defence Council and the President of  the Republic during any state of  
national crisis or state of  emergency [paragraph (2)].
Article T) paragraph (4) differentiates cardinal acts within the notion of  
laws: „Cardinal Acts shall be Acts of  Parliament, the adoption and amendment of  
which requires a two-thirds majority of  the votes of  Members of  Parliament present.”
In Hungary’s Fundamental Law 32 cardinal acts are mentioned. 
Among cardinal acts initiated or approved after the approval of  the Fundamental 
Law those shall be mentioned every provision of  which required 2/3 majority (Act 
LXVI of  2011 on the State Audit Office of  Hungary, Act CLI of  2011 
on the Constitutional Court, Act CCIII of  2011 on the election of  the 
members of  the Parliament, Act CCXI of  2011 on the protection of  
families, Act C of  2011 on the Right to Freedom of  Conscience and 
Religion, and on the Legal Status of  Churches, Religious Denominations 
and Religious Communities, which was abolished by the Constitutional 
Court due to constitutional invalidity256, Act CCVI of  2011 on the Right 
to Freedom of  Conscience and Religion, and on the Legal Status of  
Churches, Religious Denominations and Religious Communities), as well 
as those some provisions of  which may be approved with simple majority (Act CXIII 
of  2011 on the national defence and the Hungarian Defence Forces and 
specific measures may be implemented in case of  special legislation, Act 
CX of  2011 on the Legal Status and Remuneration of  the President of  
the Republic, Act CLXI of  2011 on the Organisation and Administration 
of  Courts, Act CLXII of  2011 on the Legal Status and Remuneration of  
Judges, Act CLXIII of  2011 on the Prosecution Service, Act CLXIV of  
2011 on the Status of  the Prosecutor General, Prosecutors and Other 
Prosecution Employees and the Prosecution Career, Act CLXXXIX 
of  2011 on Local Governments of  Hungary, Act CCII of  2011 on the 
Use of  the Coat of  Arms and Flag of  Hungary and on State Awards, 
Act CLXXIX of  2011 on the Rights of  Minorities, Act CXCIV of  2011 
256 Decision of  the Constitutional Court 164/2011. (XII.20.) ABH 
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on the economic stability of  Hungary, Act CXCVI of  2011 on national 
assets, Act CCVIII of  2011 on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, Act XXXVI 
of  2012 on the Parliament). The above list shows well that during an 
exceptionally short period of  time acts carrying material novelties were 
approved, acts which serve as foundation of  society and thus function 
as central elements of  the legal system. 
 5. Cardinal acts
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vI. characterIstIcs of newer leGIslatIon
1. Facts and processes. Effects of  the modification of  laws
In advance it shall be stated that Hungarian legislation has gone through 
a shift of  balances after the change in the political system: while in 
state socialism the enactment of  ordinances dominated, after 1989 the 
dominance of  the enactment of  acts may be observed (in 1985 only 
3% of  all laws was act, while in 2005 the ratio of  the same was 16%).
Between the summers of  2010 and 2011 legislation was extremely 
„revolutionary” in Hungary, as the 266 approved acts (from which 95 
were brand-new, while 171 were modifications of  previous acts) and 
172 decisions of  the Parliament significantly exceed the annual statistics 
of  the first years of  previous governmental cycles (before and after the 
change of  the political system in 1990). In the previous cycle between 2006 
and 2010 these numbers in total are 263 (new) and 328 (modification).
Almost one-third (!) of  the acts enacted in 2011 were modified in 
the same year: in December 63 of  the 213 acts approved in 2011 – 
which was a new record – were modified. In the normal course of  work 
modifications of  acts are usual parts of  the tasks of  the Parliament, but 
it definitely does not fulfil the requirement of  legal certainty if  a newly 
approved act is modified several times in the same month, especially, 
if  such modification often affects a whole „network” of  laws. Such 
quick and comprehensive flow of  acts and their modifications brings 
uncertainty to all players, as these are not easy to interpret in the first 
place, and often it is impossible to prepare for them.257 
It is also worth mentioning that in December 2011 during one month 
18 acts were modified which were enacted in December, 5 of  them were 
modified several times. The act about the modification of  acts serving 
as basis for the budget was rewritten six times by the legislator in this 
period. The acts on taxation, on personal income tax and on duties 
were each modified eleven times in the last month of  the year. The act 
257 Tax laws rewritten in every four days. Index 18 January 2012 www.index.hu
119
on education was affected by ten acts enacted in December, the one on 
higher education was modified eight times. The acts on public employees 
and civil servants were changed eight times, each, while the act on civil 
procedure was modified nine times. The modification of  tax laws shall 
be announced thirty days in advance, according the valid regulations, 
thus the announcement of  the modification of  the act on certain tax 
regulations and some other related acts was made on 29 November, 
just to „rethink what they exactly want during December and modify it 
seven times by the end of  the year”. 258 
Regarding the outlined phenomenon we shall definitely state that 
this – in international comparison – cannot be viewed as exceptional, 
maybe its degree and intensity are extraordinary.
It is necessary to state also that the number of  newly enacted acts 
significantly influences the number of  other legal instruments; as 
once the great Hungarian poet – Miklós Radnóti – put it in his poem 
Tünemény (Illusion):259
(...)
And as act alone cannot stand,
Sprawled along numerous ordinances.
(...)
In case of  the „sprawl” of  laws necessarily and from time to time a 
natural need arises in each legal system – thus also in Hungarian – for 
deregulation, for the maintenance and improvement of  the transparency 
and operability of  the legal system.
Deregulation itself  results in capacity expansion, so far as through the 
filtering of  parallel, controversial regulations, the „reduction of  the burdens” 
of  the legal system, merely the reduction of  the rules to be complied with 
by citizens it increases the chances of  law abiding. The validity of  law – at 
least in legal sociology approach – also depends on the answer given to 
258 Ibid. 
259 réz, pál (ed.): Radnóti Miklós összes versei és versfordításai. [Poems and translations 
of  Miklós Radnóti.] Nagy Klasszikusok. Szépirodalmi Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 
1987. p. 296. 
1. Facts and processes. Effects of the modification of laws
120
the question that at what degree of  probability it may be stated that the 
given law will be applied260, and this latter may seriously depend on the 
„accessibility” of  law, which at the same time means chances for getting 
to know the law and clarified norm contents. 
Act LXXVI of  2012 which was enacted upon the draft law – no. 
T/6957 – about the technical deregulation of  certain acts and provisions 
for the abolishment of  the over regulation of  the legal system, submitted 
by the Government of  Hungary in April 2012, in several steps annuls 
laws which form part of  the legal system but have no material legal effect 
(e.g. from laws regulating economic order the legislator abolishes 250). 
Some will become null and void already in 2012, some others in the 
coming years, but there are some which will be repealed on 1 January 
2020. According to the reasoning the government – as part of  the 
Magyary Zoltán Administration Development Programme – initiated 
the deregulation of  laws „the annulment of  which does not cause legal 
uncertainty”. Based on the 41 pages long governmental decision which 
is mainly composed of  the list of  laws to be annulled the abolishment 
of  the given provisions does not affect legal relationships, rights and 
obligations originating, abolished or modified upon them.
Regarding the modification of  acts at any time – as it has been 
mentioned – Péter Paczolay – placing the issue into a broader context 
– says the following: „The legislator makes the general rule, but several 
situations exceed this rule. One possible, though rather scary answer 
to this is casuistic, when the legislator tries to regulate every possible 
scenario in advance. The other answer is the constant modification of  
laws, which contravenes with one principle of  the rule of  law defined 
by Locke, the requirement of  the existence of  permanent, but at least 
long-lasting laws. The third solution – evident for and favoured by 
conservative legal approach – may be the judicial development of  laws 
(the legal development role of  the Curia).”261
A special case of  the modification of  acts (laws) is the modification 
of  the constitution. In Hungary we shall pay especially careful attention 
to this, because – as it has been mentioned before – our previous 
260 Tamás op. sic. 144. o.
261 paczolay (2011) 
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Constitution was modified several times till 2010, and – despite the short 
period of  time which passed since its approval – the new Fundamental 
Law has also been changed. Among the special effects of  this only 
one will receive special attention this time: the effect of  the quickly 
changing constitution to the „monopoly of  the interpretation of  law”. 
„As only the Constitutional Court has the competence to interpret the 
Fundamental Law in an authentic way and with final force (…) – state 
Csink and Frölich in their newest work. Regarding this it may be stated 
that where the constitution is stable, this competence may in reality be 
primarily and practically centralised in the hands of  a constitutional 
court. However, when in Hungary the changing speed of  the all-time 
fundamental norm is quite high in all aspects (in the examined period of  
time, till the enter into force of  the Fundamental Law the Constitution 
was modified 12 times)262, it is impossible to avoid the interpretation role 
of  the Parliament – in some ways as competitor of  the Constitutional 
Court – which is mainly expressed in a way that as practical consequence 
of  its own interpretation of  the laws and/or with regard to the expected 
decision of  the Constitutional Court the legislator modifies the law. This 
special, but still material (and sometimes preventive) „interpretation” 
via „legislation” is extremely important when it may also be assumed 
262 The previous constitution was modified several times in the examined period:
Act CXIII of  2010 on the modification of  Act XX of  1949 on the Constitution 
of  the Republic of  Hungary; 
Act CXIX of  2010 on the modification of  Act XX of  1949 on the Constitution 
of  the Republic of  Hungary;
Act CLXIII of  2010 on the modification of  Act XX of  1949 on the Constitution 
of  the Republic of  Hungary;
Act LXI of  2012 on the modification of  Act XX of  1949 on the Constitution of  
the Republic of  Hungary necessray for the establishment of  certain transitional 
provisions related to the Fundamental Law;
Act CXLVI of  2011 on the modification of  Act XX of  1949 on the Constitution 
of  the Republic of  Hungary;
Act CLIX of  2011 on the modification of  Act XX of  1949 on the Constitution 
of  the Republic of  Hungary;
and further on in the spring-summer of  2010 six more unnumbered acts were 
approved „On the modification of  Act XX of  1949 on the Constitution of  the 
Republic of  Hungary”. 
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that the Hungarian Parliament as legislator in some regards – e.g. in the 
field of  public expenses – wished to reduce the list of  issues belonging 
to the competence of  the Constitutional Court. 
2. Newer laws regarding legislation
The Constitutional Court annulled the previous act on legislation, act XI 
of  1987 (herein after referred to as Jat.) as of  31 December 2010 with 
a decision made in December 2009.263 According to the decision of  the 
Constitutional Court the scope of  laws and their hierarchy, as well as the 
topics which may be regulated exclusively in act of  Parliament shall not 
be regulated in act. According to the Constitutional Court the regulation 
of  such subjects shall always be the task of  the constitution. Therefore 
the previous act was practically a constitution level regulation, which is 
not in conformity with the legal order (hierarchy of  legal sources) of  
the republic, which declares the primacy of  the constitution. The makers 
of  the Fundamental Law and the new act on legislation – Act CXXX 
of  2010264 – proceeded in line with this guideline.
It is an important change in the new regulation of  legislation that Act 
XXXVI of  2012 on the Parliament and Act CXXXI of  2010 on social 
participation in the preparation of  laws receive their own role. With 
regard to the former one it shall be stated that the existence of  the act 
is the result of  the innovation according to which the more important 
issues – in relation with detailed rules regarding the organisation and 
operation of  the Parliament – shall be regulated in act.265 As result of  
this some regulations of  the Standing Orders [46/1994 (IX. 30.) OGY 
decision about certain provisions of  the Standing Orders] which served 
the same purpose earlier (together with some new rules) „were raised” 
to the level of  acts, while the significantly modified (and shortened) 
Standing Orders also remained in force. 
263 Constitutional Court decision 121/2009. (XII. 17.) AB
264 About the new act on legislation see in details: csinK, lóránT: Mérföldkő 
a jogalkotásban. (Milestone in legislation.) Új Magyar Közigazgatás 8/2011. p. 2. 
[hereinafter referred to as csinK (2011)]
265 The preamble of  the act metions as specific reason for the creation of  the act the 
intention to „formulate certain provisions of  the Standing Orders at level of  an act”.
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A novelty of  the new act on legislation is the more accentuated 
regulation of  the institution of  previous and subsequent impact 
assessment, even though the new act also lacks specific methodology. 
Preliminary impact assessment is the task of  the drafter of  the act, 
while the subsequent impact assessment is conducted by the minister 
if  it is necessary in order to measure how much the regulation makes 
the effects expected at the time of  its preparation. Theoretically this could 
significantly contribute to the improvement of  the quality of  laws.
At the time of  examination we shall not disregard of  requirements 
and specifications deriving from our membership in the European 
Union and from our other international obligations; within this scope 
we only indicate that the quality and actual application of  „internal” law 
is significantly affected by the characteristics of  adaptation mechanisms. 
We shall state that „in the relationship of  the reception of  law and 
national legislation spontaneous, forced and active adaptation may be 
determinative at the same time”.266 
Regarding legislation we shall further stress that in addition to 
provisions set forth in law attention shall be also paid to the political 
document called the Declaration of  National Cooperation – made in 2010 
– in one wishes to systemize the norms relevant within the scope of  
legislation in Hungary. 
3. Internal characteristics of  legislation in Hungary after 2010
3.1. Attempt to approximate law and reality
A specific phenomenon has been mention before, which by mixing 
reality and law is able to establish changes also in fields where no material 
social-economic changes happen. In parallel with this, however, the 
approximation of  law and reality, their more harmonious relationship 
is one of  the answers of  the legislator to the new social and economic 
challenges: e.g. according to Act XC of  2010 on the enactment and 
modification of  certain acts regarding economy and finances some 
266 sziGeTi (2011) pp. 170-171.
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household jobs,267 are taken outside of  the tax system,268, as reaction to the fact 
that no tax has been paid after these; the supervision of  these activities 
is (traditionally) very difficult, and the fact of  taxation was unfair in 
some aspects. Therefore, the modification of  the law only establishes 
reasonable relationship with (adjustment to) reality, with significance 
which goes beyond the fact of  deregulation. 
3.1.1. Simplification and its consequences
Nevertheless the „simplification”, „clarification” of  the legal system, if  made 
at high speed may violate guarantees even if  behind the new provisions 
there is an intention to adjust the law to traditional and actual practices. For 
this let us examine an example, the separate act on government servants 
breaking the previous unified system of  regulation about civil servants 
(Act LVIII of  2010 on the status of  government servants; herein after 
referred to as: Ktjt.), which introduced several specific solutions. Among 
the new solutions the sharpest debate arose about the regulation of  the 
termination of  the employment, which greatly differed from the previous 
system. According to this the termination of  the employment relationship 
of  a government servant shall not be reasoned. This is in definitely in 
contrary to the fact that even in case of  a simple employment relationship 
article 89 paragraph (2) of  Act XXII 1992 on the (former) Labour Code269 
(herein after referred to as Mt.) obliged the employer to give reasons for 
the termination of  employment, then regulated further material and former 
267 According to the law household works are the following activities ensuring 
the everyday living conditions of  the natural person and persons living in his/
her household, as well as his/her close relatives: cleaning of  the house, cooking, 
laundry, ironing, supervision of  children, their home education, home care, house 
management, gardening.
268 Income outside of  the tax system is a benefit which is given by the employer 
to the household employee as remuneration for the household works. In relation 
with this payment neither tax declaration nor tax payment obligation burden the 
employer or the household employee.
269 In the meantime the new Act I of  2012 on the Labour Code was accepted, 
which – in line with domestic and international trends – eased the rules of  the 
termination of  the employment relationship my the employer. 
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guarantees related to the termination in paragraphs (3)-(5) of  article 89. The 
regulation of  the guarantees related to the termination of  the employment 
of  civil servants (e.g. the relative limited options for the termination of  
employment) is often interpreted in a way that it ensures further rights to 
the civil servants compared to mere employees because in return they have 
further obligations. But due to the mentioned modification government 
servants were not protected at all, not even with the guarantees which 
entitle every employee in general.
The Constitutional Court’s reasoning – in relation with this change – 
focused on the fact that the rule of  law does not contain the requirement 
of  legality with regard to administrative authority actions, but the 
requirement of  legality of  public administration also covers all acts of  
public administration authorities in which public administration makes 
decisions which affect the rights of  clients. Therefore regarding the 
examination an important requirement originating from legality is that 
the material legal framework of  the employer’s decision is defined by law. 
According to the reasoning of  the modification of  act approved 
half  year after the establishment of  the new government it „provides 
opportunity for the establishment of  quality professional staff  and for 
the improvement of  the level of  work performed for the public”. The 
reason of  those opposing the modification – beyond legal arguments – 
was that the act was preparing the ground for the cadres of  the governing 
political forces to spread into public sphere, while it paralyses the present 
civil servants, forcing them to be servile. 
In its 8/2011. (II. 18.) AB decision the Constitutional Court considered 
this provision unconstitutional – as the only one among the objected 
provisions of  the Ktjt. – analysing the issue for long and objecting to the 
provision from several aspects: the Constitutional Court held Article 8 
paragraph (1) b) of  the Ktjt. unconstitutional, it found that the provision 
violated the principle of  the rule of  law as set forth in Article 2 paragraph 
(1) of  the Constitution, as well as the right to work declared in Article 
70/B paragraph (1), the right to hold public office described in Article 
70 paragraph (6), the right to court regulated in Article 57 paragraph (1) 
and the right to human dignity, as formulated in Article 54 paragraph 
(1) of  the Constitution, therefore annulled it. 
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A similar provision of  the Ktv. [Article 17 paragraph (1) of  the Ktv.: 
„The employer may terminate the public service relationship without 
the obligation to provide reasons”] was annulled by the Constitutional 
Court later, with its decision 111/B/2011 AB. In addition to this there 
were further consequences of  the regulations contrary to Hungary’s 
international obligations: according to the decision of  the European 
Court of  Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg Hungary shall pay as 
compensation more than 3 million HUF (9,000 EUR with interest) to a 
former public servant, whose contract was terminated without reasons 
in the fall of  2010. In the mentioned case it is an important element that 
the ECHR accepted the claim in the first place, stating that the petitioner 
could not (have) expect(ed) legal remedy within a reasonable period of  
time in Hungary (the main argument of  the Hungarian government was 
that the former public servant should have resorted to labour court in 
Hungary). 
Based on the provisions replacing the annulled regulations (Article 
63 of  Act CXCIX of  2011 on public officials and Article 229 stating the 
differences regarding civil servants) governmental service relationship 
may be terminated – among others – if  the „government official loses the 
trust of  its superior”.270 This newest regulation is quite problematic. Based 
on the comparison of  Article 66 paragraph (1) and Article 76 paragraph 
(2) one of  the most ambiguous, least provable aspect of  the loss of  
trust is the lack of  professional loyalty for the superior. According to the 
act „Professional loyalty means especially commitment to professional 
values set by the superior, cooperation with superiors and colleagues, 
performance of  tasks with professional commitment, in a disciplined 
and thorough way.” It is not a coincidence that Jácint Ferencz puts it in 
a way that these (loss of  trust, professional loyalty) are „objectively not 
clarified” notions, which „have no place” within the „gravest sanction 
regarding employment relationship, the termination of  employment”. 271
In summary, with regard to those analysed in this subsection we 
may state that it is not possible to introduce new regulations either in 
270 Article 63 paragraph (2) 
271 Ferencz, JácinT: Jogszerű jogbizonytalanság? [Lawful legal uncertainty?] 
Miskolci Jogi Szemle 1/2012. p. 103 
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harmony with some – sometimes century old (!) – practices or speeding 
up some processes desired by the government in contrary to important 
legal guarantees (or at the price of  their cutback).
3.2. Symbolic legislation
Due to the previously analysed reasons and at the earlier mentioned 
ways post-2010 Hungarian legislation significantly carries the features 
of  symbolic legislation, through the following phenomena: 
a) Abstract presence of  new (basic) principles and theories in certain legal documents 
In some regard symbolic legislation has the task of  presenting 
gradualism in the transformation of  the legal system. Instead of  a 
positivist way of  thinking or legal approach built on individualism 
and liberal foundations a radically different legal order and citizens’ 
attitude cannot be established from one day to another. As it has 
been mentioned before – as a possible way of  development – the 
positive law – relative natural law – Christian natural law course 
cannot be thriving during one parliamentary cycle. The inclusion of  
some principles – with weaker value – into the legal system may be 
performed only step by step, as a process. A good example for this 
from principles present in the Fundamental Law is the requirement 
of  sanity, as an obligatory starting point of  interpretation; about 
which it may be expected only later that it will be materially, textually 
explained and/or its real meaning will be elaborated in the legal 
practice. 
b) Presence of  specific enemy picture and well defined points of  reference
It is enough to refer again to the basic concept of  the Fundamental 
Law and the Aár. based on the delegitimization of  the past, in which 
there are, simultaneously present – in an accentuated way – the 
reliance on the past and the intention to delete the past, through a 
kind of  selective recycling of  the past.
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3.3. Legislation, as an answer given to the failure of  previous products of  legislation
Another important phenomenon regarding Hungarian legislation is 
that often certain legal instruments appear as answers given for the 
failure (i.e. inapplicability) of  previous products of  legislation. There is 
nothing special in this – in itself  – provided that a deregulation based 
on the rule of  law happens continuously and consciously. One of  the 
real difficulties in this case, however, is that in the past several times the 
legislator missed to observe properly whether the given situation shall be influenced 
by legal norm, or a social norm or system of  norms would be more suitable to settle 
the given field. Thus, the selection of  the most appropriate form of  norm 
meant and means also today the most problematic issue of  legislation.
The failure of  the previous legal instruments was especially obvious in the fields 
influencing financial, economic relationships: e.g. criminal law measures applicable for 
legal persons,272, the previous act on lobbying,273 or the act on volunteer work which 
aimed at repressing black work,274 may be mentioned as deterrent examples. Even 
though these are (were) formally part of  the legal system, they have never been really 
used..275 Why not? It has become clear that the law tried in vain to simulate, 
replace the moral texture, material of  society; the law – in itself, without 
other supporting norm types – cannot create an autonomous moral 
reality, the structure of  simply becomes overloaded and inoperable. 276
272 Act CIV of  2001 about criminal measures applicable against legal persons.
273 Annulled in December 2010
274 Act LXXXVIII of  2005 on volunteer public service 
275 According to the statistics of  the Office of  the Parliament for example 
the number of  events held formally announced by the lobby act (Act XLIX 
of  2000 on lobbying) was about 20-25 (!) in each quarter of  a year, which is 
just fragment of  that activity which was probably realised as lobbying. The fate 
of  rules prescribing the registration of  volunteers was similar, the number of  
registrations may be measured in thousandths in comparison with the actual 
volunteer activities [according to Article 11 paragraph (1) of  the act the receiving 
organisation shall register it in advance at the minister for the development of  
social and civil relationships on the Registration form annexed to the act]. 
276 If  we accept that „European integration has been a procedure governed by law 
from the beginning” (Vörös Imre: A regionális együttműködés új, hatékonyabb 
jogi formája az EU-ban. [A new, more effective legal form of  cooperation in the 
EU] Miskolci Jogi Szemle 2012/1. p. 5), it may be also examined whether behind 
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Similar difficulties are generated in the situation when in the regulated 
field the basic social agreement is missing, and the legislator makes a 
rule without having intentions (!) to actually settle the issue. A „good” 
example of  this latter phenomenon in the Hungarian legal system is 
Act III of  2003 on the Disclosure of  the Secret Service Activities of  
the Communist Regime and on the Establishment of  the Historical 
Archives of  the Hungarian State Security. A basic function of  the act 
would have been to disclose the „agents” of  the previous system(s), 
but based on legally grounded regulations and legal practice one may 
be called an „agent” only if  at least two of  the following three criteria 
are met: his/her own signature is stated on the declaration to join the 
organisation, there is his/her own signature about the reception of  material 
remuneration, and other document exists which proves the activities as 
agent. Even though it may be well estimated that during the years of  
state socialism about 200,000 people were roped in in Hungary, due to 
the above mentioned conditions (evidences to be proved) this may be 
revealed (researched) or proven only in few hundred cases.
The greatest – and capacity reducing – danger of  a legal system overloaded with 
such rules which cannot be fitted into the social-economic context, which are incapable 
of  existing and impossible to use is that it establishes an impression in the public 
that law is powerless in general, due to which it may partially lose its authority, which 
is its special feature.277 
The above mentioned bad examples partially shed light on the fact 
that even well elaborated law cannot abolish the reasons for the existence 
of  and the need for individual norms, social norms and organisational 
norms, moreover: it becomes more and more obvious that the generality 
of  law can be enforced only through the „inclusion” (transmission) of  
such norm types. The failure of  the earlier act on lobbying showed that in 
certain fields in case of  the lack of  self-regulation278 - the spread of  which in contrary 
the crisis symptoms of  the EU (its insufficient answers given to the crises) there 
are – at least partially – similar reasons: ie.e the underestimation of  dimensions 
beyond law, their stranded development regarding certain cooperation.
277 sziGeTi (2011) p. 193. 
278 vincenT porTer: How Can Civil Organisations Establish a Connection with 
EU Institutions? ECE City Center, Budapest, 24 February 2012 (lecture in the 
organisation of  The Organisation and Management Scientific Association)
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to central regulations is trend-like today – the state cannot step in with its additional 
provisions: in some social sectors permanent results may be achieved only 
with the permanent stimulation of  self-regulating mechanisms, which is 
a slow, circumstantial solution but has not alternatives. This is why the 
new regulation on lobbying chooses the solution that it creates obligatory 
rules related to the enforcement of  interests on the side of  the public servant receiving 
the lobbyist, 279otherwise it settles for the creation of  patterns upon its own 
forming practice, and it trusts itself  to the already established criminal 
law framework (e.g. crime of  bribery). 280 
In Hungary this concept – which takes social reality into account – is in 
opposition with the opinion of  organisations thinking within the previous 
framework. Therefore in 2012 Amnesty International, Greenpeace, the 
Hungarian Civil Liberties Union and others wrote a joint petition to the 
minister of  public administration and justice, resenting that after 2010 it 
was not regulated on the merits in which ways companies and economic 
interest groups may influence the central power: Article 19 section b) 
of  Act CXXXI of  2010 on the participation of  society in legislation 
(herein after referred to as: Trj.) annulled Act XLIX of  2000 on lobbying 
without replacing it with proper regulations. The possibility of  strategic 
partnership ensured in Article 13 of  the Trj. concerns only a narrow 
field of  the enforcement of  interests, within the framework of  which 
ministries may establish direct relationship with these organisations which 
are ready for mutual cooperation, and which present wide social interests 
in the preparation of  legislation in the given field or perform scientific 
activities in the given field. This act is far from the proper regulation of  
lobbying. It provides for cooperation exclusively with ministries, even 
though lobbying is more than participation in legislation at ministerial 
279 The form of  this is permitting the reception of  external partners representing private 
interest by officials and its publication procedure.
280 It is also a parallel – and within Hungarian administration a long disputed 
– issue that at what level and at what depth professional ethical noms within 
the public service shall be regulated; under the egis of  the Magyary Zoltán 
Közigazgatás-fejlesztési Program (Magyary Zoltán Public Administration 
Development Programme) a new approach seems to be gaining strength, which 
– within legal frameworks – would ensure more freedom to the self-regulation of  
those concerned. 
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level: every activity aiming at influencing the decisions of  the central 
power or at enforcing interests shall be considered lobbying.” 281
The issues analysed in the present subsection may be approached 
also in a way that „along the formal notion of  legal certainty at what 
degree would the law be able to interpret and resolve social conflicts 
[exclusively] with its own tools”282 and at what degree will the law be 
able to determine the „limits of  the acceptability of  social needs”.283 
3.4. Scope and features of  the legislation process
3.4.1. New contents of  the notion of  cooperation
This paper deals in several subchapters with certain negative phenomena 
of  state-social life, often the common origin of  which is the discrepancy 
between political intentions and real social needs, and legal norms trying 
to formulate the former ones. Every solution or reparation attempt made 
in the examined period refers to the notion of  cooperation, which we may 
consider to be the most important aspect regarding the latest legislation. 
Due to the change of  the government in 2010 several new ideas have 
been presented also in this field, but the most significant changes cannot 
be necessarily interpreted as legal institutions. Even though the idea 
of  establishing a two-chamber parliament was also raised during the 
drafting process of  the new constitution, this idea was finally rejected. 
Among the tools of  including the concerned elements of  society 
into the decision making processes the government operating since 2010 
rather prefers the non-legal ones (i.e. those which do not constitute direct 
obligations for the government); rather solutions outside of  the legal 
system are put into focus. Therefore the so-called national consultation, 
which – among others, such as sectoral, professional and other negotiating 
281 Letter of  TASZ; http://nonprofit.hu/?q=content/civil%C3%B6sszefo%C3 
%A1st-kezdem%C3%A9nyez-tasz-lobbit%C3%B6rv%C3%A9ny%C3%A9rt
282 eGresi ,KaTalin: A jogbiztonság, az igazságosság és a demokrácia a jog 
mérlegén. [Legal certainty, justice and democracy on the scale of  law.] 2012. p. 147. 
283 eGresi op. sic. p. 148. 
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forums284 – introduced in Hungary a previously unknown political 
technique: within two years – in ordinary mail – each citizen received 
two surveys with possible answers to choose from,285 furthermore, – as 
a method not really used before in Hungary – an information booklet 
was sent to all citizens with the right to vote which presented the newest 
pieces of  legislation.286 The political framework of  different consultations 
is the political declaration about the National Cooperation made in 
2010, which established the System of  National Cooperation. This 
document – prior to the Fundamental Law – describes the relationship 
of  the parliamentary majority, through them the whole nation to the 
past and their preferred values. Therefore – among others – we may 
read the following: „At the end of  the first decade of  the 21st century, after 
forty-six years of  occupation, dictatorship, and two ambiguous decades of  transition, 
Hungarian has regained its right to and capability of  self-determination” and „The 
National Assembly declares the inception of  a new social contract in the elections 
held in April whereby Hungarians decided on the creation of  a new system, the 
System of  National Cooperation. With this historical deed the Hungarian nation 
has committed the newly established National Assembly and the new government to 
resolutely, uncompromisingly, and steadfastly direct the work with which Hungarian 
is going to build the System of  National Cooperation.” furthermore „We, the 
representatives of  the Hungarian National Assembly, declare that we are going to 
build the new political and economic system formed on the basis of  the democratic 
will of  the people on the pillars indispensable to happiness and a respectable life, 
284 We may consider as such the National Cooperation Forum of  Local 
Governments, which is a body performing official negotiations between the 
Government and local governments.
285 For example the 16th question of  the „National Consultation 2012” survey 
was the following: „There are some people according to whom the government 
shall protect the purchasing force of  pensions also in times of  crisis. In the 
opinion of  others this is not possible. What do you think?” For the question an 
answer had to be chosen from the following three options:
• The government shall further protect the purchasing force of  pensions;
• During crisis it is not possible to maintain the purchasing force of  pensions;
• I don’t know.
286 Such information was provided by the „Job protection action 2012” letter 
sent to each citizen in the summer of  2012.
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and which bond the diverse members of  the Hungarian nation. Work, home, family, 
health, and order are going to be the pillars of  the future.”
Looking beyond political slogans and pathetic forms it may be well 
observed that the government expects from the method of  crowdsourcing – which may 
be considered traditional in other countries – as well as from different 
online consultations and the introduction of  new means (surfaces) of  
information the establishment and deepening of  discussion (cooperation) 
with society. Among the new means of  information we shall mention 
that the government of  Hungary created its websites civil.kormany.hu 
and kozhasznusag.kormany.hu related to the civil sector (in broader 
sense about legislation related to the civil sector), which wish to provide 
information to domestic civil organisation about the new legal background 
and information related to them, in order to support their operation. The 
websites – according to the intentions of  the government – are part of  
the process of  changing the attitude aimed at with the new act on the 
civil sector (Act CLXXV of  2011 on right of  association, non-profit 
status, operation and support of  NGOs), through which the government 
wishes to establish transparent connections with the civil sector.
In Article 7 of  the already mentioned new act on legislation the two 
basic form of  social compromise are described, general negotiation and 
direct negotiation. The former one provides opportunity for sharing 
opinion on the website of  the organisation publishing concepts, drafts 
(in a way which obliges the organisation which asks for the opinion, 
e.g. through confirmation obligation or through preparing summaries 
on the merits), while the latter one allows the concerned minister to 
directly request persons and organisations to give opinion. A specific 
form of  direct negotiation – creating obligations on the side of  the 
minister – is the institution of  strategic partnership, the framework of  
which is settled in a thorough agreement. One material weakness of  
the regulation, however, is that Article 13 paragraph (2) of  the act only 
lists in an exemplary way those with whom such partnership may be 
concluded, by mentioning forms of  organisations (e.g. church, trade 
union, civil organisation).
Among the newer developments a – truly significant – framework 
agreement shall be definitely mentioned that was established in May 
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2011 between the representatives of  Roma people in Hungary and the 
government of  the Republic of  Hungary about the development of  
Roma people. The real value of  the document is represented by the 
fact that – contrary to previous unilateral acts – it undertakes specific, 
definite obligations on both sides, especially in the fields of  education 
and employment, at the same time aiming at making the use of  budget 
sources more transparent in the future. Regarding Hungarian Roma issue 
and Roma policy – as one of  Hungary’s most urgent issues – it may be 
stated that in the past thirty years the determination (political declarations, 
integration programs) of  the different governments were usually not 
followed by changes of  laws or consistently performed measures.287 Moreover, 
it is worth noting here that „The material and formal equality of  citizens 
belonging to a minority cannot be achieved simply with legal means, but it 
usually requires the alteration of  the approaches, attitudes of  society”.288 
The Hungarian presidency of  the European Union (2011) set as a 
priority the establishment of  a European Union level Roma strategy 289 
in parallel of  which the Hungarian – not only Roma-centred – Roma 
strategy was created under the title National Social Development Strategy 
– deep poverty, child poverty and Roma people 2011-2020, to which 
the – above mentioned – framework agreement made by the Prime 
Minister and the president of  the National Roma Self-Government is 
formally attached.
Regarding the participation of  society in legislation a double tendency has been 
present since 2010: on the one hand by keeping – some of  – the traditional 
forums and forms (legal institutions) new – typically virtual – connection 
points have been established – not necessarily with legally obliging force, 
– while, on the other hand the maintenance of  negative tendencies 
observed earlier in the preparation of  laws (closed legislation, formal 
negotiations in compliance with the words of  the law but in conflict 
287 maJTényi, Balázs – maJTényi, GyörGy: Üveggyöngyhatás. Változatlan 
romapolitika. [Glass pearl effect. Unchanged Roma policy.] Fundamentum 1/2012. 
p. 67. 
288 Ibid.
289 An EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies up to 2020. 
Council Conclusions 10658/11. 
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with its spirit, unreasonably short deadlines) and the abolishment of  
certain institutionalised forums may be observed. Within the latter scope 
it shall be definitely mentioned that the previously existing quasi veto 
right of  the National Council for the Reconciliation of  Interests (OÉT) 
– a three-sided forum of  labour issues existing since 1988 (!) – has been 
abolished in a way that the OÉT itself  gave its place to a forum bearing 
exclusively consultation rights and lacking the obligatory cooperation 
of  the Government – the National Economic and Social Council 
(NGTT) regulated by Act XCIII of  2011. OÉT was the national interest 
negotiating forum of  the government, the trade union confederations 
and employers, its operative activities mainly covered the debate on draft 
laws in the field of  labour law proposed by the government. Its quasi 
veto right originated from the fact that agreement on minimal wage was 
also made at this forum.
Regarding this issue we shall note that within most member states of  
the European Union the forums of  bilateral (autonomous) negotiations 
conducted exclusively with employers and the trade unions of  employees, 
forums holding three-sided (tripartite) negotiations with the participation 
of  the government, and the forums of  multilateral consultation (civil 
discussion) realised with the participation of  civil organisations, the 
representatives of  sciences, churches, etc. From the changes of  the 
Hungarian legal system (system of  laws) made after 2010 it seems to be 
clear that the FIDESZ-KDNP considers the first and the third forms 
of  the previously mentioned three necessary or desired.
In the search for reasons behind changes and shifts of  balances it shall 
be definitely mentioned that today’s democracy-approach – represented 
by the official majority – argues for the majority model of  democracy, 
against consensual approach.290 This statement shall be supplemented 
with the fact which is often referred to in Hungarian political scientific 
literature, namely that – in the past 25 years – between certain groups of  
Hungarian political elite the emergence and strengthening of  competitive, 
instead of  cooperative relationships may be observed.
290 Regarding the models see: Körösényi, andrás – TóTh, csaBa – TöröK, 
GáBor: A magyar politikai rendszer. [The Hungarian political system] Osiris Kiadó, 
Budapest, 2003. pp. 594-607. and pp. 618-620. 
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The relationship and the Hungarian form shaping of  the democratic 
representation principle and the functional (interest) representation 
principle291 presented by pressing organisations are cardinal issues – 
supporting the interpretation of  Hungarian processes – which deserve 
closer observation. 
It is a fact that through social interest negotiation based on the 
partnership and cooperation of  state and society mutual information and 
discussion have become organic, systematic part of  everyday governmental 
activities also in Hungary (e.g. via the publication obligation of  draft 
laws and other textual proposals). However, it is worth developing those 
procedural, organisational and technological conditions which ensure 
that requirements of  open legislation – defined earlier in Act XI of  
1987 on Legislation, in Act XC of  2005 on the Freedom of  Electronic 
Information, today in Act CXXX of  2010 on Legislation292 and in Act 
CXXXI of  2010 on the participation of  Society in the preparation of  
legislation – may be actually fulfilled in a broader scope regarding citizens 
and their organisations.
3.4.2. Limiting techniques in parliamentary legislation
As it has been mentioned earlier, one of  the common methods in 
Hungary for speeding up legislation is the minimization of  material 
political and professional debate during the preparation of  laws, as well 
as its obligatory nature, squeezed into a narrow institutionalised scope. 
Among techniques minimizing substantive debate there are a) solutions 
created with legal authorization (e.g. as individual petition of  an MP the 
preliminary and material impact assessment and social negotiation of  
laws may be avoided) and b) techniques used „somewhat legally” for a long 
time (e.g. the modification proposal submitted before the closing vote 
in the parliamentary debate of  acts). 
ad a) It is striking that the most important – and most criticised – 
acts, even complex codes (the Fundamental Law, the „nullity act”293, the 
291 Gulyás op. sic. p. 238. 
292 About the new act on legislation see in details: csinK (2011) pp. 2-6.
293 Act XVI of  2011 on the redress of  the verdicts in connection with the crowd 
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media act) were approved in the Parliament upon individual MP proposal. 
The most obvious tendency is the relatively high number of  draft laws 
submitted as individual MP proposal, neglecting the provisions of  Act 
CXXXI of  2010 on the participation of  society in the preparation of  
law approved in 2010. „Even though proposals for the modification 
of  the Fundamental Law submitted by MPs comply with procedural 
rules set forth in the Fundamental Law (…) obviously they do not 
fully fulfil the requirements of  the democratic rule of  law” – held the 
Constitutional Court in relation with the rejection of  the proposal for the 
establishment of  the public law invalidity of  Act CXIX of  2010 on the 
modification of  the Fundamental Law. According to the opinion of  the 
Constitutional Court the same problems of  legitimacy arise with regard 
to the eight modifications of  the Fundamental Law proposed by MPs till 
July 2010: „Negotiations necessary (especially during the modification 
of  the Fundamental Law) were missing. (…) The modifications of  the 
Fundamental Law may carry primarily material violations related to 
the rule of  law. The constant modification of  the Fundamental Law 
for the achievement of  some interests and goals of  actual politics is 
extremely worrisome from the aspect of  the requirements of  the rule 
of  law, especially regarding the stability, reliability of  the constitutional 
legal system, the broad social legitimacy, and their uncontradictory 
incorporation into the legal system” – held the Constitutional Court.
ad b) The institutions of  modification proposal before the final vote 
has been part of  Hungarian parliamentary law for a long time, but its 
scope of  application – especially in the past decade – has exceed the 
filtering of  problems of  coherence, which would have been the original 
intention of  the legislator and – in parallel with this – it has become a 
tool of  avoiding substantial debate.
E.g. to the Act LVI of  1990 on the remuneration of  the Members of  
the Parliament on 6 June 2011 the Constitutional Committee submitted a 
modification proposal before the final vote for the modification 294 of  the 
following acts: Act XL on 2008 on natural gas supply (!); act LXXXVI of  
2007 on electricity (!) and act XXIX of  2011 on the modification of  acts 
controls in the autumn of  2006 
294 Reference number: T/2224/6.
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in the field of  energy (!). The 12 pages long modification proposal – with 
the new rules and with those abolishing the old ones – significantly rewrote 
majority of  the Hungarian energy laws, and which is most important 
with regard to our topic, they had nothing to do with the remuneration 
of  the Members of  the Parliament. From the brief  reasoning it turns 
out that the modification in „necessary and unavoidable”, and it shall 
fix the previous mistakes of  the legislator, e.g. by postponing the date 
of  entry into force of  some provisions of  act XXIX of  2011 on the 
modification of  act in the field of  energy…
This happened despite the fact that the old and new version of  
provisions of  the Standing Orders 295 clarify the sole function of  this legal 
institutions: „Article 107 (1) Before the beginning of  the closing vote a proposed 
amendment may be introduced in writing to any provision voted on in the debate 
in detail for such reason that the provision voted on is not in compliance with the 
Constitution or any other Act, with a provision of  the bill already voted on or with 
any provision of  the bill not affected by amendments” and „Article 107 (1) Before 
the start of  the closing vote – at last 24 hours before the opening of  the session on 
which the closing vote of  the draft bill will be conducted – a proposed amendment may 
be introduced in writing by a committee or any MP to any provision voted on in the 
debate in detail for such reason that the provision voted on is not in compliance with 
the Constitution or any other Act, with a provision of  the bill already voted on or 
with any provision of  the bill not affected by amendments, or if  the unified draft does 
not comply with the requirements of  the structure of  an act or of  linguistics (…)”.
Therefore the modification proposal submitted before the final vote 
shall not be a tool for incorporating a completely new element into the 
act, but shall be a sort of  tool of  correction in the hand of  the Parliament.
The Constitutional Court examined this issue in details in its 
Constitutional Court decision 164/2011. (XII. 20.) AB. In this decision the 
Constitutional Court held that Act C of  2011 on the Right to Freedom of  
Conscience and Religion, and on the Legal Status of  Churches, Religious 
Denominations and Religious Communities is unconstitutional due to 
public law invalidity, as the modification proposal no. T/3507/98 rewrote 
295 46/1994. (IX. 30.) OGY határozat egyes házszabályi rendelkezésekről. 
Decision of  the Parliament 46/1994 (IX. 30.) OGY on certain provisions of  the 
Standing Orders of  the Parliament
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the draft law significantly just before the final vote, thus its submission 
violated Article 107 paragraph (1) of  the Resolution 46/1994 OGY of  
the Parliament on the Standing Orders of  the Parliament. „(…) limiting 
the possibility to submit a modification proposal before the final vote to 
problems of  coherence is an important rule related to the reasonableness 
of  legislation, because without this – or if  it is disregarded – the draft 
law could be conceptionally, comprehensively modified in the last phase 
of  legislation, which practice may result in the emptying of  guarantees 
forming part of  the previous phases of  legislation and aiming at quality 
legislation. Based on this the Constitutional Court states that the provision 
of  the Standing Orders regarding the submission of  modification 
proposals before the final vote shall be considered guarantee of  democratic 
exercise of  power and of  activities of  representatives performed for 
the public, therefore the violation of  these shall be considered serious 
procedural mistake, which results in the partial or full public law invalidity 
of  the law” – held the decision. „In European constitutional tradition the 
notion of  act has included for a long time the procedure of  legislation, 
more precisely certain features and the legislation process, which define 
the essence of  the act. An essential part of  this the material and public 
debate in advance about the norm which is intended to be enacted as 
obligatory and valid – explained András Bragyova in his separate opinion 
attached to the Constitutional Court-decision stating the public law 
invalidity of  the act on churches. In his opinion an act „is not just any 
law, but a norm justified in advance in the political representation, thus 
in front of  the public.” „A necessary element of  legislation is that the 
Parliament approves the act in a parliamentary debate – by stating pro 
and contra reasons. The law which cannot be preceded by a debate, for 
and against the justness and acceptability of  which no reasons could 
be stated in front of  the public of  the legislator, cannot be considered 
lawfully created act.” 
It may also result in the change of  the previous practice that János Áder 
President of  the Republic sent back to the Parliament the modification 
of  the media act on 31 May 2012 (anticipating the possible procedure 
of  the Constitutional Court). The President, who took office on 2 
May 2012 considered the modification of  the media act perfect from 
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constitutional point of  view, but due to a modification proposal before 
the final vote in compliance with the Standing Orders of  the Parliament, 
and as result of  this its public law validity may be questionable: the 
modification proposal of  MP László L. Simon inserted a brand new 
provision into the draft law. The President acted similarly in case of  a 
modification proposal submitted – and later approved – to the draft 
law on the establishment of  districts and the modification of  related acts, which 
was submitted by MP Lajos Kósa, proposing the modification of  the 
act on gambling (!) and the act of  organised crime (!). Till July 2012 
the President sent back five acts – for similar reasons – but has never 
objected to any acts for material reasons. 
3.5. Intensity and effects of  legislation
3.5.1. Legislation and developmental psychology
Most modern pedagogic schools and psychologists (Maria Montessori, 
Rachel Cohen, Carl Rogers, Waldorf-school, etc.) agree that in the 
development of  learning skills and the healthy development of  personality 
there is an extremely significant role of  the requirement that learning – 
let it be about anything – shall happen in every child’s own speed. The 
improvement of  children is determined by the sum of  genetic features, 
specific rules of  maturity, special socio-cultural background, environmental 
effects used spontaneously or in a planned way, and due to the joint effect 
of  these factors children have special physical and psychological needs 
(and capacity) depending on age (age periods) and their personality. On 
the analogy of  this it may be assumed – hypothetically – that just like a 
child, also the centrally organised state has specialities which determine its 
own learning (receptive) skills and its possible (ideal) methods and pace.
It may be assumed that the fast pace – compared to its possibilities 
and skills – education of  society through legislation, in this case, may 
weaken the social ability and its degree to understand and adapt to rules. 
Naturally, the counterproductive and disfunctional effects of  accelerated 
legislation do not only emerge on the side of  the addressees of  laws, but 
also on the side of  the legislator, already in the process of  legislation: 
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according to an assumption which could be proven by sociopsychology, 
entities authorised with legislative power have objective and general limits 
which make it impossible – or at least unlikely – that legislation above 
a certain pace could be suitable to realise the desired goals in full or in 
part (therewith the correction of  mistakes originating from accelerated 
legislation and the reduction of  political trust in correlation with the 
quantity of  mistakes may significantly lower, or in some cases may fully 
abolish social level advantages desired from the given legislative product).
All that has been mentioned before is true also for law enforcement: 
the missing „settlement” time for laws can seriously affect the quality 
of  legal practice, and – in a narrow interpretation – the correctness 
of  certain interpretations of  law by authorities. (For this see in details 
subchapter VI.3.7 about the „phantom pain” of  the legal system.)
3.5.2. Accelerated legislation, faster than thinking…
Too fast legislation, therefore, may be the cause of  several disfunctions; 
it may make the goals, processes of  the legislation difficult to follow, as 
well as the content of  law, moreover, it may cause serious extra costs: To 
the latter one the case of  ITD Hungary, a state non-profit organisation 
is a good example. In the government decree no. 265/2010 on the 
National External Trade Authority (HITA) the legislator made an obvious 
mistake, because the HITA would have taken over completely the role 
and tasks of  the ITD Hungary, therefore – with some simplification – 
the change of  the sign-board would have been enough for continuous 
operation. The company, however, was dissolved without legal successor, 
thus could not leave the files, statistics, databases, staff  and equipment 
to the HITA. The ITD Hungary is in operation today (August 2012) – 
almost two years after the decision made about its dissolution, – but it 
has not been performing material work, it only caused approximately 
eight hundred million HUF extra costs to the state. The reasons seem 
to be simple: only days (hours?) passed between the political decision, 
the political „order” and the actual legislation, this is why a huge mistake 
was made during the preparation phase. 
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The speed of  transforming political intentions into legal decisions may 
lead to unexpected difficulties also in personal issues, especially of  the 
participants of  the public law process are not familiar with the content 
of  valid laws… According to the previous Article 69 of  Act XLIII of  
2010 on central state administrative authorities and the legal status of  
members of  the Government and undersecretaries of  state „at the Office 
of  the Prime Minister there is no undersecretary for administration, the 
activities of  the deputy undersecretary of  state operating at the Office 
of  the Prime Minister are performed by the undersecretary of  state 
directing the Office of  the Prime Minister and the Office of  the Prime 
Minister is divided into main departments and departments.” Despite this 
on 29 May 2012 János Áder President of  the Republic appointed Péter 
Szijjártó and Tibor Győri as undersecretaries of  state for the Office of  
the Prime Minister. One week later the Parliament corrected the situation 
in a way that it modified the act, introducing the institution of  under-
secretaries of  state for the Office of  the Prime Minister, in addition to 
the under-secretary of  state directing the Office of  the Prime Minister.
Another example of  ad hoc legislation – focusing on momentary 
interests against calculability – is Appendix 1 of  Act CXXXIX of  2005 
on higher education, the subtitle „Non-state colleges” was modified by 
Article 42 of  Act XCVI of  2011 on the modification of  acts about certain 
economic issues (!). The basis of  the modification was the closure of  a 
church college. Article 2 paragraph (4) point d) of  Act CXXX of  2010 
on Legislation states that during legislation the legislator shall observe 
the professional requirements of  legislation; among these – despite the 
opposite practise of  the past decades – there is the unavoidable need 
that at least some logical connection shall exist between the title and 
the content of  the law…
In addition to the above mentioned, however, there are/may be 
some subsidiary advantages of  „hard-pressed” legislation. In case of  
regulations the text of  which is unchanged for decades – e.g. rules that 
were the same before and after the change in the political system – there 
is a danger that (for those who did not participate in their establishment) 
the knowledge of  principles, moral rules, customs justifying the creation 
of  the rule may fade away and the rule becomes the final argument, the 
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starting point of  the argument. In comparison with this the state of  permanent 
legal revolution, the – temporarily – incalculable relationships may bring about the 
subsidiary advantage that they necessarily result in a need for clear reasoning, and 
eventually for public agreement in background moral considerations.
3.5.3. Establishment of  „rapidly responding” law
The accelerated speed of  legislation – partly – may be justified with the 
forced adjustment to the stormy speed of  external social-economic 
changes. The category of  blogger has emerged, for example, someone 
who functions as a one-man legal institution despite the fact that he is a 
natural person, and who cannot really be interpreted within the categories 
of  traditional law; whom the law cannot supervise or limit neither in his 
effect nor in his activities; he may be used, at best. The legislator has 
to face phenomena the effect mechanisms of  which sometimes cannot 
even be interpreted within traditional dogmatic supplementary categories.
3.6. Weakening of  the aspect of  legality
Among the products of  Hungarian legislation after 2010 we may find 
one which – as the „veterinary horse” of  the Hungarian legal system – 
carries almost all – herein examined – „illnesses”. The act on churches 
may be considered as such, which is in reality two acts, as the first 
attempt – Act C of  2011 on the Right to Freedom of  Conscience and 
Religion, and on the Legal Status of  Churches, Religious Denominations 
and Religious Communities – was abolished by the Constitutional 
Court due to public law invalidity (see subsection 6.3.4.2). Act CC VI 
of  2011 on the Right to Freedom of  Conscience and Religion, and on 
the Legal Status of  Churches, Religious Denominations and Religious 
Communities which replaced the previous one was approved on 30 
December 2011 and entered in to force on 1 January 2012. The new 
act(s) turned majority of  churches previously registered in Hungary – 
upon the force of  the law – into association.296 In case of  Act CC VI 
296 E.g. Article 34 paragraph (1) of  Act 2011 on the Right to Freedom of  
Conscience and Religion, and on the Legal Status of  Churches, Religious 
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of  2011 this brought about serious, immediate financial consequences 
with regard to churches transformed into associations (loss of  benefits, 
allowances, establishment of  new obligations), and the last day of  the 
year was (could) not (have been) enough to prepare for this (e.g. upon 
the tax and social security contribution payment obligation after the 
payment of  the December salaries), and to establish the framework of  
the new economic operation. With regard to Act C of  2011 the same 
problem emerged with an opposite sign, as the act did not settle the 
deadline for dissolution (transformation into association): based on 
Article 36 of  the act it was unclear how many days or months would 
given organisations have had – after 1 January 2012, the enter into force 
of  this provisions of  the act – to decide about their dissolution [to make 
negative declaration about their further operation – as paragraph (1) of  
the act put it].
The freedom of  religion, and religious activity itself, as well as the 
regulation of  the conditions of  being recognised as church are issues 
which are quite actual, and not only the interest of  certain specific sciences, 
but general public interest is directed at these. This is why it should be 
stressed that the most significant and „classic” mistakes continuously 
made during the „cultural history” of  Hungarian legislation may be 
mentioned also with regard to these two acts: 1) the existence and depth 
of  both preliminary and subsequent impact assessment is questionable 
(especially with regard to the final, approved text versions); 2) those most 
concerned by the subject of  regulation were not included or only in a 
symbolic way; itemised law content appeared as direct result of  certain 
isolated – therefore ad hoc – political decisions. The lack of  material 
impact assessments may probably be traced back to the fact that the 
previous Act IV of  1990 on the Right to Freedom of  Conscience and 
Religion, and on the Legal Status of  Churches was an act which was 
considered quite liberal in European comparison, a well operating act 
with clear legal practice. Even though the reason for the establishment 
of  the new laws – in the opinion of  the legislator – was the stepping up 
against various abuses, domestic law enforcement authorities detected 
only one (!) such action (abuse) during 20 years.
Denominations and Religious Communities
VI. characterIstIcs of newer leGIslatIon
145
During the evaluation of  the law, therefore, it shall be clarified in 
advance whether problematic practice related to the previous act and 
the registration of  churches built on the act, as well as the handling of  
financing abuses were manageable only through a new act?
It is a fact that in the past twenty years the registration procedure of  
churches was mere formality, mainly because courts in their examination 
did not go beyond the declarations of  petitioners and the documents 
handed in by them: neither regarding the genuineness of  documents – of  
the enclosed facts – nor the real reasons and aims of  the organisation to 
be established. Therefore, if  upon the submitted documents there was a 
slight legal and somewhat religious goal, registration – usually – was made 
automatically. The basic dilemma was the same: the aggravation of  legal 
practice should have been made in a way that it should have not violated 
legal certainty, the requirement of  reliability and the practical enforcement 
of  certain rights. With the new act the legislator tired to cut through the 
Gordian knot with one hit: practically – with some simplification – it 
transformed the problem which earlier existed as primarily matter of  
interpretation into direct political question. It is a fact that earlier courts were 
„careful” not to measure any other – e.g. moral – aspects in addition to the 
examination of  the technical conditions. The legislator set the courts free 
of  this obligation, but it is a question whether with the direct participation 
of  the Parliament it created a system which – as sort of  contrary to the 
previous one – is radically subjective and raises the „authoritative” task 
of  the recognition of  a church to a level infected with everyday politics. 
Newer Hungarian and international legal literature297 established after 
1 January 2012 hold it against the act – in addition to the circumstances 
of  the creation of  the acts – that even though the legislator tied the 
acquisition of  church status to more or less objective conditions, in 
case of  decisions tied (in case of  parliamentary support act, in lack of  
it decree of  the Parliament) to a 2/3 parliamentary majority regarding 
the recognition of  church status it cannot be assessed that based on 
what criteria these decisions are made, whether legal criteria defined 
in the act are met, and there is no possibility for remedy against them.
297 david Baer: Two Open Letters from Hungary. Religion in Eastern Europe 
2012/2. 15.
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Among thwartings related to the act we shall mention that Act VII of  
2012 on the modification of  Act CCIV of  2011 on the Right to Freedom 
of  Conscience and Religion, and on the Legal Status of. Churches, 
Religious Denominations and Religious Communities increased the 
number of  religious communities recognised by law as churches from 
14 to 27298 while in parallel with this the Parliament rejected the petition 
of  66 former churches (religious communities) with its decision.299 The 
reasons for the positive or negative decisions were never – officially – 
communicated to those concerned. 
There are two acts, therefore,
a) the necessity of  which is not well justified;
b) the creation of  which does not comply with legal and professional 
requirements defined for legislation;
c) in case of  which the deadline for the performance of  obligations 
is not interpretable or is improperly short;
d) in case of  which it is easy to interpret what (political) requirements the 
religious group which is striving to get church status shall fulfil, and
e) in case of  which the possibility of  effective remedy, i.e. the right 
to appeal is missing.
3.7. The phantom pain of  the legal system
Article 7 paragraph (4) of  the already mentioned Act C of  2011 stated: 
„The name church may be used only by organisations registered in 
compliance with the law”. This was worrisome especially with regard 
to the fact that the word church is not primarily itemized law category, 
not a notion used to describe a type of  institutions, but is a popular and 
biblical, as well as theological phrase used for the description of  those 
in Christ, the community of  people following Christ and the body of  
Christ. It is doubtful whether the use of  this word may be prohibited 
298 In case of  other religions only a common name is indicated in the appendix, 
therefore in fact we may speak of  32 churches, instead of  the list containing 27 
items.
299 Decision of  the Parliament 8/2012 (II. 29.) OGY on the rejection of  
recognition as church
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to a lawfully operating religious organisation which is (should be) 
registered. Based on this consideration the new act on church, Act CC 
VI of  2011 does not contain this provision. The fact that makes this 
situation existing from 1 January 2012 interesting is that since the spring 
of  2012 the Metropolitan Court of  Budapest does not allow the use 
of  the word church in the official name of  organisations transforming 
from church to association. Based on the requirement of  the validity 
of  names it states that the use of  the word church may be specious in 
the name, even if  at the same time it also contains the word association 
(as clear reference to the type of  organisation).
This phenomenon is nothing else but the phantom pain of  the legal system: 
the relevant provision is not in force any more, but the legal practice 
– with reference to a forced legal argument – enforces the previous 
construction. Among the reasons for the behaviour of  the law enforcer 
– in this case the Metropolitan Court of  Budapest – political loyalty may 
appear – beyond constrained professional factors, – but another factor 
which shall be stressed is the high pace of  „law changing”, which surely 
worsens the chances for the proper, adequate interpretation of  the law. 
Only such extremely distracted law making may result in such extreme 
phenomena, when the law enforcer’s need for stability is stronger than 
the rules of  itemised law… In the concrete interpretation issue the case 
is even more complicated because the information booklet sent by the 
Ministry of  Administration and Justice on 1 February 2012 to religious 
communities transformed from church to association contains – word 
by word – that the „[association] may use the name church”.
3.8. Self-destructing law
The intentions of  the law to destruct itself  are shown in several ways, 
this subsection will present three of  them. These solutions are not 
necessarily new legal technical solutions, but their frequency of  occurrence 
and application is unquestionable higher today than ever before in the 
past decades.
3. Internal characteristics of legislation in Hungary after 2010
148
a) The first set of  cases is when the law defines in advance that the law 
itself  as a whole or its part when shall lose effect 300 This phenomenon 
is a necessary part of  a properly flexible legal system, especially, that 
this is the most common technique of  the „cancellation” of  laws 
modifying other laws out of  the system. However, it is important 
that the degree of  „deregulation automatism” itself  may be the 
generator of  certainly surrounding the essential content of  law, and 
through this of  the decrease of  general public trust for law. These 
laws containing modifications – in „omnibus” laws modifying several 
acts at the same time – often indicate only paragraph numbers, and as 
free legal databases only contain law valid on that given day, without 
serious practice in law reading and expertise in the given field it may 
be very difficult for the citizen to find the law on his own even in 
rather simple questions, when the goal would be to define what the 
law will be in the given field (in case of  the late entry into force of  
certain provisions) on 1 January 2013 or even a year later… 
b) The second possibility is when the valid, but not yet effective 
law is abolished as a whole, or – and this is more frequent in the 
examined time period – some of  its provisions are modified. This 
option is mentioned in Article 9 paragraph (2) of  the new act on 
legislation as an extraordinary option, stating that „If  the goal of  
the regulation cannot be achieved otherwise, the authority with 
legislative competences may regulate it in law that the valid but 
not yet effective text shall enter into force with text different from 
that approved, or that the valid, but not yet effective law or legal 
provision shall not enter into force.” This solution has become quite 
popular, moreover, quite general, increasing uncertainties related to 
the content of  the law.
c) A special feature of  the overly strengthened transparency of  legal 
system and the system of  laws is the broadest scope of  „self  
destructing law”, which at the same time may be considered the 
realisation form of  symbolic legislation. Compliance with the criteria 
of  the rule of  law is closely attached to the „self-picture” of  legal 
systems, which in practice usually include the values of  transparency 
300 See e.g. Article 6 paragraph (4) of  Act CXXIII of  2012
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and accountability as well. Forcing it as one-sided, absolute value, 
however, may result in surprising consequences: The National Tax 
and Customs Authority (NAV) started enforcement procedure against 
itself  – it turns out from the list published by the tax authority301 
Public debts will be strictly collected – decided the NAV in 2011, 
and since 1 April 2010 the authority itself  is listed in its own list of  
organisations with leeway. „The area of  movement of  the authority 
for financial management is quite narrow, the organisation has 
everyday financial problems. Therefore exceptionally it may happen 
that the NAV has some debts – it is stated in the declaration of  
the tax authority. It is also added that the NAV is not exempt from 
the enforcement of  the laws, therefore if  enforcement procedure 
is started against it, the organisation is listed in the in list of  such 
debtors published on the Internet. 
The question is only what happens if  it will be permanently unable 
to repay its debts…
4. Language capacities of  the newer Hungarian legal system
4.1. The Fundamental Law of  Hungary and the Hungarian language
„Last year the Parliament enacted Hungary’s Fundamental Law, which 
entered into force on 1 January 2012. The National Avowal part of  
the document which is at the top of  the hierarchy of  laws states: „We 
commit to promoting and safeguarding our heritage, our unique language, Hungarian 
culture, the languages and cultures of  nationalities living in Hungary, along with all 
man-made and natural assets of  the Carpathian Basin”, furthermore, Article H) 
paragraph (2) of  the Foundation declares that „Hungary shall protect the Hungarian 
language”. „It may be best complied with the undertaking and obligation 
created for the maintenance and protection of  the Hungarian language if  
it is ensured that the text of  written documents created in the legislative 
processes are always of  exceptional linguistic quality. Within the row 
301 hermann, irén: Önkritikus önkontroll. Bekeményített a NAV. [Self-critical 
self-control. The NAV (National Tax Authority) in action.] 19/2012, 10 May 
2012, http://www.figyelo.hu/hetilap/20120509/onkritikus_onkontroll/
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of  legislative organs the Parliament, as creator of  acts has always had a 
special role. It activities are greatly important also from linguistic point 
of  view, because any linguistic mistakes (in the structure of  sentences, 
spelling and stylistic mistakes) all appear again in lower level legal sources, 
e.g. in the text of  a governmental decree enacted for the execution of  
the act, as their linguistic tools are practically the same” – it is stated in 
a preparation document.302
4.2. Regulation of  the linguistic compliance of  laws
The regulation of  this issue is twofold: on the one hand – with regard 
to the fact that majority of  acts are prepared here and decrees are all 
enacted here – it is necessary to influence the law drafting and law 
making activities of  public administration from linguistic aspects, and, 
on the other hand, the definition of  requirements for legislation within 
the Parliament is unavoidable, as well.
According to Article 2 paragraph (1) of  Act CXXX of  2010 on 
Legislation the law shall carry a regulation content which shall be clearly 
understandable for those concerned. This obviously includes the need for 
complying with linguistic requirements. With regard to this, however, there 
are no regulations at the level of  acts (detailing, clarifying regulations).
Regarding the Parliament the previous Standing Orders of  the 
Parliament of  the Republic of  Hungary defined as the task of  the 
given committee to examine whether the proposals complied with 
linguistic requirements, and to state its opinion in the recommendations 
prepared for the general debate [HSZ Article 95 paragraph (3) section 
c)]. Since 2004 it has been realised in a way that the linguistic opinion 
of  proposals on the agenda of  the Parliament were given to the first 
appointed committee before the final vote, which submitted proposals 
for the correction of  mistakes. These proposals – theoretically – are not 
always limited to the correction of  spelling mistakes (writing into one 
or more words, small and capital letters, division of  words, punctuation, 
misspellings, accent mistakes, etc.), but corrections regarding the structure 
of  sentences, wording and stylistic mistakes can be corrected, as well, 
302 http://magyarnyelvert.hu/a-magyar-nyelv-es-az-allam/
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which in some cases may result in material modification of  the text of  the 
norm. In this scope, however, it is unfortunate that the linguistic control 
of  modification proposals is not regulated and established properly.303 
Even though Resolution 36/2012 (IV. 19.) OGY of  the Parliament on 
the modification of  the Resolution 46/1994 OGY of  the Parliament 
on the Standing Orders of  the Parliament of  the Republic of  Hungary 
significantly modified the content of  the Standing Orders, no reassuring 
changes have been made in the mentioned issue. 
4.3. Certain features of  the present Hungarian language
a) It is a significant fact that the language of  the (still) valid laws is 
often the last form of  appearance of  the old spoken language – let 
it be special grammatical structures, certain words, phrases – in 
the presently used language. In this case it is extremely important 
to distinguish between the used and the spoken language, because 
the special language of  law has always showed a sort of  distance 
from the spoken version (especially when the language of  legal 
culture was primarily Latin or German…), but today there is a 
huge gap between grammatical structures used in the everyday 
language and the grammatical structures used in itemised law 
instruments made more than 30-40 years ago. Let us examine 
one example from the Civil Code in force today304: according 
to Article 381 paragraphs (1) and (2): (1) Customers shall be 
entitled to cancel contracts at any time, but they shall be liable 
for paying compensation for damages sustained by the supplier. 
If  the situation prevailing before the conclusion of  a contract cannot 
be restored, or if  it is justified by the interest of  the national economy 
or by any other appreciable interest, the court, if  requested by either 
party, shall terminate the contract for future considerations in the 
case of  cancellation by the customer.305
303 http://magyarnyelvert.hu/a-magyar-nyelv-es-az-allam/
304 1 January 2012 
305 Highlighted by me (Á.R.) 
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Based on the above mentioned facts the danger of  the reduction 
of  language capacities may be mentioned; basically the difference 
of  the unchanged reality of  artificial legal terminology (its state 
fixing decades old linguistic status) and the everyday reality of  
the presently spoken language may be described as the difference 
between the two blades of  a constantly opening scissor. Solutions 
and possible changing and modification tendencies shall not be 
limited to Anglicism and to the incorporation of  elements of  the 
British/American legal terminology and the overtaken phrases of  
the special language of  the European Union,306 on the medium-term the 
renewal of  legal terminology, as well as the general language seems to be necessary. 
The UNESCO „Guidelines for Terminology Policies. Formulating 
and implementing terminology policy in language communities” 
published in 2005 draws attention to the fact that is the professional 
terminology of  a language does not develop in certain fields or 
develops, but very slowly, it may happen that in today’s quick 
technological development no material communication may be 
conducted in the given language in the given fields (thus functional 
language loss may happen), and this may lead to the exclusion of  
one-language societies from scientific and economic development.307 
People with Hungarian as mother tongue shall use foreign languages 
(typically English) during the processing, learning of  legal instruments 
and knowledge accessible (also) on the internet, thus – it seems that 
– they are in disadvantageous language position compared to those 
who receive this information in their mother tongue.308 
306 On the same topic see: láncos, peTra lea: Nyelvpolitika és nyelvi sokszínűség 
az Európai Unióban. [Linguistic policy and linguistic diversity in the European Union.] 
Doktori értekezés. [Doctoral essay.] Pázmány Péter Katolikus Egyetem Jog –és 
Államtudományi Doktori Iskola, Budapest, 2012. /kézirat/
307 Guidelines for Terminology Policies. Formulating and implementing 
terminology policy in language communities; V-VI., referred to by: Bölcskei, 
Andrea: A szabványügy és magyar nyelv. [Standards and the Hungarian language.] 
Magyar Nyelvőr 3/2011. p. 28. 
308 BölcsKei andrea: A szabványügy és magyar nyelv. [Standards and the 
Hungarian language.] Magyar Nyelvőr 3/2011. p. 28. 
VI. characterIstIcs of newer leGIslatIon
153
It is important that laws (and individual decisions put into writing) are 
at the same time important elements of  social (collective) memory. 
The collective memory notion of  Maurice Halbwachs refers to the 
social feature of  remembrance; to the fact that recollection is society 
based interpretation, thus is a reconstructive process. It is a question 
that at which personal round and at what degree this reconstruction 
may be made if  available linguistic skills (e.g. in understanding the 
text of  laws) are limited.
Despite the above mentioned tendencies attempts to create new 
legal terminology may be observed in Hungarian legal terminology 
(and science): e.g. the previous act on legislation (Act XI of  1987 on 
Legislation) regulated as part of  the hierarchy of  norms – in addition 
to laws – other legal means of  government control; however, the 
new act on legislation – breaking up with the paternalist „attitude” 
introduced in the state socialism – introduced the phrase administrative 
means of  public law nature.
b) A special border-land of  written language and spoken language is 
the so-called SMS-language. Its specific features are also present in 
laws, so far as different abbreviations, moreover, „structure-shifts” 
which are considered to be serious linguistic mistakes are present in 
the newer legal instruments in high numbers. The mistaken structures 
of  the spoken language may be traced back to the simultaneousity of  speaking 
and receiving: the sending and receipt of  the message has a common context.309 
Speaking is dynamic and depends on the context, its inherent feature 
is temporal continuity. Specialities determining the linguistic nature 
of  the spoken form originate from the fact that at the time of  
speaking the emergence of  thoughts and the structuring of  the text 
happen at (almost) the same time. The dominance of  writing in the 
legal language is traditionally supported by the fact that that writing, 
contrary to speaking, spans territorial and temporal differences, it is 
permanent and may be recalled. In writing the transfer of  information 
is one-sided, no immediate response is given. Due to the different 
mechanisms determining spoken performance and writing, therefore, 
309 andó, éva: E-nyelv, netbeszéd. [E-language, net-speaking.] In: E-világ. XXI. 
Század - Tudományos Közlemények April 2010 (23.), p. 33. 
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the spoken form and the written language differ from each other 
in several aspects: thus from the aspect of  directness and context, 
lexical consistence and grammatical complexity. There are (should 
be) consistent differences regarding a) structural complexity (length 
of  sentences, embeddedness), b) linguistic precision, c) frequency of  
word classes (e.g. the complexity of  verbs, abstract nouns, frequency 
of  adjectives), and d) personal relevance, personalisation.310 
Let us examine a specific example for the expansion of  SMS-language 
in our legal system (which is practically a simple grammatical mistake): 
based on the modification of  the Constitution in 2010 Article 61 
paragraph (3) was phrased in the following was: „In the Republic 
of  Hungary, public service broadcasting contributes to foster and 
enrich national self-identity and European identity, Hungarian, as 
well as ethnic minorities’ languages and culture, to strengthen national 
cohesion and to satisfy the needs of  national, ethnic, family and 
religious communities.” The great mistake may go unobserved in 
spoken language, but in the written text it cannot be accepted; the 
highlighted text should have been written in the following way: 
(…) Hungarian language, as well as ethnic minorities’ languages (…), as 
„Hungarian languages” do not exist.
c) It may be hardly divided from those written in section a) that laws 
and other legal texts in a strong supply sector from information 
point of  view could be extremely important tools of  establishing 
social narratives. Collective memory which may be examined within 
the framework of  certain social units – as it has been mentioned 
before – are tied to time and environment. In the life of  smaller 
groups – thus in families – there are common stories: ”each family 
has its own typical spiritual life; memories for which only they care, 
and secrets which only family members know.”311 This statement, 
however, may not only be justified at family level, but also at the 
level of  the society. „Stories play crucial, pervasive role in our lives, 
310 Ibid. 
311 andó éva: A történetmondás kulturális szerepéről. [About the cultural role 
of  story-telling.] In: Vállalkozás, személyiség, kultúra. XXI. Század - Tudományos 
Közlemények September 2010 (24.), p. 55. 
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they give form and shape to our experiences. Experiences without 
stories would be only amorphous, not differentiated flows of  events. 
Story telling and story – synonyms of  our knowledge of  the world, 
our daily events get meaning through them and we formulate our 
expectation from the future though our stories put into words.”312 
Who would deny that in a centrally organised society shared and 
definitely interpretable stories may be reconstructed from written 
norms at a larger level than necessary…, and in this sense the renewal 
of  the Hungarian legal system carries the need for a special change 
of  narrative.
4.4. Practical language problems in the past years
The extraordinary schedule of  legislation has left deep signs also on the 
linguistic (grammar) quality of  prepared drafts and approved laws, many 
times significantly influencing their content and interpretability: e.g. due to 
a comma mistake in 2011 some tax laws (would have) entered into force 
earlier, and a draft law (about churches) was submitted to the Parliament 
without title (!) at the end of  2011, while in another case familiarity with 
Roman numbers caused problems, therefore the one hundred and ninety 
tenth (!) act was enacted instead of  the two hundredth.313
It shall be added to the complexity of  the picture that the education of  
the details of  lawmaking was rather poor in the legal-public administration 
basic courses, as well as in the materials of  different postgraduate 
specialist courses till the second half  of  the previous decade, when 
finally organised codifier courses commenced in Hungary.
Beyond the lack of  knowledge of  legal technique general reasons (may) 
also influence the linguistic quality of  legislation, such as the change in 
the level and content of  general education. Today, when the accessibility 
of  storable information is getting better, the significance of  traditional – 
lexical – knowledge is – seemingly – getting lower, and focus shifts more 
and more to how we can find the information and what we can do with 
it. The problem is that this reorganisation is – partly – secondary, as the 
312 Ibid. 
313 Tax laws rewritten in every four days. Index 18 January 2012 www.index.hu
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proper analysis, interpretation and organisation of  the knowledge of  
new fields also require a basic context consisting of  changing knowledge 
elements, but building on similar skills and knowledge.
5. International effects
5.1. Change of  stages
The joint effect of  changes affecting the legal system and the full system 
of  laws that after forums for internal legislation and the correction of  
laws get narrower and become partly formal, discussions to be held step one 
level above: their focus partly shifts from internal forums to European level.
A good example for this is Act CCIV of  2011 on the Right to Freedom 
of  Conscience and Religion, and on the Legal Status of  Churches, 
Religious Denominations and Religious Communities (and Act C of  
2011 with similar title and content, annulled by the Constitutional Court 
later), which issued the awarding of  church status to the discretional 
power of  the Parliament without defining (prescribing) the conditions 
of  discretion and without providing right to remedy. In lack of  internal 
forums of  remedy the adequate forum of  the EU and the European Court of  
Human Rights in Strasbourg shall deal with the laws and with the individual cases.
As a matter of  fact in August 2012 the parliamentary commissioner 
of  fundamental rights turned to the Constitutional Court; in his opinion 
legal provisions regulating the recognition of  churches violate the 
principle of  the division of  powers, the right to fair proceedings and to 
the right to remedy from several aspects.
5.2. Legislation, as testing
What does the fact draw attention to, that the processes and products of  
Hungarian legislation resulted in sharper and more intensive reactions 
than ever before all around the world? Basically to the central role of  
communication. To the fact that communication cannot be fragmented, 
and that great mistake of  politics may be not only to underestimate the 
strength of  its opponents (e.g. the abilities of  international financial 
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conglomerates subjected to crisis taxes to enforce their interests), but 
also overestimates the loyalty of  its allies.
Naturally, „unorthodox” legal and non-legal solutions forced by the 
crisis, the desire to handle conflicts in own and new ways is somewhat 
similar to the child’s pushing the limits, to the partially instinctive intention 
to experience how far it can get in the given situations. From the aspects 
of  our topic it may be important that it may be possible to search for the 
limits, to map the real motivation and possibilities of  those concerned. 
Therefore today it is not necessarily the primary and definite goal of  
legislation to create an operable and applicable rule; often one – not 
main – function of  legislation is (may be) the testing of  the opinions of  
typically international actors (EU, IMF, etc.). This function has existed 
before, but it was not present constantly, due to the lower intensity of  
global cooperation and effects.
5.3. External criticism regarding Hungarian legislation314
On 17 January 2012 the European Commission started infringement 
procedure against Hungary in three issues, namely the independence of  the 
Magyar Nemzeti Bank (the Central Bank of  Hungary), the independence 
of  the data protection authority and the age limit of  judicial activities 
(the service relations of  judges is regulated by the Transitional Provisions 
to Hungary’s Fundamental Law and the transitional provision of  act 
on the status of  judges in a way that the age limit is reduced from 70 
to 62). (Also) in the latter case some processes received some impulse 
from the fact that the Constitutional Court decided about the issue on 
the merits.315
314 Regarding certain criticisms in details see e.g. pruGBerGer, Tamás: Az 
Európai Unió és az IMF reflexiója az Orbán-kormány politikai törekvéseire (…). 
[Reflections of  the EU and the IMF on the political ambitions of  the Orbán-
government (…)] Polgári Szemle 1-2/2012. pp. 15-34. 
315 The Constitutional Court held that Article 90 section ha) and Article 230 of  
the Act CLXII of  2012 on the status and remuneration of  judges are against the 
Fundamental Law, therefore annulled them with retroactive force from the day 
when the act entered into force – 1 January 2012. According to the reasoning 
of  Decision IV/2096/2012 AB „no specific age limit may be derived from the 
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Regarding the possible impeachment we shall state that according 
to Article 4 paragraph (3) of  the TEU a fundamental obligation of  the 
authorities of  member states – thus of  the legislative organs of  the EU 
member states – is to ensure the effective enforcement of  EU law.316 One 
form of  behaviours of  member states and their authorities in violation 
of  EU law is when the legislative organ of  a member state enacts a 
law in the member state which violates the EU law. It is the task of  the 
Commission to make members states to enforce EU law, and for the 
performance of  this task the EU law provides tools for it against member 
states, for example the initiation of  infringement procedure against a 
member state. According to Article 258 TFEU (ex Article 226 TEC): 
„If  the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil 
an obligation under the Treaties, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on 
the matter after giving the State concerned the opportunity to submit its 
observations. If  the State concerned does not comply with the opinion 
within the period laid down by the Commission, the latter may bring the 
matter before the Court of  Justice of  the European Union”. 
The constitutional law advisory body of  the Strasbourg-based 
European Council (EC), the Venice Commission published it opinion 
about Hungarian acts regarding the judiciary in March 2012. According 
to the Venice Commission significant elements of  the Hungarian judicial 
reform, in case they remain unchanged, will be not only against European 
norms regulating the structure of  judiciary – especially the independence 
of  judges – but may also be considered problematic from the aspect of  
the enforcement of  the right to fair procedure. 
The Venice Commission criticised the Hungarian act on churches 
from several aspects, according to the Commission it is doubtful whether 
Fundamental Law. It may be held, however, that the introduction of  the age limit, 
if  it concerns the reduction of  the upper limit and not the increase of  the previous 
age limit, shall happen gradually, during proper transitional period, wihtouth the 
violation of  the right of  the judge to unremovability.” With regard to the afterlife 
of  this decision it shall be mentioned that the Zalaegerszeg Labour Court already 
reset a judge in Kaposvár to her position as a judge in August 2012. 
316 BluTman, lászló: Az Európai Unió joga a gyakorlatban. [EU Law in Practice.] 
HVG-ORAC, Budapest, 2010. 425. 
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a community is recognised as church or not, it belongs to the exclusive 
decision making authority of  the Parliament.
Behind each mentioned case there is – among others – the fact 
that there was no proper – substantial – or was no consultation at all 
with those concerned in the given regulatory field. Due to the EU and 
international criticism the Hungarian party adjusted several problematic 
provisions, but regarding the future it is still unclear how and along what 
institutional guarantees (or changing practices) the preparation of  law 
will be improved, e.g. via discussion with the concerned field.
The Commission, by the way, issued a statement already in June 
2011 about the Fundamental Law, which was not yet in force at that 
time. Majority of  the criticism formulated in the statement – beyond 
some material objections – concerned the procedure of  legislation. At 
that time the Venice Commission regretted the fact that the procedure 
of  constitution making lacked transparency, there were deficiencies in 
the discussion between the governing parties and the opposition, there 
were no proper guarantees of  necessary social discussion, and the time 
limit for the complete procedure was extremely short. The body also 
resented that several fields are not regulated in detail in the constitution, 
and refers those issues to 2/3 majority, cardinal acts which in most legal 
system belong to the sphere of  everyday political legislation and require 
simple majority decision. Furthermore, the Venice Commission indicated 
that it found the limitation of  the competences of  the Constitutional 
Court in „tax and financial issues” problematic. 
The IMF was ready to start negotiations 2012 about the so-called 
stand-by loan only upon the condition that the Hungarian government 
enforced the required steps and made the necessary legislation for 
ensuring the independence of  the Magyar Nemzeti Bank.
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vII. the exIstence and role of lawyers’ elIte 
as a key Issue of Governmental capacIty
A further important question of  governmental capacity – resulting from 
the transformation of  the whole legal system – is the transformation and 
role changes of  the above described lawyers’ and administrators’ layer.
Rózsa Hoffmann, undersecretary of  state in the field of  education 
in the Ministry of  Human Resources (earlier Ministry of  National 
Resources) stated the following in February 2012 as a reaction to a 
special one minute speech in the Parliament: „The education policy 
of  the FIDESZ-KDNP wishes to serve the improvement of  the 
country, which, as it is well-known, „cannot be achieved with lawyers, 
communication specialists or sociologists”, but with those studying 
engineering, IT sciences and natural sciences. This is the reason why the 
government concentrated 70% of  the centrally financed places to these 
latter fields, even though – theoretically – there may be students studying 
at social sciences course who cannot ensure the financing of  their fees 
in advance, as within the so-called Student loan 2 program it is possible 
to complete legal or economic studies with minimal own sources. The 
program which started in September 2012 allows self-funded students 
to receive loan at low interest rate (2%), which they will have to pay back 
after they completed their studies. Another funding form will be that 
the state returns the amount of  the student loan to those students who 
complete their studies in legal or economic field through self-funding 
and start working for the state afterwards. 317 
Contrary to the statement of  the undersecretary of  state we shall not 
that the all time „good state” needs the self-conscious and united legal 
elite, which as „engineers of  society”, the representatives of  a special 
normativity performs in a target setting, first motivating role: Hungarian 
history itself  is the best evidence that legal profession and the existence 
317 The threat of  pushing out/exclusion of  the „poor” from the legal career is 
weakened and balanced by the fact that according to national surveys law students 
– regarding their social recrutation – usually come from quite high status families.
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of  the legal society is not some „necessary bad thing”, as in the revolution 
and freedom fight of  1848, in 1945 and in the short period following it, 
or in the social changes of  1989 – though not always at the same degree, 
but – significant (regarding key movements sometimes overwhelming) 
role was played by legal professionals.
The brief  description of  the above mentioned polemy presents the 
contours of  another important question: why have not been comprehensive 
– i.e. examining several aspects at the same time – researches made in 
Hungary since the 1970s, which could have examined with scientific 
means the structure of  the society of  legal professionals, the existence 
of  a legal elite, its system of  values, the effect of  this layer (?) made on 
decision-making, etc.?
Even though elite researches have been present in Hungarian social 
sciences for long 318 no substantive surveys have been conducted regarding 
the how and how much the legal professionals and the legal elite influence 
decision affecting society as a whole. The last time when a – more or 
less – comprehensive survey was made about legal professionals in 
Hungary319 but this was also a politically strongly motivated and filtered 
process, as e.g. the sample of  „lawyers’ examination” was created by the 
researchers based on the position taken in the social division of  work, 
therefore „lawyers working in the field of  law” were included into the 
research sample. With this methodology approximately 53% of  those 
having law degree were excluded from the research…320 This sample 
selection did not facilitate the analysis of  the real social situation of  
lawyers, and the analysis of  lawyers as a professional group left e.g. the 
internal hierarchical structure, the possibly existing elite group within legal 
318 Lásd pl. az MTA Politikatudományi Intézetében lezajlott kulturális elitkutatást. 
Ennek ismertetését lásd See for example the cultural elite research conducted in 
the Political Sciences Institute of  the MTA. For its details see KrisTóF, luca: 
Politikai nézetek és reputáció az értelmiségi elitben. [Political views and reputation 
in the intellectual elite.] Politikatudományi Szemle 2/2011. p 83. 
319 anGelusz – BaloGh – Körmendy – léderer – széKhelyi: A jogászság 
társadalmi helyzete és szakmai életútja. [Social status and professional career of  legal 
professionals.] Szociológiai Füzetek 13. Oktatási Minisztérium, Budapest, 1977. 
320 GyeKiczKy, Tamás: A jogászok joga. [Law of  lawyers.] Gondolat Kiadó, 
Budapest, 2003. p. 16. 
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professionals, and the possible reasons and outlines of  the organisation 
of  this elite in the shade.321 
For the sake of  completeness and fairness we shall state, of  course, 
that several studies have been prepared in this field or regarding this field 
in the past decades, but a common characteristic of  these is that they 
deeply study questions regarding legal professionals but only from one 
aspects, and they work with rather small samples (let the inquired people be 
lawyers, law students, or „simple citizens” who share their opinion about 
legal professionals.) Some researches from the past decades concerning 
legal professionals were related to legal professional sectors and to the 
legal elite (e.g. Ágnes Utasi, Béla Szabó, Tamás Gyekiczky, Attila Badó, 
Zoltán Fleck), some dealt with the recruiting of  certain legal professions 
(e.g. Róbert Angéluzs and his colleagues, László Kelemen, Mihály Fónai), 
or examined the motivation and career ideas of  law students (e.g. Imre 
Kabai), or presented the changes of  the numbers of  the practitioners 
of  certain legal professions (e.g. Miklós Szabó). Naturally, almost each 
author – in longer or shorter chapters – dealt with the sociological notion 
of  legal professionals (as preliminary issue), as well as about the social 
judgement of  law and legal professionals.322 Mihály Fónai gives a good 
summary of  – the most important – works made so far.323
In centrally organised societies changes usually do not get into the , 
spaces, spheres of  the public in their full scope, in their real values, but 
usually in a simplified way, in symbolic ways, and the tematization of  
public conversation may also be performed only through simplification. 
In social changes symbolic legal itemizations have always had their role324 
however, earlier – mainly before the change in the legal system – these 
were mainly tool-like, law was the „maid” of  a specific ideology. On the 
321 Ibid. 
322 On the latter on see e.g.: Kelemen, lászló: Miként vélekedünk a jogról? [What do 
we think about law?] Line Design Kiadó, Budapest, 2010. p. 215.
323 Fónai, mihály: A jogi és igazgatási képzési területen végzettek 
elhelyezkedésének presztízs szempontjai. [Prestige aspects of  job finding of  
those with law or public administration degree.] In: Diplomás pályakövetés IV. – 
Képzésterületi tanulmányok. 227. http://www.felvi.hu/pub_bin/dload/DPR/
dprfuzet4/Pages227_244_Fonai.pdf
324 varGa p. 65
VII. the exIstence and role of lawyers’ elIte as a key Issue...
163
contrary, after the change in the political system the law seemed to be 
turning into the carrier of  specific, separate explanations of  reality.325 
Among the reasons for the latter one we shall mention the fact that with 
the change in the political system the role of  legal rationality and legality 
significantly increased, the establishment of  capitalist market and the 
rule of  law had direct effect on legal professions, as the society directing 
function of  the law could unfold fully under the conditions of  the rule 
of  law, it can be enforced under these conditions, therewith capitalist 
economy needed much more intensive – moreover, continuously inventive 
and proactive – legal assistance.326 A peculiarity of  the (Hungarian) change 
in the political system was that a legally controlled democratisation 
happened, which strengthened the development of  legal reasoning, and 
the expansion of  legal professionals in the procedure of  the negotiation 
type change in the political system.327 
The fact that in the past 35 years no comprehensive surveys – 
examining the group of  legal professionals as a whole, its system of  values, 
internal system, network of  relationships, etc. – which would have been 
aiming at full scope examination were made is quite surprising, especially 
because such survey would easily answer social questions – well beyond 
lawyers, related to the establishment of  law and its enforcement – such as:
• is the group of  legal professionals a separate elite group in today’s 
Hungarian society? Moreover, whether it is true that we may talk about 
lawyers still just as a functional elite, which – contrary to the political 
and economic elite – is not present in society as so-called system 
integrative elite segment, but only as socio-integrative element.328 
It is obviously not worth making the mistake of  researching and 
presenting – in this case the legal professionals and the legal elite – as 
completely separate group, because „the legal elite may be found in 
almost all big systems, integrations of  society, just like the sphere of  
325 GyeKiczKy op. sic. 23. 
326 FlecK zolTán: Változások és változatlanságok: a magyar jogrendszer a 
rendszerváltás után. [Changes and non-changes: Hungarian legal system after the 
change in the political system.] Budapest, Napvilág Kiadó, 2010. pp. 68-69. 
327 FlecK op. sic. p 67. 
328 GyeKiczKy op. sic. p. 31.
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its activities, the network of  legal system”.329 For the separation of  
connection points the fact may serve as a reason according to which 
as social basis of  foundations of  law these factors may be indicated in 
a centrally organised society such as economy, moral (cultural) order, 
power structure, law making and law enforcing institutions, etc. On 
its own none of  them may be able to determine the existence and 
content of  law, but their dominance in certain constellations may be 
determinative also regarding the segment-like characteristic of  legal 
elite. Functional description, however, is also problematic because the 
legal elite in itself  operates institutions, groups intended to produce 
ideology and knowledge, and it seems to be obvious that it performs 
its tasks with the use of  its knowledge elite network, which consist 
not only of  lawyers.330 Researches – moreover, the formulation of  
questions – is made difficult by the fragmentised society, the exact 
location and features of  the breaking lines of  which is not mapped 
well. „Fragmentisation may be also observed in the fact that there 
is no access between „partial societies”, and that they barely know 
anything about each other, or phrasing it more precisely, their ideas, 
beliefs about each other are mainly based on half  truths, prejudices, 
intolerance and often on searching for someone to take the guilt.”331 
Such question raise new ones, e.g. regarding the possibility of  forming 
a Roma legal elite in Hungary.332
• What are the conditions which influence internal relationships: 
the university of  the diploma, common profession, belonging to 
the specific legal profession, age or something else? Each of  them 
and if  yes, at what degree (ratio)? What are the dominant group 
making factors, and along with what kind of  breaking lines does 
this group get segmented and establish its own elite? Is the group of  
legal professionals a network group, which is organised through the 
329 GyeKiczKy op. sic. p. 27.
330 GyeKiczKy op. sic. p. 31.
331 Gazsó, Ferenc – laKi, lászló: Fiatalok az újkapitalizmusban. [Young generation 
in the new capitalism.] Napvilág Kiadó, Budapest, 2004. p. 43. 
332 On this issue see also: rixer, ádám: Egy új társadalmi szerződés körvonalai 
a roma kérdés ürügyén. [The outlines of  a new social contract under cover of  the 
Roma issue.] De Iurisprudentia et Iure Publico 3/2009. p. 11. (www.dieip.hu)
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creating and operating of  its own network.333 These questions may 
be answered also with the methodology of  the quickly developing 
network research. 
In relation with the education (legal education) it may be clearly 
defined that the state is shifting balances; it creates new preferences 
both on the input (significant reduction of  state funded university 
education spots) and regarding future employment, and by the 
preparation of  legal (elite) universities and the establishment of  
an elite university in the field of  public administration334 it might 
start the – possible – rivalry between these two (at the same time 
preparing to replace the traditional legal career lines, traditions public 
administration legal elite with an administration elite335). 
• Is the hypothesis appearing other in social sciences and in the media 
– though never justified well – according to which the ability of  the 
„jurist lobby”, the „lawyers’ lobby” to enforce interests is stronger 
than that of  any other group? Whether this is in connection with the 
scientific assumption that the establishment of  the legal profession 
as separate field of  activities necessarily brings about the fact that 
the making and application of  law (at least the technical aspects 
of  making) will become the exclusive competence of  this separate 
group of  legal professionals. 336 
• Is it true that the quality of  relationships within the society of  legal 
professionals, the – professional and human – cohesion decreased 
within the group? What can be the reason behind the fact that e.g. 
333 GyeKiczKy op. sic. p. 29. 
334 According to the Preamble of  Act CXXXII of  2011 on the National University 
of  Public Service and on the higher education of  public administration, law 
enforcement and military: „As part of  the Hungarian higher education the objective 
of  the National University of  Public Service with administrative, law enforcement 
and military courses is to train professionals carrying out administrative, defense 
and law enforcement activities, to provide the officer supply of  the defense and 
law enforcement organs, and to create the interoperability of  the unifying public 
service careers.”
335 On this topic see further: rixer, ádám: Jogászok a közigazgatásban. [Lawyers 
in public administration.] De iurisprudentia et iure publico 3/2007. pp. 112-125.
336 Kulcsár (1997) p. 20. 
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in the survey of  the Hungarian Lawyers’ Chamber conducted at 
the beginning of  2009 about custodian services – as a significant 
problem of  lawyers’ practice at that time – only very low ratio, 1.5% 
of  the members of  the Chamber participated?337 
• It is an exciting question that in families where there is a lawyer 
among the ancestors, in what way and with that content the special 
system of  values are transferred to the next generation(s) (thus what 
the characteristics of  generational reproduction are in „lawyers’ 
families”), and that at what degree the adequate social preparations 
(socialisation) are directed at the descendents who shall become 
lawyers themselves. 
• What is the culture creating role of  this group regarding its own 
members and the members of  societies, beyond the transmission 
of  strictly legal culture?338 With the latter issue we arrive to the 
classic questions: 1) to the issue of  legal professional and/or lawyer 
intellectual and – upon Csaba Varga – to the question 2) whether 
there is a specific legal view of  the world.
• How much can legal professionals be taken as a group of  reference 
in today’s Hungarian society?339 
• At what degree did it monopolise decision making possibilities? What 
is the degree of  the decision making competences of  this group, 
with regard to the scope and tools of  decisions concerning the whole 
society?340 What is it responsibility in the practice that today for the 
solution of  social conflicts we all demand the modification of  laws, 
because we only focus on the text of  the norm, while 1) we do no 
tor just partially apply the existing legal tools; and 2) the debate in 
reality – traditionally – is about the content of  the rules, of  their 
337 paTyi GerGely: Ügyvédség a köz- és magánjog határán. [Lawyer at the edge of  public 
and private law.] Doktori értekezés. PPKE JÁK Doktori Iskola, Budapest, 2011. p. 
205.
338 On this topic see e.g.: máThé, GáBor: Előszó. [Preface.] In: máThé, GáBor 
(editor): A Magyar Jogászgyűlés (1870) és a Magyar Jogász Egylet (1879) alapítása. 
[Founding of  the Hunagrian Lawyers’ Meeting (1870) and the Hungarian Lawyers’ 
Association (1879).] Kódexpress Kiadó, Budapest, 2010. p. 3. 
339 GyeKiczKy op. sic. p. 28. 
340 GyeKiczKy op. sic. p. 29.
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textual appearance, and not about the background principles. 341 
• Is it possible to reconstruct the background of  the way of  thinking, 
the ethos, approaches and communication of  the legal professionals 
and the legal elite from texts made before 1989 (or even earlier, 
before the Second World War)? 
• At what level did the party elite and the legal professionals, the 
legal elite interlock in the state socialism and after the change of  
the political system? In addition to mapping political interests and 
actives it could be extremely interesting to measure the degree of  
religiousness among the older and younger lawyers’ generation. 
• Within the governance models342 – getting more and more popular 
with the EU – which aim at describing the transforming functions 
of  the state and the new solutions of  the operation of  the state 
organisation, an exciting research topic could be the mapping of  
whether new – partly EU – institutions, new ideas and methods 
of  task performance at the same time change the features of  legal 
professionalism, the degree of  the need for lawyers. 343
• What is the degree of  continuity in the selection mechanisms of  
different state legal professions compared to the previous, basically 
counter selective, nepotic practices and organisational culture? For 
example the based on the comparison of  the analysis of  newer laws 
about civil servants344 and older regulations about civil servants 
with the ideal type of  the closed human resources system it may be 
considered clear „[that] the Hungarian system cannot be considered 
a closed system. After thorough examination it becomes clear that 
certain sub-systems and legal institutions traditionally ensure extremely 
341 FlecK, zolTán: Változások és változatlanságok: a magyar jogrendszer a rendszerváltás 
után. [Changes and non-changes: the hunagrian legal system after the change in the political 
system.] Budapest, Napvilág Kiadó, 2010. p. 75. 
342 See e.g.: maarTJe de visser: Network-Based Governance in EC Law. Hart 
Publishing, Portland, 2009. pp. 3-5. 
343 Regarding EU relations see e.g.: marJán, aTTila: Az Európai Unió 
intézményeinek közigazgatási rendszeréről és humánpolitikájáról. [About the 
administrative system and human policy of  the institutions of  the EU.] Jog, Állam, 
Politika 4/2009. pp. 183-188. 
344 Act CXCIX of  2011 on civil servants
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broad discretion for the decision maker, do not oppose subjectivity 
and absolutism. Therefore they are not suitable to prevent the use of  
direct political aspects, as they are not able to prevent the emergence 
of  nepotism, clientelism and patronage.”345
345 dr. GaJduscheK, GyörGy: A köztisztviselői jogviszony hazai szabályozásának 
szisztematikus, átfogó elemzése. [Systematic, comprehensive analysis of  the Hunagrian regulation 
of  civil servant relationship.] Pécsi Tudományegyetem Állam- és Jogtudományi Kar 
Doktori Iskola, Pécs, 2011. p. 149. 
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vIII. summary
In case of  a work presenting several examples and using the methods of  
several scientific fields for their – partly systematic – analysis summary, 
the statement of  revealed relationships in a separate listing is extremely 
important. We shall stress again that in majority of  the given aspects this 
book arrives only to the formulation of  questions and the presentation of  
examples necessary for answering the questions, trusting the Reader and 
the leaders of  further researches with the task of  arriving to consequences.
The questions – which are related to the legislation of  the past two 
decades – are partly material ones, searching for the concrete solutions 
of  given regulations; and partly they examine the features of  legislation, 
i.e. they concern its compliance with aspects set forth in the established 
law and beyond the law.
An important fact shall be clarified in advance, namely that part of  
the tendencies outlined in this paper – e.g. the reorganisation of  the 
performance of  public tasks, the termination of  an excrescent state-
civil organisation („GUANGO”), answers given to financial crises – do 
not only contain new, post-2010 elements, but we can mention them 
as important, well describable processes from most aspects only from 
this date.
If  we examine the valid Hungarian laws along the aspects offered 
by this paper we may observe a double tendency: on the one hand we 
witness the extension of  state role taking, on the other hand the intentions 
of  the more active – upon its own self-determination – state is quasi 
supplements, counterbalances, or partly supports the other tendency, 
which is presented by the more precise and more exact definition, also 
regarding its consequences, of  individual and society level responsibilities 
and obligations. Newer legislation obviously aims not only at separated 
handling of  individual phenomena, but as it may be seen from the catalogue 
prepared in subchapter 4.3.2.3 the legislator started frontal attack at each 
fields which the representatives of  different social sciences and public 
opinion itself  considered to be social level weakness, thus against the 
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mass phenomenon of  „living from the state”, against attitudes pricing 
different punishments as calculable low price of  the violation of  law, or 
the system maintaining institution of  gratitude payment. As a framework 
of  different – for the first sight individual – rules of  responsibility the new 
concept of  public interest emerges in front of  us; public interest which – 
according to the intentions of  the legislator – will be defined less and 
less as the uncertain sum of  individual aspects. 
The self-referential, autopoiethical closeness of  law – in the broadest 
sense – may be further observed, which makes the use of  arguments 
beyond law rather difficult in reasoning. At the same time, however, 
an opposite tendency may also be observed in the pages of  this book: 
economic and – partially related to it – moral force, certain natural law 
reasons, religious contents sometimes quasi „replace” or „weaken” 
traditional – settled during the liberal transformation – legal arguments, 
sets of  reasons and sometimes – in a restricted way – also itemized 
provisions. 
Majority of  legally itemized newer requirements point into the 
same direction: it aims at establishing a social norm system based on 
new grounds. The observation, namely that law cannot be the permanently 
strongest norm system of  a state or society which is able to handle crises on the long 
run is mirrored in new principles and specific legal institutions. It has 
become clear that law was unsuccessful in simulating, replacing the 
moral material of  society with its own tools; law – in itself, without 
other supporting norm types – cannot create an autonomous moral 
reality, the structure of  simply becomes overloaded and inoperable (see 
examples mentioned in subchapter VI.3.3). Rephrasing it: the traditional 
course of  the rationalization and positivization of  law – described by 
Max Weber – seems to be showing the signs of  sudden stop – not only 
in Hungary, in the Hungarian legal system, of  course.
In the establishment of  the new context of  law the legal system itself  
has a great role: it attempts to strengthen its own foundations by opening 
up itself  to the traditional – more theoretical – values and specific legal 
constructions of  the past (e.g. incorporating historical constitution into 
itemized law). Nevertheless, regarding natural law tendencies we shall 
stress that majority of  changes which occurred in the legal system is 
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only „relative natural law” oriented, thus they are answers to certain 
specific extraordinary situations. Even if  due to certain forces, but in 
Hungarian law the background principles of  law keep coming to the 
front; a law is being „conceptualised” which, instead and in addition to 
material answers also focuses on the practice that the answer given in 
legal nature (legal answer) shall be preceded by a more precise definition 
than ever of  the moral ground of  the given situation. Practically a law 
is being outlined which opens up more than ever the scope of  aspects 
which may be and shall be considered during legal evaluation (either 
through new principles or – as it has been mentioned – by incorporating 
the aspects of  the past and future, as possible arguments). 
A significant and new element of  the transformation of  the legal 
system is its concept of  legal continuity. The moral reasons and political 
motivations of  this concept are clear, but its undefined notions (e.g. 
historical constitution) and its specific, or rather complex relationship 
with certain historical periods (1990-2011) partly reproduces them instead 
of  clarifying certain questions. 
The emphasized subjects of  legal instruments made after 2010 are 
the large care systems and the related legal relationships. Within this 
topic it is a striking duality that behind the transformation of  certain 
large systems exclusively short-term fiscal interest may be observed 
(e.g. secularization of  private pension fund property), while in the case 
of  other systems (health care, education) real conceptual, systematic 
transformations were realised via legal changes. The evolvement of  the 
new legal system was not only supported by the establishment of  the 
Fundamental Law, but also the approval (preparation) of  new codes in 
almost all significant fields of  social being (e.g. the Penal Code, the Civil 
Code and the Labour Code shall be mentioned above all).
It is undoubted, as well that the most comprehensive Gypsy strategy 
of  the past decades has been established in a was that not a unilateral 
governmental act, but a bilateral agreement laid down the foundations 
of  further legal regulations.
This work has provided several reasons – originating in the basic 
social-economic structure and in the historical past – of  this significant 
legal transformation, which may be compared to the changes of  1989. 
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The transformation which – clearly – defined as its goal the liquidation 
of  the false social public agreements existing for decades, sometimes 
for centuries, with the available tools of  law. It is a twofold fact – which 
deserves further scientific research – that while majority (!) of  the 
material rules of  the transformed law has been supported with strictly 
value-related and newly defined authorizations and principles, during 
the legislative procedures which were conducted between 2010 and 2012 
several guarantees were continuously, systematically and consciously 
neglected. Within the evaluation of  this controversy – as it has been 
mentioned in the Introduction – the most important element is what 
significance we give to forces originating from different crises (external-
internal, moral-financial, etc.). Both in political argumentations and 
within professional reasons the sharpest idea is the question whether 
the strong legal voluntarism of  the power structure which does not 
necessarily comply with the rules of  legislation may be – theoretically and 
in practice – suitable to carry out the radical – or maybe revolutionary 
– renewal of  society. The significance of  the latter question is increased 
by the fact that the operations of  the legislative mechanisms not always 
paying attention to the existence of  rules, moral messages and specific 
provisions regarding accelerated legislation were meant to be justified 
by this latter fact, i.e. the need to put an end to the moral deepening 
of  society.
Within the framework of  legislative procedures we may state that 
the traditional weaknesses of  Hungarian public politics (e.g. politicised 
and instable practice of  interest negotiation) „reproduced” also in the 
examined period. The work also raises the question whether there is an 
objective limit to the speed of  legislative procedures and to the number 
of  legislative products. Thus on the one hand whether the ability of  the 
society to reception and the performance of  the legislative – complying 
with basic professional requirements – have any measurable limits; 
rephrasing it: whether there is a possibility to create such intensive 
legislation which is necessarily counter-productive, which generates 
more significant disadvantages than advantages for society, and if  yes, 
the use of  which indicators would be advisable during the examination 
of  the phenomenon.
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This work also draws attention to the fact that within the examination 
of  the transformation of  the legal system it is not really possible to 
disregard the evaluation of  a broader scope of  the legal system, the 
existence of  comprehensive research projects – carrying the need for 
fullness – regarding legal profession and the system of  related values. 
This work wished to contribute to the anticipated future researches with 
the composition of  a catalogue of  questions, which at the same time 
sketches the outlines of  recommended research approaches.
174
